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Abstract
Strategic decision-making is ubiquitous in everyday life. The analysis of game
strategies has been a research theme in game theory for several decades since
von Neumann and Morgenstern. Sophisticated models and analysis tools have
been developed with wide applications in Economics, Management Science, So-
cial Science and Computer Science, especially in the field of Artificial Intelligence.
However, “much of game theory is about the question whether strategic equilibria
exist”, as Johan van Benthem, a world-leading logician and game-theorist, points
out, “but there are hardly any explicit languages for defining, comparing, or com-
bining strategies”. Without such a facility it is challenging for computer scientists
to build intelligent agents that are capable of strategic decision-making.
In the last twenty years, logical approaches have been proposed to tackle this
problem. Pioneering work includes Game Logics, Coalition Logic and Alternating-
time Temporal Logic (ATL). These logics either provide facilities for expressing
and combining games or offer mechanisms for reasoning about strategic abilities
of players. But none of them can solve the problem. The intrinsic difficulty in
establishing such a logic is that reasoning about strategies requires combinations of
temporal reasoning, counterfactual reasoning, reasoning about actions, preferences
and knowledge, as well as reasoning about multi-agent interactions and coalitional
abilities. More recently, a few new logical formalisms have been proposed by
extending ATL with strategy variables in order to express strategies explicitly.
However, most of these logics tend to have high computational complexity, because
ATL introduces quantifications over strategies (functions), which leaves little hope
of building any tractable inference system based on such a logic.
This thesis takes up the challenge by using a bottom-up approach in order to
create a balance between expressive power and computational efficiency. Instead
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of starting with a highly complicated logic, we propose a set of logical frame-
works based on a simple and practical logical language, called Game Description
Language (GDL), which has been used as an official language for General Game
Playing (GGP) since 2005. To represent game strategies, we extend GDL with
two binary prioritized connectives for combining actions in terms of their priori-
ties specified by these connectives, and provide it with a semantics based on the
standard state transition model.
To reason about the strategic abilities of players, we further extend the framework
with coalition operators from ATL for specifying the strategic abilities of players.
More importantly, a unified semantics is provided for both GDL- and ATL- formu-
las, which allows us to verify and reason about game strategies. Interestingly, the
framework can be used to formalize the fundamental game-playing principles and
formally derive two well-known results on two-player games: Weak Determinacy
and Zermelo’s Theorem. We also show that the model-checking problem of the
logic is not worse than that of ATL∗, an extension of ATL.
To deal with imperfect information games, we extend GDL with the standard
epistemic operators and provide it with a semantics based on the epistemic state
transition model. The language allows us to specify an imperfect information
game and formalize its epistemic properties. Meanwhile, the framework allows
us to reason about players’ own as well as other players’ knowledge during game
playing. Most importantly, the logic has a moderate computational complexity,
which makes it significantly different from similar existing frameworks.
To investigate the interplay between knowledge shared by a group of players and
its coalitional abilities , we provide a variant of semantics for ATL with imperfect
information. The relation between knowledge sharing and coalitional abilities is
investigated through the interplay of epistemic and coalition modalities. Moreover,
this semantics is able to preserve the desirable properties of coalitional abilities.
To deal with collective decision-making, we apply the approach of combining
actions via their priorities for collective choice. We extend propositional logic
with the prioritized connective for modelling reason-based individual and collec-
tive choices. Not only individual preferences but also aggregation rules can be
expressed within this logic. A model-checking algorithm for this logic is thus
developed to automatically generate individual and collective choices.
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In many real-world situations, a group making collective judgments may assign
individual members or subgroups different priorities to determine the collective
judgment. We design an aggregation rule based on the priorities of individuals so
as to investigate how the judgment from each individual affects group judgment in
a hierarchical environment. We also show that this rule satisfies a set of plausible
conditions and has a tractable computational complexity.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This thesis introduces a set of logical formalisms to analyze strategic reasoning and
collective decision-making so as to provide a logical foundation for game playing in
Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Multi-Agent Systems (MAS). This chapter includes
the motivation for this research, the literature review, the methods, the major
contributions and the structure of the thesis.
1.1 Motivations
A game can be thought of as any strategic decision-making situation involving a
group of self-interested agents, where the final outcome depends not only on the
individual’s own choice but also on the choices of others. For instance, when you
play chess, the winner is determined not only by your own strategy (a general plan
of actions) but also by the strategy of your opponent. Game theory has been used
to predict the behaviour of rational agents and prescribe a plan of action that
needs to be adopted. However, as van Benthem [2012] points out, “much of game
theory is about the question whether strategic equilibria exist. But there are hardly
any explicit languages for defining, comparing, or combining strategies”(p.96.).
1
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This problem also challenges researchers of AI. The study of distributed and multi-
agent systems typically deals with agents who have individual and possibly con-
flicting goals, and have a choice of actions to perform. This makes agents act
strategically, attempting to choose their actions so as to guarantee their goals
while facing other agents’ actions. However, without such a facility for represent-
ing strategies explicitly, it is difficult for them to design intelligent agents that are
capable of strategic decision making.
In the past two decades, formal logical analysis of strategic decision making has
gathered momentum. Pioneering work includes Parikh and Pauly’s Propositional
Logic of Games, Kaneko and Nagashima’s Predicate Logic of Games, Pauly’s
Coalition Logic (CL) and Alur et al.’s Alternating-time Temporal Logic (ATL).
These logics either provide facilities for expressing and combing games or offer
mechanisms for reasoning about strategic abilities of players. But none of them
have solved van Benthem’s problem. The intrinsic difficulty of establishing such
a logic is that reasoning about game strategies requires combinations of tempo-
ral reasoning, counterfactual reasoning, reasoning about actions, preferences and
knowledge, as well as reasoning about multi-agent interactions and coalitional
abilities. To highlight this idea, let us consider an example.
Suppose that you and your friends are playing a game and this is the first time for
all of you to play this game. The following questions might come to your mind:
• What’s the game rule?
• What legal actions can I perform?
• What information is available to me and to others?
• Is there a strategy I can use to win?
If yes, how to find such a strategy?
If no, what strategy can I use to give myself a good chance to win?
• Can I collaborate with some of the other players to win?
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These questions are even more important when we want to build an autonomous
intelligent agent to play a game. Game-playing agents need to understand game
rules and select their actions so as to guarantee their goals, even in face of other
agents’ actions. Basically, these questions involve game rules, game strategies,
coalitional abilities, information and strategic reasoning. Accordingly, logical anal-
ysis of strategic decision-making needs to deal with the problems of
(1) How to describe the rules of a game?
(2) How to represent game strategies?
(3) How to specify strategic abilities of game players?
(4) How to clarify information and players’ knowledge?
(5) How to model the strategic reasoning of game players?
These problems are closely interrelated. Without explicitly specifying game situa-
tions, without representing the game strategy under consideration, it is impossible
to reason about the effects of these strategies. Therefore, we need a logical frame-
work that is equipped with (i) a language for describing the rules of a game,
representing a game strategy and specifying strategic abilities of players, (ii) se-
mantical structures for modelling the execution of a game, and, more importantly,
(iii) an inference mechanism for the epistemic and strategic reasoning of game
players.
More recently, new logical formalisms have been proposed by extending ATL with
strategy variables to express game strategies explicitly. However, most of these
logics tend to have high computational complexity due to the introduction of quan-
tifiers over strategies (functions) in ATL. For instance, to reason about strategies
explicitly, Mogavero et al. [2014] propose Strategy Logic (SL), which strictly con-
tains ATL, but the model checking problem for this logic becomes nonelementary.
This leaves little hope for building any tractable inference systems based on such
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a logic. Therefore, we need a cautious and delicate way to establish such a logic
so as to create a balance between expressive power and reasoning efficiency.
Moreover, playing games with imperfect information, such as Poker, poses a more
intricate challenge to model the epistemic and strategic reasoning of players. In
these games, players only have partial information of the current game state due
to their limited observation powers or memory abilities, and they need to draw
conclusions from their own knowledge about the current game state and about
the knowledge of other players. If any logic is used in dealing with imperfect
information games, such a logic must be able to reason about knowledge, time
and actions at the same time. On the other hand, if we want to use this logic
to build a game-playing agent that supports these reasoning mechanisms, the
reasoning complexity of the logic must be in a range that the agent can manage,
which poses another challenge to researchers of AI.
This thesis aims to address these challenges by establishing a set of logical frame-
works to create a good balance between expressive power and computational effi-
ciency.
1.2 Related Work
A number of logical formalisms have been developed to deal with different as-
pects of strategic decision-making. For the purposes of the thesis, this section
discusses literature in terms of the following aspects: game specification, game
strategies, coalitional abilities, epistemic and strategic reasoning. For a compre-
hensive overview of this topic, please refer to [Pacuit, 2015, van Benthem, 2014,
van der Hoek and Pauly, 2006].
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1.2.1 Game Specification
To specify a game situation, Parikh and Pauly’s Propositional Logic of Games
(GPL) treats a game as a program so that different games can be combined by
program connectives [Parikh, 1985, Pauly and Parikh, 2003]. The benefit of this
approach is that the effects of game playing can be specified by using proposi-
tional dynamic logic (PDL)-like inference mechanism. Yet GPL describes games
as atomic objects, without specifying game structures. Kaneko and Nagashima
[1996, 1997] propose another logic framework to capture the logical abilities of
game players as well as the knowledge of a game situation, but to express the
common knowledge concept explicitly, their base logic is an infinitary extension of
classical predicate logic with very high reasoning complexity. De Giacomo et al.
[2010] provide a different approach to specify a game structure based on situa-
tion calculus and ConGolog agent programming language. In their framework,
a program specifies a game structure by making use of a background situation
calculus action theory. Another approach is to treat games as interactive process
models [van Benthem, 2002] and use dynamic logics to describe structures of ex-
tensive sequential games [van Benthem, 2001], as well as simultaneous games [van
Benthem et al., 2008]. A more practical approach to specify a game is to use the
so-called Game Description Language (GDL) [Genesereth et al., 2005]. This lan-
guage is less expressive than the above mentioned game logics, but rich enough for
describing any finite combinatorial games [Love et al., 2006]. Most importantly,
GDL is designed as a machine-processable language with a tractable computa-
tional complexity. It has been used as an official language for General Game
Playing (GGP) since 2005. However, as a purely game descriptive language, GDL
does not provide the inference facility to reason about how a player derives unveiled
information based on game rules.
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1.2.2 Strategy Representation
To represent game strategies, a number of frameworks have been proposed. They
can be categorized into three approaches. The first approach is to treat strate-
gies as explicit first-order objects in which a strategy is a function from states or
sequences of states to actions [Chatterjee et al., 2010, Mogavero, 2013, Mogavero
et al., 2014, 2010]. Chatterjee et al. [2010] first introduce Strategy Logic (SL),
a logic to use first-order quantifications over strategies in two-player turn-based
games. Then Mogavero et al. extend SL to a more general framework for explicit
reasoning about strategies in multi-player concurrent games. Yet this approach
cannot model the internal structures of strategies, and thus it is difficult to show
how to design a game strategy so as to achieve a goal state. Moreover, both SL
and its extensions are highly undecidable [Mogavero et al., 2010]. The second
approach is to express a game strategy as an action or a program so that sim-
ple strategies can be combined into more complicated strategies using PDL-like
connectives [Ghosh, 2008, Ramanujam and Simon, 2006, 2008a,b, van Benthem,
2013, van Eijck, 2013]. Ramanujam and Simon [2006, 2008a,b] introduce a logic
for reasoning about composite strategies in extensive form turn-based games. In
their logic, players’ strategies are treated as programs which are composed struc-
turally by PDL-like connectives so as to ensure an outcome. Similarly, in [Ghosh,
2008, van Benthem, 2013, van Eijck, 2013] strategies are treated as partial transi-
tion relations and hence PDL provides a good framework to describe and reason
about them. Yet this approach does not seem practical because the decision com-
plexity for PDL and its variants is already rather high [Harel et al., 2000, Valiev,
1980]. Recently Zhang and Thielscher [2015a,b] introduce a third approach to
represent strategies. They develop a modal logic, equipped with a variant of GDL
to describe game strategies and a specific semantics by which formulas can be un-
derstood as move recommendations for a player. More importantly, they propose
two preference operators, respectively called prioritized disjunction and prioritized
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conjunction, so as to combine simple strategies according to their priorities. How-
ever, their work can only model turn-based games and does not have the facility
to reason about strategic abilities of players.
1.2.3 Reasoning about Coalitional Abilities
Many logics have been proposed to model coalitional abilities in perfect infor-
mation games, mostly based on either Coalition Logic (CL) or Alternating-time
Temporal Logic (ATL) [Alur et al., 2002, Pauly, 2002]. Both logics use coalition
modalities to specify strategic abilities of players. In a nutshell, they use coalition
operators of the form [C]φ to say coalition C (a set of players) has the ability to
ensure temporal goal φ holds no matter what the other players do. However, these
logics treat strategies implicitly through coalition modalities by using existential
quantifiers to express players’ strategic abilities, while description of strategies is
not part of the logical language [van Benthem, 2012]. In other words, these logics
do not model how a strategy is generated to ensure an outcome. To overcome
this limitation, some work has been done to extend ATL with explicit expression
of game strategies [Brihaye et al., 2009, Chatterjee et al., 2010, Mogavero et al.,
2010, van der Hoek et al., 2005, Walther et al., 2007]. van der Hoek et al. [2005]
introduce a logic for strategic reasoning based on ATL by treating strategies as
first-class components of the language. The logic can not only reason about what
coalitions can achieve, but also how they can achieve them. Based on this work,
Walther et al. [2007] propose a variant of ATL with explicit names for strategies
and develop a complete axiomatic system for this logic. However, as pointed out
by Ramanujam and Simon [2008b] and van Eijck [2013], these extensions treat
strategies as atomic objects without considering their internal structures. On the
other hand, there is a price to pay for the rich expressiveness of these exten-
sions. Because ATL introduces quantifiers over strategies, explicit representation
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of strategies incurs very high reasoning complexity. For instance, ATL with strat-
egy contexts proposed by Brihaye et al. [2009] is undecidable in general [Troquard
and Walther, 2012]. This leaves little hope of building any tractable inference
system for representing and reasoning about game strategies based on such logics.
1.2.4 Reasoning about Information
To deal with imperfect information games, many logics, mostly epistemic exten-
sions of ATL, SL and PDL, have been developed [Pacuit, 2014, Perea, 2014, van der
Hoek and Pauly, 2006]. For instance, epistemic ATL-style logics can be used to
specify and verify (epistemic) properties of multi-agent systems with imperfect
information [Jamroga and van der Hoek, 2004, Schobbens, 2004, van der Hoek
and Wooldridge, 2003]; Dynamic Epistemic Logic (DEL) takes imperfect informa-
tion games as models for dynamic epistemic logic [Lorini and Schwarzentruber,
2010, van Benthem, 2001], and Epistemic Strategy Logic (ESL) extends tempo-
ral epistemic logic with operators that quantify over strategies so as to represent
and reason about the knowledge that agents have of their own and other agents’
strategies [Belardinelli, 2015, Huang and van der Meyden, 2014a,b]. Differently,
Herzig and Troquard [2006] and Herzig and Lorini [2010] provide logical frame-
works for reasoning about actions, agency and powers of agents and coalitions
based on the logic of seeing-to-it-that (STIT) [Nuel et al., 2001]. Also Belle and
Lakemeyer [2010] propose to reason about imperfect information games in the
epistemic situation calculus. However, this approach does not seem practical due
to the high complexity of the situation calculus. Recently, GDL has been extended
to GDL-II so as to incorporate imperfect information games [Thielscher, 2010]. It
can describe any extensive-form game with randomness and imperfect informa-
tion [Thielscher, 2011]. Unfortunately, like GDL, GDL-II,as a purely descriptive
language, is a tool only for describing the rules of an imperfect information game,
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but does not provide a facility for reasoning about how a player infers unveiled
information based on game rules [Schiffel and Thielscher, 2011, 2014].
In brief, (i) logics to specify a game situation, such as GPL, GDL, are not designed
for representing and reasoning about game strategies; (ii) logics to represent game
strategies, such as SL and PDL-style logics, fail to specify a game situation ex-
plicitly; (iii) logics to describe games and represent strategies, such as the logic
of Zhang and Thielscher [2015a,b], do not have the facility for reasoning about
strategic abilities of players, and (iv) logics to reason about strategies, such as
ATL and its extensions, fail to specify strategies or their structures explicitly.
Thus, few logical frameworks can achieve all goals within a single logical formal-
ism. On the other hand, logics to deal with imperfect information games either
have the same expressiveness limitations inherited from their underlying logics, or
have a rather high computational complexity, which are unlikely to be used for
building practical agents in AI and MAS.
It should be noted that besides the above discussed work, more specific and tech-
nical literature will be mentioned in the relevant chapters.
1.3 Methods
This thesis uses logic-based methods to analyze strategic reasoning and collective
decision-making. The following quote from Bacharach [1994] partially explains
why logic is useful in games.
Game theory is full of deep puzzles, and there is often disagreement
about proposed solutions to them. The puzzlement and disagreement
are neither empirical nor mathematical but, rather, concern the mean-
ings of fundamental concepts (‘solution’, ‘rational’, ‘complete informa-
tion’) and the soundness of certain argument · · · . Logic appears to
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be an appropriate tool for game theory both because these conceptual
obscurities involve notions such as reasoning, knowledge and counter-
factuality which are part of the stock-in-trade of logic, and because
it is a prime function of logic to establish the validity or invalidity of
disputed arguments. (p.21.)
Specifically, there are several advantages to use logic-based methods for strategic
reasoning and collective decision-making.
1. Formalisation is the first step towards automation. Logical formalism can
be used together with tools and techniques developed in AI and computer
science [A˚gotnes et al., 2009, Wooldridge et al., 2007]. For instance,
• As query languages for expressing properties of games or game strate-
gies, checking whether a game or a game strategy has a property reduces
to the model checking problems.
• Reasoning about game strategies may be reduced to theorem proving.
• Synthesising desirable properties of games corresponds to the satisfia-
bility problem.
2. Logical analysis of strategic reasoning and collective decision making might
also be of value in game theory and decision theory. Formal language can
be used to make precise the important notions, such as knowledge and game
strategies, that are often left informal or implicit in games, and rigorous
mathematical models can be used to clarify confusions about the underlying
assumptions of games. More importantly, they open the door for automated
reasoning tools such as model checkers and theorem provers.
3. Logical formalisms are normally more succinct, compared to alternative
methods. Representing game structures with concrete game models suf-
fers from the state explosion problem. For instance, in Chess game, there
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are almost 1030 states. Yet logical languages can provide a compact way
for describing games. For instance, GDL is sufficient to describe any finite
combinatorial game by encoding its rules [Love et al., 2006].
Nowadays there is a very active research area focused on using existing logical
formalisms and developing new ones to analyze strategic reasoning and collective
decision-making [Endriss, 2011, Pacuit, 2015, van Benthem, 2014].
1.4 Major Contributions
This thesis addresses the problem of modelling strategic reasoning and collective
decision-making. The main contributions of this thesis can be summarized as
follows:
1. Introduce a comprehensive logical formalism for game specifications, strat-
egy representation and strategic reasoning of game players. Interestingly,
this logic allows us to formalise van Benthem’s game-oriented principles in
multi-player games and formally derive two well-known results on two-player
games: Weak Determinacy and Zermelo’s Theorem. On the other hand, the
model-checking problem of the logic is in PSPACE, which is not worse than
that of ATL∗.
2. Propose an epistemic extension of GDL to represent and reason about im-
perfect information games. The language allows us to represent the rules
of an imperfect information game and formalize its epistemic properties.
Meanwhile, the framework allows us to reason about a player’s own as well
as other players’ knowledge during game playing. Most importantly, the
model-checking problem of the framework is in ∆p2, which makes it signifi-
cantly different from similar existing frameworks.
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3. Provide a variant of semantics for ATL to investigate the interplay between
knowledge shared by a group of agents and its coalitional abilities. Their
relation is captured through the interplay of epistemic and coalition modal-
ities. This result provides a partial answer to the question: which kind of
group knowledge is required for a group to achieve their goals in the context
of imperfect information [Herzig, 2015].
4. Introduce a modal logic for modelling reason-based individual and collective
decision-making. Not only individual preferences but also collective choice
rules can be built into this logic. This allows us to develop a model checking
algorithm for this logic to automatically generate individual and collective
choices, which is rarely achieved in the existing logics for social choice the-
ory [Endriss, 2011].
5. Investigate how individual judgment affects group judgment in a hierarchical
environment by designing a judgement aggregation rule based on the priority
over individuals. This aggregation rule is specified by a set of plausible
conditions and has a tractable computational complexity.
1.5 Outline of Chapters
Chapter 2 introduces the basic language GDL for describing game rules, and pro-
vides it with a semantics based on the state transition model. We then extend the
basic logic with two binary prioritized connectives for representing game strategies.
We also demonstrate with a generalised Gomuko game how to use the language
to describe game rules, represent game strategies and formalize game properties.
Chapter 3 further extends the framework with coalition operators from ATL for
specifying strategic abilities of players, and provides a unified semantics for both
GDL- and ATL- formulas, which allows us to verify and reason about game strate-
gies. We then use the framework to formalize the game-playing principles in
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multi-player games and derive two well-known results for two-player games: Weak
Determinacy and Zermelo’s Theorem. We also show the model-checking problem
for the logic is in PSPACE.
Chapter 4 proposes an epistemic extension of GDL to deal with imperfect infor-
mation games. The semantics is based on the epistemic state transition model.
We demonstrate with a variant of a generalised Gomuko game how to use the
language to represent the rules of an imperfect information game and formalize its
epistemic properties, and, more importantly, how to use the logic to reason about
a player’s own as well as other players’ knowledge during game playing. We also
show the model-checking problem of the framework is Θp2-hard, yet in ∆
p
2.
Chapter 5 investigates the interplay between knowledge shared by a group of agents
and its coalitional abilities. To achieve this, we provide a variant of semantics for
ATL based on the assumption of knowledge sharing within coalitions. We then
investigate their relation through the interplay of epistemic and coalition opera-
tors. We also show this semantics preserves the desirable properties of coalitional
abilities.
Chapter 6 explores collective decision-making by applying the prioritized connec-
tive introduced in Chapter 2 for collective choice. We first extend propositional
logic with the prioritized connective so that a formula can express not only prop-
erties of alternatives but also individuals’ priorities over the properties. We then
define a set of collective choice rules within the same logic, which are specified by
Arrowian conditions. We also develop a model-checking algorithm for the logic so
as to automatically generate individual and collective choices.
Chapter 7 investigates how individual judgment affects group judgment in a hi-
erarchical environment. We first provide a logic-based model for this situation
by giving priorities over voters, and then define a lexicographic aggregation rule
based on the priorities of voters. We also show this rule satisfies a set of plausible
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Arrowian conditions and has a tractable computational complexity. We finally
investigate the oligarchic property of this rule.
Chapter 8 summarizes the main results of this thesis and discusses some directions
for future work.
Chapter 2
Game Description and Strategy
Representation
This chapter addresses game specifications and strategy representation. Strategic
reasoning will be discussed in Chapter 3. We first propose a logical framework
for game specifications based on GDL. GDL is simple yet rich enough for describ-
ing any finite combinatorial games [Love et al., 2006]. It has been used as an
official language for the annual General Game Playing (GGP) competitions since
2005 [Genesereth et al., 2005]. The semantics for the language is based on the
standard state transition model. We then extend the basic framework with two
binary prioritized connectives for strategy representation [Zhang and Thielscher,
2015b]. We also demonstrate with a running example that the framework allows
us to specify game rules, formalize game properties as well as represent game
strategies.
2.1 Game Description
We assume that all games we consider in this thesis are played in multi-agent
environments. A game signature S is a triple (N,A,Φ), where
15
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• N = {r1, r2, · · · , rk} is a nonempty finite set of agents.
• A = ⋃r∈N Ar, where Ar consists of a nonempty finite set of actions per-
formed by agent r and no action can be performed by two different agents,
i.e., Ari ∩ Arj = ∅ if ri 6= rj ∈ N .
• Φ = {p, q, · · · } is a finite set of atomic propositions for specifying individual
features of a game state.
Through the rest of the chapter, we will fix a game signature S, and all concepts
will be based on the same game signature unless otherwise specified.
2.1.1 State Transition Structures
We consider synchronous games where all players move simultaneously. These
games take place in a multi-agent environment with one initial state, one or more
terminal states and one or more winning states for each player. The execution
model for these games is synchronous update: all players act together at every
stage (although some actions could be “noops”) and the environment updates
only in response to the actions taken by the players. In its most abstract form, the
underlying structures of these games may be specified by state transition frames
defined as follows:
Definition 2.1. A state transition (ST) frame F is a tuple (W,w, T, L, U, g),
where
• W is a nonempty set of states.
• w ∈ W is the initial state.
• T ⊆ W is the set of terminal states.
• L ⊆ W ×A is a legality relation, describing the legal actions at each state.
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• U : W ×D → W is an update function, where D = ∏r∈N Ar denote the set
of joint actions, specifying state transitions for each joint action.
• g : N → 2W is a goal function, specifying the winning states for each agent.
It should be noted that, to make the framework as general as possible, different
from [Zhang and Thielscher, 2015b], we focus on synchronous games instead of
turn-based games. The latter is a special case of the former by allowing a player
only to do “noop”, an action without effect, when it is not her turn. Given d ∈ D,
let d(r) be the individual action of agent r in the joint action d. For convenience,
let L(w) = {a ∈ A | (w, a) ∈ L} be the set of all legal actions at state w.
Furthermore, to specify a particular synchronous game, we need to associate a
state transition frame with a valuation function to address its domain-dependent
information. In this way we obtain a state transition model.
Definition 2.2. A state transition (ST) model M is a pair (F , pi) where
• F is an ST-frame;
• pi : W → 2Φ is a standard valuation function.
We now define the set of all possible ways in which a game can develop as follows:
Definition 2.3. Given an ST-model M = (F , pi), a path is a sequence of states
and joint actions w
d1→ w1 d2→ · · · de→ we such that e ≥ 0 and for any j ∈ {1, · · · , e},
1. {w0, · · · , we−1} ∩ T = ∅ (that is, only the last state may be terminal.)
2. dj(r) ∈ L(wj−1) for any r ∈ N (that is, any action that is taken must be
legal.)
3. wj = U(wj−1, dj) (state update)
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A path δ is complete if we ∈ T . Let P(M) denote the set of all complete paths in
M . It follows that for any underlying ST-frame F of M , the set of all complete
paths in F , denoted by P(F), is just P(M). When M is fixed, we simply write
P . Given δ ∈ P , the states on δ are called reachable states. Let δ[j] denote the
j-th reachable state of δ, θ(δ, j) denote the joint action taken at stage j of δ, and
θr(δ, j) denote the action of agent r taken at stage j of δ. We write δ[0, j] for the
initial segment of δ up to stage j. Finally, the length of a path λ, written |λ|, is
defined as the number of joint actions.
To demonstrate the framework, we use as a running example a special family of
mnk-games [van den Herik et al., 2002].
Example 2.1. (mk-Game) An mk-game is a combinatorial game in which two
players take turns in marking either a nought ‘o’ or a cross ‘x’ on an m × m
board. The player who first gets k consecutive marks of her own symbol in a row
(horizontally, vertically, or diagonally), will win this game.
Obviously, an mk-game is a generalisation of Tic-Tac-Toe (m = k = 3) and
Gomoku (m = 19 and k = 5).
To represent an mk-game in terms of the ST-model, we first describe the game
signature, written Smk, as follows:
• Nmk = {x, o}.
• Armk = {ari,j | 1 ≤ j, k ≤ m} ∪ {noopr}, where ari,j denotes the action that
player r fills grid (i, j) with her symbol and noopr denotes that player r does
action noop.
• Φmk = {pri,j, turn(r) | r ∈ {x, o} and 1 ≤ i, j ≤ m}, where pri,j represents the
fact that grid (i, j) is filled with player r’s symbol, and turn(r) says that it
is player r’s turn now.
We next specify the ST-frame for this game, written Fmk, as follows:
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• Wmk = {(tx, to, c1,1, · · · , c1,m, c2,1, · · · , cm,m) : tx, to ∈ {0, 1} & ci,j ∈ {,, }
for 1 ≤ i, j ≤ m} be the set of possible states, where tx, to specify the turn
taking and ci,j represents the fact that grid (i, j) is occupied by the cross ,
occupied by the nought   or empty .
• wmk = (1, 0,, · · · ,).
• gmk(x) = {(tx, to, c1,1, · · · , cm,m) : ci,j, · · · , ch,l ∈ Gk & ci,j = · · · = ch,l = },
and
gmk(o) = {(tx, to, c1,1, · · · , cm,m) : ci,j, · · · , ch,l ∈ Gk & ci,j = · · · = ch,l =  },
where
Gk = {ci,j, · · · , ci,j+k−1 : 1 ≤ i ≤ m, 1 ≤ j ≤ m− k + 1}
∪ {ci,j, · · · , ci+k−1,j : 1 ≤ i ≤ m− k + 1, 1 ≤ j ≤ m}
∪ {ci,j, · · · , ci+k−1,j+k−1 : 1 ≤ i, j ≤ m− k + 1}
∪ {ci,j, · · · , ci+k−1,j−k+1 : 1 ≤ i ≤ m− k + 1, k ≤ j ≤ m}1.
• Tmk = gmk(x) ∪ gmk(o)
∪{(tx, to, c1,1, · · · , cm,m) : ci,j ∈ {, } for 1 ≤ i, j ≤ m}.
• for all (tx, to, c1,1, · · · , cm,m) ∈ Wmk,
– for all ari,j ∈ Amk,
((tx, to, c1,1, · · · , cm,m), ari,j) ∈ Lmk iff tr = 1 and ci,j = ;
– for noopr ∈ Amk, ((tx, to, c1,1, · · · , cm,m), noopr) ∈ Lmk iff t−r = 1,
where −r denotes the opponent of player r.
• Umk : Wmk×Dmk → Wmk is defined as follows: for all (tx, to, c1,1, · · · , cm,m) ∈
Wmk and for all 〈ari,j, noop−r〉 ∈ Dmk, let
Umk((tx, to, c1,1, · · · , cm,m), 〈ari,j, noop−r〉) = (t′x, t′o, c′1,1, · · · , c′m,m)
1Gk is the set of all lines of k grids. For instance, on 3× 3 board, G3 has 8 elements.
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such that (t′x, t
′
o, c
′
1,1, · · · , c′m,m) is the same as (tx, to, c1,1, · · · , cm,m) except
its components t′x, t
′
o and c
′
i,j which are updated as follows: t
′
x = to, t
′
o = tx
and
c′i,j =

 if ci,j =  and r = x
  if ci,j =  and r = o
ci,j otherwise
Finally, for each state w = (tx, to, c1,1, · · · , cm,m) ∈ Wmk, let
pimk(w) = {turn(r) : tr = 1} ∪ {pxi,j : ci,j = } ∪ {poi,j : ci,j =  }.
Then let Mmk = (Fmk, pimk) be the ST-model for this game. 
2.1.2 Logic for Game Description
In this subsection, we introduce a logical framework for specifying and reason-
ing about perfect information games. We call this framework Logic for Game
Description, denoted as LGD.
2.1.2.1 The Language
Describing a game with the state transition game model is possible but not practi-
cal especially when modelling large games. For instance, in Chess game, there are
almost 1030 states. We now introduce a variant2 of GDL [Zhang and Thielscher,
2015b] for specifying games, which allows us to describe a game in a more compact
way by encoding its rules.
Definition 2.4. The language, denoted by LLGD, consists of
• the finite set of atomic propositions Φ = {p, q, · · · };
2GDL is a logical language in Zhang and Tielscher’s work instead of an official program
language for general game playing.
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• pre-defined propositions: initial, terminal, wins(·), legal(·) and does(·);
• logical connectives: ¬ and ∧;
• temporal operator: ©.
A formula ϕ in LLGD is defined by the following BNF:
ϕ ::= p | initial | terminal | legal(ar) | wins(r) | does(ar) | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ψ | ©ϕ
where p ∈ Φ, r ∈ N and ar ∈ Ar.
Other connectives ∨, →, ↔, >, ⊥ are defined by ¬ and ∧ in the standard way.
Intuitively, initial and terminal specify the initial state and the terminal states
of a game, respectively; does(ar) asserts that agent r takes action a at the current
state; legal(ar) asserts that agent r is allowed to take action a at the current state;
and wins(r) asserts that agent r wins at the current state. The formula©ϕ means
“ϕ holds in the next state”.
To help the reader capture the intuition of the language, let us go back to the
mk-games.
Example 2.1 (continued) The rules of an mk-game can be naturally formulated
by LGD-formulas in Figure 2.1 (where r ∈ {x, o} and −r represents r’s opponent).
Statement 1 says that all grids are empty in the initial state and player x has the
first turn. Statements 2 and 3 specify the winning states for each player and the
terminal states of the game, respectively. The player who succeeds in placing k
respective marks in a horizontal, vertical or diagonal row wins the game, and the
game ends if one player wins or all grids are filled. Statements 4 and 5 specify the
preconditions of each action (legality). The player who has the turn can fill any
empty grid. The other player can only do noop. Statement 6 is the combination
of the frame axioms and the effect axioms [Reiter, 1991]: a grid is marked with
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1. initial↔ turn(x) ∧ ¬turn(o) ∧
m∧
i,j=1
¬(pxi,j ∨ poi,j)
2. wins(r)↔

m∨
i=1
m−k+1∨
j=1
k−1∧
l=0
pri,j+l ∨
m−k+1∨
i=1
m∨
j=1
k−1∧
l=0
pri+l,j
∨
m−k+1∨
i=1
m−k+1∨
j=1
k−1∧
l=0
pri+l,j+l ∨
m−k+1∨
i=1
m∨
j=k
k−1∧
l=0
pri+l,j−l

3. teminal↔ wins(x) ∨ wins(o) ∨
m∧
i,j=1
(pxi,j ∨ poi,j)
4. legal(ari,j)↔ ¬(pxi,j ∨ poi,j) ∧ turn(r)
5. legal(noopr)↔ turn(−r)
6. ©pri,j ↔ pri,j ∨ (does(ari,j) ∧ ¬(pxi,j ∨ poi,j)) ∨ terminal
7. turn(r)→©¬turn(r) ∧©turn(−r)
Figure 2.1: An LGD description of an mk-game.
a player’s symbol in the next state, if the player takes the corresponding action
at the current state or the grid has been filled before or the game ends. The last
formula specifies the turn-taking. Let Σmk be the set of rules 1-7. 
2.1.2.2 The Semantics
The semantics for the language is based on the state transition model. With the
temporal operator, a formula is interpreted with respect to two parameters: a
complete path and a stage.
Definition 2.5. Let M = (W,w, T, L, U, g, pi) be an ST-model. Given a complete
path δ of M , a stage j on δ and a formula ϕ ∈ LLGD, we say ϕ is true (or satisfied)
at j of δ under M , denoted by M, δ, j |= ϕ, according to the following definition:
M, δ, j |= p iff p ∈ pi(δ[j])
M, δ, j |= ¬ϕ iff M, δ, j 6|= ϕ
M, δ, j |= ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 iff M, δ, j |= ϕ1 and M, δ, j |= ϕ2
M, δ, j |= initial iff δ[j] = w
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M, δ, j |= terminal iff δ[j] ∈ T
M, δ, j |= wins(r) iff δ[j] ∈ g(r)
M, δ, j |= legal(ar) iff ar ∈ L(δ[j])
M, δ, j |= does(ar) iff θr(δ, j) = ar
M, δ, j |=©ϕ iff if j < |δ|, then M, δ, j + 1 |= ϕ
A formula ϕ is globally true through δ, denoted by M, δ |= ϕ, if M, δ, j |= ϕ for
any stage j of δ. A formula ϕ is globally true in an ST-model M , written M |= ϕ,
if M, δ |= ϕ for all complete paths δ in M , that is, ϕ is true at every reachable
state. A formula ϕ is valid in an ST-frame F , denoted by F |= ϕ, if it is globally
true in every ST-model based on it. A formula ϕ is valid , denoted by |= ϕ, if it
is valid in every ST-frame. Finally, let Σ be a set of formulas in LLGD, then M is
a model of Σ if M |= ϕ for all ϕ ∈ Σ.
Let us recall that Mmk is the ST-model for an mk−game and Σmk is the set of
rules for the game. The following proposition shows that the framework provides
a sound description for the mk-game.
Proposition 2.1. Mmk is a model of Σmk.
Proof. Given any complete path δ, any stage t of δ in Mmk, we need to verify that
each rule is true at t of δ under Mmk.
Let us first verify Rule 1. Assume Mmk, δ, t |= initial, then δ[t] = wmk, i.e.,
δ[t] = (1, 0,, · · · ,). And by the definition of pimk, turn(x) ∈ pimk(w), turn(o) 6∈
pimk(w), p
r
i,j 6∈ pimk(w) for any r ∈ {x, o} and any 1 ≤ i, j ≤ m. Thus, Mmk, δ, j |=
turn(x) ∧ ¬turn(o) ∧∧mi,j=1(¬(pxi,j ∨ poi,j)).
Conversely, assume Mmk, δ, t |= turn(x)∧¬turn(o)∧
∧m
i,j=1(¬(pxi,j ∨ poi,j)), then by
the definition of pimk, δ[t] = (1, 0,, · · · ,), so δ[t] = wmk. Thus, Mmk, δ, t |=
initial.
Rule 2 and Rule 3 are verified in a similar way of Rule 1.
Chapter 2. Game Description and Strategy Representation 24
Then we consider Rule 4, and Rule 5 is proved in a similar way. AssumeMmk, δ, t |=
legal(ari,j) iff a
r
i,j ∈ Lmk(δ[t]) iff t(r) = 1 and ci,j in δ[t] is empty (by the definition
of Lmk) iff turn(r) ∈ pimk(δ[t]) and pri,j 6∈ pimk(δ[t]) for any r ∈ {x, o} (by the
definition of pimk) iff Mmk, δ, t |= ¬(pxi,j ∨ poi,j) ∧ turn(r).
We now verify Rule 6. Assume Mmk, δ, t |= terminal ∨ pri,j ∨ (does(ari,j) ∧ ¬(pxi,j ∨
poi,j)). We next prove by three cases.
(1) If Mmk, δ, t |= terminal, then t = |δ|, then it is trivial that Mmk, δ, t |=©pri,j.
(2) If Mmk, δ, t |= pri,j, by the definition of Umk, we have Mmk, δ, t + 1 |= pri,j, so
Mmk, δ, t |=©pri,j.
(3) If Mmk, δ, t |= does(ari,j)∧¬(pxi,j ∨ poi,j), again by the definition of Umk, we have
Mmk, δ, t+ 1 |= pri,j, so Mmk, δ, t |=©pri,j.
Thus, in all cases Mmk, δ, t |=©pri,j.
Conversely, suppose Mmk, δ, t 6|= terminal ∨ pri,j ∨ (does(ari,j) ∧ ¬(pxi,j ∨ poi,j)), then
t < |δ|, Mmk, δ, t 6|= pri,j and Mmk, δ, t 6|= does(ari,j) ∧ ¬(pxi,j ∨ poi,j). Then by the
definition of Umk, Mmk, δ, t+ 1 6|= pri,j, so Mmk, δ, t 6|=©pri,j.
Finally we consider Rule 7. Assume Mmk, δ, t |= turn(r), then t(r) = 1. If |δ| = t,
then it is straightforward. If |δ| > t, by the definition of Umk and wmk, we have
t(−r) = 0. And again by them we get that in δ[t + 1], t′(r) = 0 and t′(−r) = 1,
so Mmk, δ, t+ 1 |= ¬turn(r) ∧ turn(−r), so Mmk, δ, t |=©(¬turn(r) ∧ turn(−r)).
Thus, Mmk, δ, t |=©¬turn(r) ∧©turn(−r).
2.1.3 Game Properties
In this section, we demonstrate the expressiveness and flexibility of the framework
by showing how to use it to specify and verify game properties. To start with, the
following validities describe interesting general (or domain-independent) properties
of synchronous games.
Proposition 2.2. For all ϕ, ψ ∈ LLGD,
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1. |= ¬terminal→ ∨ar∈Ar does(ar)
2. |= ¬(does(ar) ∧ does(br)) for ar 6= br ∈ Ar
3. |= does(ar)→ legal(ar)
4. |=©(ϕ→ ψ)→ (©ϕ→©ψ)
5. |=©>
Proof. For any ST-model M , any complete path δ ∈ P and any stage j of δ,
1. Assume M, δ, j |= ¬terminal, then |δ| > j, then M, δ, j |= does(θr(δ, j)). And
θr(δ, j) ∈ Ar, so M, δ, j |=
∨
ar∈Ar does(a
r).
2. Suppose not for a contradiction that M, δ, j |= does(ar) ∧ does(br), then ar =
br = θr(δ, j) contradicting with the assumption a
r 6= br ∈ Ar.
3. Assume M, δ, j |= does(ar), then ar = θr(δ, j). And by the definition of δ,
ar ∈ L(δ[j]), so M, δ, j |= legal(ar).
4. Assume M, δ, j |=©(ϕ→ ψ) and M, δ, j |=©ϕ, we next show M, δ, j |=©ψ.
Further assume j < |δ|, then by assumption M, δ, j+1 |= ϕ→ ψ and M, δ, j+1 |=
ϕ, so M, δ, j + 1 |= ψ. Thus, M, δ, j |=©ψ.
It is straightforward for 5.
Clauses 1 and 2 specify that there is only one action for each agent to be taken
at each non-terminal state. Clause 3 states that an agent takes legal actions. The
last two clauses indicate that the next operator is a KD-modality. The properties
specified by these formulas hold for all ST-frames.
We next show that non-valid formulas in LGD can be used to classify game frames.
Let us consider the following formulas.
1. 6|= ¬terminal→ ¬© initial
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2. 6|= terminal→ ∧a∈A ¬legal(a)
3. 6|= ∨r∈N wins(r)→ terminal
Formula 1 states that for any reachable non-terminal state the initial state is not its
successor. Formula 2 says that at terminal states there is no legal action. The last
one asserts that the game ends once one agent wins. It is easy to check that they are
not valid in LGD. For instance, the single-agent state transition frame F1 depicted
in Figure 2.2 is a simple countermodel for the first two formulas. Specifically, F1
Figure 2.2: A state transition frame F1.
is a state transition frame with one initial state w0 and two terminal (winning)
states w4 and w10. In addition, the legality relation and the update function can
be directly specified accordingly. Consider the following two complete paths in
F1:
δ1 = w0
e→ w0 a→ w3 a→ w4; δ2 = w0 c→ w1 b→ w6 d→ w7 a→ w10
Given an arbitrary model M based on F1, we have that
M, δ1, 0 |= ¬terminal ∧©initial and M, δ2, 4 |= terminal ∧ legal(e).
Thus, F1 6|= ¬terminal→ ¬©initial and F1 6|= terminal→
∧
a∈A ¬legal(a).
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Such formulas can be used to classify game frames as they correspond to different
properties of frames. For instance, most board games satisfy the property specified
by the first formula; two-player games normally have the property specified by the
third formula. Specifically, let F1 be the set of all ST-frames F satisfying the
property that U(δ[j], θ(δ, j)) 6= w for any δ ∈ P and any j < |δ|; F2 be the set
of all ST-frames F satisfying the property that L(w) = ∅ for any reachable state
w ∈ T , and F3 be the set of all ST-frames F satisfying the property that for any
reachable state w ∈ W , if w ∈ g(r) for some r ∈ N , then w ∈ T . Then we have
the following characterization results.
Proposition 2.3. For any ST-frame F ,
1. F ∈ F1 iff F |= ¬terminal→ ¬© initial.
2. F ∈ F2 iff F |= terminal→
∧
a∈A ¬legal(a).
3. F ∈ F3 iff F |=
∨
r∈N wins(r)→ terminal.
Proof. 1. Assume F ∈ F1, then U(δ[j], θ(δ, j)) 6= w for any δ ∈ P and any j < |δ|,
then for any ST-model M based on F , we have M, δ, j |= ¬ © initial for any
δ ∈ P and any j < |δ|. And for j = |δ|, we have M, δ, j |= terminal. Thus,
M |= terminal∨¬© initial. So F |= terminal∨¬© initial. Conversely, assume
F |= terminal ∨¬© initial, then M |= terminal ∨¬© initial for any ST-model
M based on F , then M, δ, j |= terminal ∨ ¬ © initial for any δ ∈ P and any
j of δ. And for any j < |δ|, we have M, δ, j 6|= terminal, so for any j < |δ|
M, δ, j |= ¬© initial, so U(δ[j], θ(δ, j)) 6= w for any δ ∈ P and any j < |δ|. Thus,
F ∈ F1.
2. Assume F 6|= terminal → ∧a∈A ¬legal(a), then there are some ST-model
M based on F , some complete path δ in M and some stage j on δ such that
M, δ, j |= terminal but M, δ, j 6|= ∧a∈A ¬legal(a), then δ[j] ∈ T and a ∈ L(δ[j])
for some a ∈ A, so there is reachable state δ[j] ∈ T such that L(δ[j]) 6= ∅, so
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F 6∈ F2. Conversely, assume F |= terminal →
∧
a∈A ¬legal(a), then for any ST-
model M based on F , M |= terminal → ∧a∈A ¬legal(a), then for any reachable
state w ∈ T , L(w) = ∅, so F ∈ F2.
3 is proved in a similar way of 2.
In particular, we make the following observation about mk-games.
Observation 2.4. Let Fmk be the ST-frame for mk-games. Then
1. Fmk |= ¬terminal→ ¬© initial
2. Fmk |=
∨
r∈Nmk wins(r)→ terminal
3. Fmk 6|= terminal→
∧
a∈Amk ¬legal(a)
Proof. Statement 1 follows from the fact that Umk(w, d) 6= wmk for any reachable
state w ∈ W and d ∈ D. Statement 2 follows from the fact that gmk(r) ⊆ T for
any r ∈ N . The last statement does not hold in Mmk. Consider a game situation
where one player wins but the board is not completely filled. In this case, it is still
legal for the player who has the turn to fill an empty grid.
It should be noted that an ST-frame specifies a class of synchronous games and by
adding a valuation to address its domain-dependent information, an ST-model rep-
resents a particular game. Accordingly, valid formulas specify general (or domain-
independent) properties of synchronous games of which we are interested, while
globally true formulas prescribe specific properties of a particular game, such as
the game rules in Figure 2.1 for an mk-game.
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2.2 Strategy Representation
In this section, we consider the problem of how to represent a game strategy based
on LGD. We first provide the notion of a game strategy, and then introduce an
additional modality for representing a game strategy.
2.2.1 Strategy
A strategy for a player is a plan of actions telling this player how to play a game
so as to achieve her goal. In game theory, there are two basic types of strategies:
memoryless strategies and memory-based strategies [Osborne, 1994].
Before presenting their formal definitions, we first introduce some notations. Given
an ST-model M and a complete path δ in M , any proper initial segment of δ is
called a history. The set of all histories in M is denoted by H. Let δw = {δ[j] ∈
W | 0 ≤ j ≤ |δ|} be the set of all the reachable states on δ. Then the set
of all reachable states in M , denoted by WP , is the union of all sets δw, i.e.,
WP =
⋃
δ∈P δ
w.
We are now in the position to define the notion of a memoryless strategy for an
agent.
Definition 2.6. Given an ST-model M = (W,w, T, L, U, g, pi), a memoryless strat-
egy for agent r ∈ N in M is a total function fr: WP\T → Ar such that for every
w ∈ WP\T , (w, fr(w)) ∈ L.
Intuitively, a memoryless strategy for an agent specifies a unique legal action for
this agent at each non-terminal reachable state. On the other hand, a memory-
based strategy for an agent requires that this agent should take the past states
and actions into consideration when making a choice of actions.
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Definition 2.7. Given an ST-model M = (W,w, T, L, U, g, pi), a memory-based
strategy for agent r ∈ N in M is a total function fr: H → Ar such that for every
h ∈ H, (last(h), fr(h)) ∈ L where last(h) denotes the last state of history h.
That is, a memory-based strategy for an agent assigns a unique action of the agent
to all possible histories of the game. It should be noted that both memoryless
strategies and memory-based strategies are agent-specific. That is, a strategy
applies to one agent only. Hereafter, we focus on memoryless strategies and simply
call them strategies; nevertheless, our approach can be generalized to the memory-
based case.
2.2.2 Prioritized Connectives
Let us now introduce an additional modality to LGD so as to combine basic actions
into a strategy. To give a rough idea of the composition, let us first consider a
simple mk-game where m = 5 and k = 3.
After some practice or backward induction reasoning, we may find that the fol-
lowing simple idea can help player x to win:
(1) Fill the center.
(2) If filling any grid leads to win, fill it.
(3) Fill an empty grid next to her own symbol.
(4) Fill any grid.
(5) Try (1) first; if fails, try (2); if fails, try (3); if fails, do (4).
The simple actions (1)-(4) can be naturally formulated in LGD as follows:
1. fill centerr =def does(a
r
3,3)
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2. checkr =def
5∨
i,j=1
(does(ari,j) ∧©wins(r))
3. fill nextr =def
5∨
i,j=1
(
pri,j∧ ( does(ari−1,j) ∨does(ari,j−1)∨does(ari,j+1)∨does(ari+1,j))
)
3
4. fill anyr =def
5∨
i,j=1
does(ari,j)
To win this game, a player needs to assign priorities over basic actions and then
compose them into a winning strategy according to the priorities. Yet the un-
derlying priorities over these actions in Clause (5) are beyond the expressiveness
of LGD (also GDL). To represent these priorities, we introduce a binary priori-
tized disjunction, denoted by O, with the intention that first take action a; if it is
not available, then take action b, and so on. Syntactically, we add the following
formula formulation rule to the rules we already have in Definition 2.4:
If ϕ1, ϕ2 ∈ LLGD, then ϕ1Oϕ2 is a formula of LLGD.
The formula ϕ1Oϕ2 has to be read as “try ϕ1 first; if it is impossible, try ϕ2”.
In other words, when composing actions, an agent gives a higher priority to the
action specified by ϕ1 than to the action specified by ϕ2.
We then define an abbreviation called the prioritized conjunction M as follows:
ϕ1 M ϕ2 =def (ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2)Oϕ1
The formula means “try both ϕ1 and ϕ2; if they are conflict, only try ϕ1”. It is
worth noting that the prioritized connectives are fully embedded in the logical
language to make sure that context dependent strategies can be expressed, that is
we may have the formulas like ϕ→ (ϕ1Oϕ2) and ¬ϕ→ (ϕ1 M ϕ2). Meanwhile we
also allow the nesting of the prioritized connectives.
To interpret these formulas, we need an additional notation. Let δ[0, j] denote the
initial segment of a complete path δ up to stage j. A complete path δ′ that shares
3To avoid too much complexity, we ignore the cases when the indexes go over their range.
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the same initial segment with δ up to stage j is denoted by δ[0, j] v δ′. Given
ϕ ∈ LLGD, let
P(ϕ, δ[0, j]) = {δ′ ∈ P | δ[0, j] v δ′ and M, δ′, j |= ϕ}
denote the set of all complete paths that share the same initial segment of δ up to
stage j and satisfy ϕ at stage j. Now we add the following interpretation clause
to Definition 2.5:
M, δ, j |= ϕ1Oϕ2 iff M, δ, j |= ϕ1, or (P(ϕ1, δ[0, j]) = ∅ and M, δ, j |= ϕ2)
To demonstrate the intuition behind the prioritized disjunction, let us consider
the following example.
Example 2.2. Assume that a complete path δ in a one-player state transition
model M diverges at stage j due to executing different actions as illustrated in Fig-
ure 2.3. Consider a formula does(α)Odoes(b), which says “do action α first; if α is
δ j
δ1
a
δb
δ2
c
Figure 2.3: Example for O.
not doable, do b”. We check whether it is true at stage j on δ. Since δ takes action
b instead of α at j, we have M, δ, j |= ¬does(α) ∧ does(b). And α is not doable at
j, i.e., P(α, δ[0, j]) = ∅. According to the semantics, M, δ, j |= does(α)Odoes(b).
Consider another formula does(a)Odoes(b), which says “do action a first; if a is
not doable, do b”. Since action a can be done through δ1 (M, δ1, j |= does(a)) and
δ1 shares the same initial segment of δ up to stage j (i.e., δ1 ∈ P(does(a), δ[0, j])).
Thus a is doable at j. According to the semantics, M, δ, j 6|= does(a)Odoes(b).
This is because δ picks up b even though a is doable at state j.
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In addition, the following proposition provides the truth condition for the priori-
tized conjunction.
Proposition 2.5. M, δ, j |= ϕ1Mϕ2 iff
M, δ, j |= ϕ1 and (if P(ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2, δ[0, j]) 6= ∅, then M, δ, j |= ϕ2).
Proof.
Assume M, δ, j |= ϕ1 M ϕ2
iff M, δ, j |= (ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2)Oϕ1
iff M, δ, j |= (ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2), or (P(ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2, δ[0, j]) = ∅ and M, δ, j |= ϕ1)
iff M, δ, j |= ϕ1, and (P(ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2, δ[0, j]) = ∅ or M, δ, j |= ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2)
iff M, δ, j |= ϕ1, and (P(ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2, δ[0, j]) = ∅ or M, δ, j |= ϕ2)
iff M, δ, j |= ϕ1, and ( if P(ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2, δ[0, j]) 6= ∅, then M, δ, j |= ϕ2).
Thus, the result holds.
To demonstrate the interpretation of the prioritized conjunction, let us go back to
Example 2.2. Consider another formula (does(a)∨ does(b)) M does(b), which says
that “try to make both does(a) ∨ does(b) and does(b) true, i.e., do action b; if it
is impossible, try to make does(a) ∨ does(b) true, i.e., do action a”. It is easy to
check that M, δ, j |= (does(a) ∨ does(b)) M does(b) as δ picks up b.
The ideas behind the prioritized connectives are similar to [Zhang and Thielscher,
2015b]. Basically, the prioritized disjunction “O” extends the choice of actions,
such that if the first set of actions fails to apply, then a second one offers more
options, and if that fails too then a third set may offer more options, and so on.
Conversely, the prioritized conjunction “M” narrows down the choice of actions
such that if the first set of actions allows too many options, then a second set
may be used to constrain these options, a third one may narrow down the options
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even further, and so on—up to the last set. These two connectives can be easily
extended to take multiple arguments as follows:
ϕ1Oϕ2O · · ·Oϕm =def ((ϕ1Oϕ2) O · · · ) O ϕm
ϕ1Mϕ2M · · ·Mϕm =def ((ϕ1Mϕ2)M · · · )Mϕm
From now on, we will use L+LGD to refer to the full language generated by the
formation rules given by Definition 2.4 including the formation rule that allows
the use of prioritized connectives.
2.2.3 Strategy Rule
We now discuss how to represent a game strategy in L+LGD. Let us recall that
a strategy specifies a unique action for an agent at each non-terminal reachable
state. If a formula satisfies this condition, this formula can then be a syntacti-
cal representation of a strategy for that agent. This idea leads to the following
definition.
Definition 2.8. Given an ST-model M and a formula ϕ ∈ L, ϕ is a strategy rule
for player r if for all w ∈ WP\T , the set
Ar(ϕ,w) = {a ∈ Ar : ∃δ ∈ P∃j ∈ N(M, δ, j |= ϕ, δ[j] = w and θr(δ, j) = a)}
is a singleton.
Similarly, a memory-based strategy rule for an agent is defined as follows:
Definition 2.9. Given an ST-model M and a formula ϕ ∈ L, ϕ is a memory-based
strategy rule for player r if for all h ∈ H, the set
Ar(ϕ, h) = {a ∈ Ar : ∃δ ∈ P∃j ∈ N(M, δ, j |= ϕ, δ[0, j] = h and θr(δ, j) = a)}
is a singleton.
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It should be noted that our definition of strategy rules is different from that
of Zhang and Thielscher [2015b]. They view a strategy as a set of possible moves,
while we consider a strategy as an action plan that completely specifies the agent’s
future behavior when it is her turn, which coincides with the game-theoretical
view. Obviously, not every formula ϕ ∈ L can be a strategy rule. In particular,
we specify two types of formulas that have potentials to be strategy rules. We say
ϕ is a complete quasi-strategy rule for player r if for all w ∈ WP\T , Ar(ϕ,w) 6= ∅.
Similarly, ϕ is a deterministic quasi-strategy rule for player r if for all w ∈ WP\T
and a, b ∈ Ar(ϕ,w) implies a = b for all a, b ∈ Ar. Consequently, a complete and
deterministic quasi-strategy rule is a strategy rule.
We next show how to create a strategy rule from non-strategy rules by combining
a set of actions into a strategy using prioritized connectives. To this end, we start
with some properties that can be used not only as a guideline to design a strategy,
but also as a justification to check whether or not a formula is a strategy rule.
Proposition 2.6. Given an ST-model M , for each player r ∈ N and for all
ϕ1, ϕ2 ∈ L+LGD,
1. if either ϕ1 or ϕ2 is a complete quasi-strategy rule for r, so is ϕ1Oϕ2.
2. ϕ1 is a complete quasi-strategy rule for r iff ϕ1 M ϕ2 is a complete quasi-
strategy rule for r.
3. If both ϕ1 and ϕ2 are deterministic quasi-strategy rules for r, so is ϕ1Oϕ2.
4. If ϕ1 is a deterministic quasi-strategy rule for r, so is ϕ1 M ϕ2.
Proof. 1. Suppose not for a contradiction that ϕ1Oϕ2 is not complete. Then
there is some w ∈ WP\T such that Ar(ϕ1Oϕ2, w) = ∅, so for all δ for all stage
j if δ[j] = w then M, δ, j 6|= ϕ1Oϕ2, so M, δ, j 6|= ϕ1 and (P(ϕ1, δ[0, j]) 6= ∅ or
M, δ, j 6|= ϕ2). Since M, δ, j 6|= ϕ1 contradicts with P(ϕ1, δ[0, j]) 6= ∅, so M, δ, j 6|=
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ϕ1 and M, δ, j 6|= ϕ2. Thus, Ar(ϕ1, w) = ∅ and Ar(ϕ2, w) = ∅, contradicting with
the assumption, so ϕ1Oϕ2 is a complete quasi-strategy rule for r.
3. Suppose not for a contradiction that ϕ1Oϕ2 is not deterministic, then there is
some w ∈ WP\T such that a ∈ Ar(ϕ1Oϕ2, w) and b ∈ Ar(ϕ1Oϕ2, w) for a 6= b ∈
Ar, then
(there are δ and j such that δ[j] = w, M, δ, j |= ϕ1Oϕ2 and θr(δ, j) = a) and
(there are δ′ and j′ such that δ′[j′] = w, M, δ′, j′ |= ϕ1Oϕ2 and θr(δ′, j′) = a), so
M, δ, j |= ϕ1 or (P(ϕ1, δ[0, j]) = ∅ and M, δ, j |= ϕ2) and
M, δ′, j′ |= ϕ1 or (P(ϕ1, δ′[0, j′]) = ∅ and M, δ′, j′ |= ϕ2).
Then there are four cases, and it is not hard to get a contradiction for each case.
Clauses 2 and 4 are straightforward.
This result can be generalized to multiple arguments as follows:
Proposition 2.7. Given an ST-model M , for each player r ∈ N and for all
ϕ1, · · · , ϕn ∈ L+LGD,
1. if for some i (1 ≤ i ≤ n) ϕi is a complete quasi-strategy rule for r, so is
ϕ1O · · ·Oϕn.
2. ϕ1 is a complete quasi-strategy rule for r iff ϕ1 M · · · M ϕn is a complete
quasi-strategy rule for r.
3. If for all i (1 ≤ i ≤ n) ϕi is a deterministic quasi-strategy rule for r, so is
ϕ1O · · ·Oϕn.
4. If ϕ1 is a deterministic quasi-strategy rule for r, so is ϕ1 M · · · M ϕn.
Proof. 1. We prove this by induction on n.
• For n = 1. It is trivial by assumption since i = 1;
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• For n = l + 1. Given any w ∈ WP\T , by the induction hypothesis that
ϕ1O · · ·Oϕl is a complete quasi-strategy rule for r, we have there is some a ∈
Ar(ϕ1O · · ·Oϕl, w), then there are some complete path δ and some stage j on
δ such that M, δ, j |= ϕ1O · · ·Oϕl, δ[j] = w and θr(δ, j) = a, then M, δ, j |=
ϕ1O · · ·Oϕl+1, δ[j] = w and θr(δ, j) = a. So a ∈ Ar(ϕ1O · · ·Oϕl+1, w).
Thus, ϕ1O · · ·Oϕn is also a complete quasi-strategy rule for r.
2. The direction from the left to the right follows from Proposition 2.6.2, and
the other direction is straightforward.
3. Assume for all i (1 ≤ i ≤ n) ϕi is a deterministic quasi-strategy rule for r,
then by Proposition 2.6.3, ϕ1Oϕ2 is deterministic. And by assumption ϕ3 is
a deterministic quasi-strategy rule for r, so is ϕ1Oϕ2Oϕ3 by Proposition 2.6.3.
Repeat this process, we obtain that ϕ1O · · ·Oϕn is a deterministic quasi-strategy
rule for r.
4. It follows from Proposition 2.6.4.
Statement 1 provides us an easy way of generating a complete quasi-strategy rule:
create a trivial complete quasi-strategy rule first and then combine it with other
quasi-strategy rules using the prioritized disjunction. Statement 2 tells us that once
we get a complete quasi-strategy rule, we can further refine the quasi-strategy rule
targeting more specific property, say deterministic, using the prioritized conjunc-
tion without losing its completeness. Statement 3 shows us another feasible way of
generating a strategy rule: instead of creating a complete quasi-strategy rule then
refining it into a deterministic one, we can devise a set of specific deterministic
quasi-strategy rules first and then combine them into a complete one [Zhang and
Thielscher, 2015b].
To demonstrate how they work, let us go back to the 53-game at the beginning of
this section.
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(1) Fill the center.
(2) If filling any grid leads to win, fill it.
(3) Fill an empty grid next to her own symbol.
(4) Fill any grid.
(5) Try (1) first; if fails, try (2); if fails, try (3); if fails, do (4).
The actions (1)-(4) are represented in LLGD (also in L+LGD) as follows: for r ∈ {x, o},
1. fill centerr =def does(a
r
3,3)
2. checkr =def
5∨
i,j=1
(does(ari,j) ∧©wins(r))
3. fill nextr =def
5∨
i,j=1
(
pri,j∧ ( does(ari−1,j) ∨does(ari,j−1)∨does(ari,j+1)∨does(ari+1,j))
)
4
4. fill anyr =def
5∨
i,j=1
does(ari,j)
With the prioritized connectives, Clause (5) can be naturally described in L+LGD
as follows:
5. combinedr =def fill center
rOcheckrOfill nextrOfill anyr
It is easy to see that formula combinedr can be satisfied in any state when it is
r’s turn (due to fill anyr). However, it is not a strategy rule because it may
suggest more than one actions in one state. To make it deterministic, we need the
following technical treatment.
Let B = {(i, j) : 1 ≤ i, j ≤ 5} be the game board and ≺ be the lexicographic
order on B, i.e., (1, 1) ≺ (1, 2) ≺ · · · ≺ (1, 5) ≺ (2, 1) ≺ · · · ≺ (5, 5). For each grid
4To avoid too much complexity, we ignore the cases when the indexes go over their range.
Chapter 2. Game Description and Strategy Representation 39
ξ ∈ B, let crξ =
∨
(i,j)≺ξ does(a
r
i,j), which represents the idea of player r to fill any
grid from (1, 1) up to ξ. We let
Ŝr53 =def
(
(fill centerr O checkr Ofill nextr O fill anyr) M cr(5,5) M · · · M cr(1,1)
)
It is not hard to check that Ŝr53 specifies a unique action for agent r at each state
where it is her turn. To obtain a strategy rule, we also need to consider the states
where it is not her turn by simply allowing agent r to take action noop. Let
Sr53 =def (turn(r)→ Ŝr53) ∧ (¬turn(r)→ does(noopr)) (2.1)
Then we make the following observation.
Observation 2.8. For any player r ∈ {x,o}, Sr53 is a strategy rule for player r.
Proof. For any non-terminal reachable state w, if it is player r’s turn, then Ŝr53
specifies a unique action for r at w; otherwise, i.e., it is not her turn, then she
does action noop at w.
To illustrate that the framework can be used to design more complicated strategies,
let us consider another game: Tic-tac-toe (m = k = 3). We need some additional
actions. For r ∈ {x,o},
• Fill a corner.
fill cornerr =def
∨
i∈{1,3}
∨
j∈{1,3} does(a
r
i,j)
• Fill an edge.
fill edger =def
∨
i∈{1,3}(does(a
r
i,2) ∨ does(ar2,i))
• If the opponent makes to win by filling a grid in the next state, then the
player blocks her by filling the grid now.
blockr =def
∨3
i=1
∨3
j=1(©(does(a−ri,j ) ∧©wins(−r)) ∧ does(ari,j))
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• A player fills the opposite corner whenever a corner is filled by her opponent.
fill Ocornerr =def
∨
i 6=j∈{1,3}((p
−r
i,i ∧ does(arj,j)) ∨ (p−rj,j ∧ does(arj,i)))
• A player fills a besieged corner to avoid the opponent to form a double threat.
fill Bcornerr =def
∨
i 6=j∈{1,3}(p
−r
i,2 ∧ p−r2,j ∧ does(ari,j))∨
∨
i∈{1,3}(p
−r
i,2 ∧ p−r2,i ∧
does(ari,i))
• A player fills an edge when the opponent fills a pair of opposite corners.
fill Cedger =def ((p
−r
1,1 ∧ p−r3,3) ∨ (p−r1,3 ∧ p−r3,1)) ∧ fill edger
Based on these, we are now in the position to design a strategy rule for player x
filling the center as the opening action.
Sx33 =def (turn(x)→ Ŝx33) ∧ (¬turn(x)→ noopx) (2.2)
where
Ŝx33 =def (fill center
x Ocheckx Oblockx O fill cornerxO fill anyx)M cx(3,3)M · · ·M
cx(1,1)
Intuitively, the strategy rule Sx33 specifies player x to take actions when it is her
turn in such a prioritized way: first fill the center; if this fails, then try to find
chances to win; if impossible, try to block her opponent; if no threat exists, then
fill a corner; if all fail, then fill any available grid. Note that action fill anyx
guarantees that there should be at least one action for player x to take at all
non-terminal reachable states when it is her turn, and, on the other hand, the M
formulas refine these actions to a unique one, i.e., the smallest one. By taking
action noop for player x at all non-terminal reachable states when it is not her
turn, we make the following observation.
Observation 2.9. Sx33 is a strategy rule for player x.
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Meanwhile, a strategy rule for player o is given as follows:
So33 =def (turn(o)→ Ŝo33) ∧ (¬turn(o)→ does(noopo)) (2.3)
where
Ŝo33 =def (check
oOblockoO fill centeroO fill CedgeoO fill BcorneroO fill Ocornero
O fill corneroO fill anyo) M co(3,3) M · · · M co(1,1)
That is, the strategy rule So33 specifies player o to take actions in such a way:
when it is her turn, first check to win; if it fails, block to avoid an immediate
loss; if it fails again, fill the center; if it is impossible, then fill an edge when the
opponent fills the opposite corners; if this fails, fill a besieged corner to avoid a
double threat; if there is no besieged corner, fill an opposite corner; if this is still
unavailable, then just fill a corner; if all fail, fill any available grid; when it is not
her turn, player o simply does action noop.
Observation 2.10. So33 is a strategy rule for player o.
It should be noted that the conjuncts for no-ops in strategy rules 2.1-2.3 are only
added for asynchronous games, which shows the proposed framework is general
enough to treat asynchronous games as special cases by allowing a player only
to do “noop” when it is not her turn. Moreover, we have demonstrated that the
framework is able to represent game strategies for two specific mk-games, namely
53-game and 33-game; nevertheless, it is expressive to describe more complicated
strategies for more complicated games, such as Gomoku game (m = 15, k = 5).
2.3 Summary
In this chapter, we have presented a logical framework by extending GDL with
prioritized connectives for strategy representation. With a running example, we
have demonstrated that the language allows us to specify game rules and formalize
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game properties, as well as represent game strategies. In the next chapter, we
will reason about strategic abilities of game players and provide a constructive
approach to show whether a game can be forced in a draw or certain players can
cooperate to win. In particular, we will show that the strategy rule designed for
53-game can guarantee the first player to win, and the strategy rule for each player
in 33-game actually specifies a no-losing strategy for the corresponding player.
Besides the related work discussed in Section 1.2, the following is also worth men-
tioning. There is some recent work to use a Turing machine based model for
strategy representation and composition [Gelderie, 2012, 2013, 2014]. It mainly
studies the representation of winning strategies in infinite games as Turing ma-
chines. The idea of composing actions via priorities is first proposed by Zhang and
Thielscher [2015b], but there are three essential differences between their work and
ours. Firstly, their definition of the prioritized connectives is based on the seman-
tics of strategies rather than on the semantics of the logic. Strictly speaking, their
prioritized connectives are not part of their logical language. However, ours are
part of the logical language. Secondly, we define these connectives as binary op-
erators, while theirs are multiple tuple operators. Thirdly, in the next chapter,
we will further extend this framework for reasoning about strategic abilities of
players, which is not involved in their work.
Chapter 3
Coalitional Abilities and Strategic
Reasoning
Chapter 2 introduces a logical framework for game specifications and strategy
representation. It does not reason about game strategies and specify how different
agents can cooperate to achieve a desirable goal. This chapter addresses this
issue by modelling coalitional abilities and strategic reasoning. We first present a
unified framework by further extending the language for strategy representation
with coalition operators from ATL [Alur et al., 2002]. We then show that this
framework allows us to formalise van Benthem’s game-oriented principles in multi-
player games, and formally derive Weak Determinacy and Zermelo’s Theorem for
two-player games. We also demonstrate how to use this framework to verify a
winning/no-losing strategy and reason about coalitional abilities. Finally we show
that the model-checking problem of the logic is in PSPACE, which is not worse
than the model-checking problem for ATL∗, an extension of ATL.
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3.1 Coalitional Abilities
In games, an agent might cooperate with others in order to bring about a desirable
state of affairs. In this section, we begin with the notion of an effectivity function
which aims at capturing explicitly the power that can be obtained by a group of
agents if they form a coalition, and then introduce additional operators so as to
specify and reason about coalitional abilities.
3.1.1 Effectivity Functions
Effectivity functions model the distribution of power among individuals and groups
of individuals. They have been studied extensively in game theory and social
choice theory [Abdou and Keiding, 2012, Peleg, 1997]. The following definition is
borrowed from [van der Hoek and Pauly, 2006].
Definition 3.1. Given a nonempty finite set of players N and a nonempty set of
states S, an effectivity function is any function E: 2N → 22S such that (i) for any
C ⊆ N , ∅ 6∈ E(C), and (ii) for any C ⊆ N , S ∈ E(C).
The function E associates to every group of players the sets of outcomes for which
the group is effective; coalition C is effective for X ⊆ S if it can bring about a
state in X. Intuitively, condition (i) states that no coalition C can enforce the
falsity, and condition (ii) says that every coalition can ensure the truth.
In most situations, effectivity functions are expected to satisfy some properties [Pauly,
2001, 2002].
Outcome Monotonicity. For all C ⊆ N and X ⊆ X ′ ⊆ S, if X ∈ E(C), then
X ′ ∈ E(C). This requires that if a coalition is effective for a subset of states,
then it is also effective for its supersets, since a superset of states places fewer
constraints on a coalition’s ability.
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Coalition Monotonicity. For all C ⊆ C ′ ⊆ N , E(C) ⊆ E(C ′). The property
indicates that if a coalition can achieve some goal, then its superset can
achieve this goal as well.
C-Regularity. For all C ⊆ N , if X ∈ E(C), then S\X 6∈ E(N\C). This means
that it is impossible for a coalition and its complementary set to enforce
inconsistency.
C-Maximality. For all C ⊆ N , if S\X 6∈ E(N\C), then X ∈ E(C). This means
that for every coalition C, either C itself or its complementary set can at
least bring about something. Take a two-player game over S = {win1, win2}
for an example: {1}-maximality states that the game is determined: if one
player does not have a winning strategy, then the other player does.
Superadditivity. For all X1, X2 ⊆ S and C1, C2 ⊆ N with C1 ∩ C2 = ∅, if
X1 ∈ E(C1) and X2 ∈ E(C2), then X1 ∩ X2 ∈ E(C1 ∪ C2). The property
specifies that disjoint coalitions can combine their strategies to achieve more.
3.1.2 Coalition Operators
Let us now introduce two additional modalities to represent and reason about
coalitional abilities captured by effectivity functions. We extend the language
L+LGD with two coalition operators, denoted by [C] and [[C]], which intend to specify
coalition enforcement. Syntactically, we add the following formulation rule to the
language L+LGD.
If ϕ ∈ L+LGD, then [C]ϕ and [[C]]ϕ are formulas of L+LGD.
Formula [C]ϕ says that coalition C has a joint strategy to achieve ϕ at the next
state. Formula [[C]]ϕ says that coalition C has a joint strategy for maintaining ϕ
from now on. As we will see from the semantics, these operators are counterparts
of 〈〈C〉〉© and 〈〈C〉〉 in ATL [Alur et al., 2002].
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With the full expressiveness of the language, besides game descriptions and strat-
egy representation, we can also use it to describe and compare properties of a
game strategy. Let us go back to Example 2.1: mk-games introduced in Chap-
ter 2. Consider the following formulas:
1. [[x]](terminal→ wins(x))
2. [[x]](terminal→ ¬wins(o))
3. [[x]](terminal→ wins(x))O[[x]](terminal→ ¬wins(o))
Formula 1 says player x has a winning strategy and Formula 2 states player x has
a no-losing strategy. The last formula expresses that a winning strategy is more
preferable than a no-losing strategy for player x.
In order to provide the interpretations for the coalition operators with respect
to the state transition model, we need some additional notations. Recall that in
Section 2.2.1 a strategy for an agent r is defined as a total function fr : W
P\T →
Ar such that for all WP\T , (w, fr(w)) ∈ L. Consequently, a joint strategy for a
coalition is a combination of its members’ strategies.
Definition 3.2. A joint strategy for a coalition C ⊆ N is a total function fC :
WP\T → Πr∈CAr such that fC(w) = 〈fr(w)〉r∈C .
The set of all joint strategies of coalition C is denoted by FC. We say that a
complete path δ complies with agent r’s strategy fr, if for all w ∈ W δ\T , for all
j ∈ N, δ[j] = w implies θr(δ, j) = fr(w). That is, for any reachable state w on
δ, the action of agent r taken at w on δ is the same as what strategy fr specifies.
Similarly, a complete path δ complies with a joint strategy fC = 〈fr(w)〉r∈C , if for
all w ∈ W δ\T , for all j ∈ N and for any r ∈ C, δ[j] = w implies θr(δ, j) = fr(w).
That is, for any reachable state w on δ, each member r in coalition C takes the
same action as what her own strategy fr specifies at w.
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During game playing, a player often begins to adopt a strategy from now on.
Accordingly, a complete path δ may start to comply with a joint strategy fC
from the current state. To make this idea precise, let P(fC, w) denote the set of
complete paths δ reaching state w at some stage j where coalition C starts to use
joint strategy fC. Formally,
P(fC, w) = {δ ∈ P | ∃j δ[j] = w and ∀r ∈ C, ∀j ≤ i ≤ |δ| θr(δ, i) = fr(δ[i])}
We are now in the position to provide truth conditions for the coalition operators
based on Definition 2.5 as follows:
• M, δ, j |= [C]ϕ iff ∃fC ∈ FC ∀δ′ ∈ P(fC, δ[j]) ∀j′ ∈ N,
if δ[j] = δ′[j′] and j′ < |δ′|, then M, δ′, j′ + 1 |= ϕ.
• M, δ, j |= [[C]]ϕ iff ∃fC ∈ FC ∀δ′ ∈ P(fC, δ[j]) ∀j′ ∈ N,
if δ[j] = δ′[j′], then M, δ′, i |= ϕ for ∀i ≥ j′.
The interpretations for the coalition operators are similar to these in ATL [Alur
et al., 2002]. Formula [C]ϕ (or [[C]]ϕ) is true if coalition C has a joint strategy
to make ϕ true in the next stage (or maintain ϕ from now on) for all possible
complete paths complying with joint strategy fC starting from state δ[j]. Note
that index j′ denotes the stage when a complete path δ′ reaches state δ[j]. It
is possible that j 6= j′, since two complete paths may reach the same state at
different stages.
By putting all things together, we call the resulting logical framework the logic
for Game Description and strategic Reasoning, denoted as GDR. We use LGDR to
denote the full language generated by the formation rules given by Definition 2.4
including the formation rules that allows to use of prioritized connectives as well
as coalition operators. Formally,
Definition 3.3. A formula ϕ in LGDR is defined by the following BNF:
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ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | initial | terminal | legal(ar) |
wins(r) | does(ar) | ©ϕ | ϕOϕ | [C]ϕ | [[C]]ϕ
where p ∈ Φ, r ∈ N , ar ∈ Ar and C ⊆ N .
The semantics of the language is defined as follows:
Definition 3.4. Let M = (W,w, T, L, U, g, pi) be an ST-model. Given a complete
path δ of M , a stage j of δ and a formula ϕ ∈ LGDR, we say ϕ is true (or satisfied)
at j of δ under M , denoted by M, δ, j |= ϕ, according to the following definition:
M, δ, j |= p iff p ∈ pi(δ[j])
M, δ, j |= ¬ϕ iff M, δ, j 6|= ϕ
M, δ, j |= ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 iff M, δ, j |= ϕ1 and M, δ, j |= ϕ2
M, δ, j |= does(ar) iff θr(δ, j) = ar
M, δ, j |= legal(ar) iff (δ[j], ar) ∈ L
M, δ, j |= initial iff δ[j] = w
M, δ, j |= terminal iff δ[j] ∈ T
M, δ, j |= wins(r) iff δ[j] ∈ g(r)
M, δ, j |=©ϕ iff if j < |δ|, then M, δ, j + 1 |= ϕ
M, δ, j |= ϕ1Oϕ2 iff M, δ, j |= ϕ1, or (P(ϕ1, δ[0, j]) = ∅ and M, δ, j |= ϕ2)
M, δ, j |= [C]ϕ iff ∃fC ∈ FC ∀δ′ ∈ P(fC, δ[j]) ∀j′ ∈ N if δ[j] = δ′[j′]
and j′ < |δ′|, then M, δ′, j′ + 1 |= ϕ.
M, δ, j |= [[C]]ϕ iff ∃fC ∈ FC ∀δ′ ∈ P(fC, δ[j]) ∀j′ ∈ N if δ[j] = δ′[j′],
then M, δ′, i |= ϕ for ∀i ≥ j′.
We end this section by the following proposition which says that the coalitional
abilities specified by coalition operators satisfy the properties of effectivity func-
tions, except the C-Maximality in Section 3.1.1.
Proposition 3.1. For all C, C ′ ⊆ N and all ϕ, ψ ∈ LGDR,
1. |= ¬terminal→ ¬[C]⊥ (that is, no coalition C can enforce the falsity.)
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2. |= [C]> (that is, every coalition C can enforce the truth.)
3. |= [C](ϕ ∧ ψ)→ [C]ϕ (the outcome-monotonicity)
4. |= [C]ϕ→ [C ′]ϕ where C ⊆ C ′ (the coalition-monotonicity)
5. |= [C]ϕ ∧ [C ′]ψ → [C ∪ C ′](ϕ ∧ ψ) where C ∩ C ′ = ∅ (the superadditivity)
6. |= ¬terminal ∧ [C]ϕ→ ¬[N\C]¬ϕ (the C-regularity)
Similarly for [[C]] operator.
Proof. Let M be an arbitrary ST-model, δ be a complete path in M and j be a
stage on δ.
1. Suppose M, δ, j |= ¬terminal, then δ[j] 6∈ T , so for all fC ∈ FC, for any
δ′ ∈ P(fC, δ[j]) and for any j′ ∈ N with δ[j] = δ′[j′] and j′ < |δ′|, M, δ′, j′+1 6|= ⊥.
Thus, M, δ, j 6|= [C]⊥, i.e., M, δ, j |= ¬[C]⊥.
2 and 3 are straightforward.
4. Assume M, δ, j |= [C]ϕ and C ⊆ C ′, then there is fC ∈ FC, for any δ′ ∈
P(fC, δ[j]) and for any j′ ∈ N with δ[j] = δ′[j′] and j′ < |δ′|, M, δ′, j′+ 1 |= ϕ. Let
fC′ be the same as fC for any r ∈ C. Then it is easy to check that fC′ is the joint
strategy for coalition C ′ to achieve ϕ at the next state. So M, δ, j |= [C ′]ϕ.
5. Assume M, δ, j |= [C]ϕ ∧ [C ′]ψ and C ∩ C ′ = ∅, then there is fC = 〈f 1r 〉r∈C for
coalition C to achieve ϕ at the next state, and there is fC′ = 〈f 2r 〉r∈C′ for coalition
C ′ to achieve ψ at the next state. We define the joint strategy fC∪C′ = 〈fr〉r∈C∪C′
as follows: for any state w ∈ Pw\T and any r ∈ C ∪ C ′,
fr(w) =

f 1r (w) if r ∈ C;
f 2r (w) if r ∈ C ′.
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This is well-defined as C ∩ C ′ = ∅. It is easy to check that fC∪C′ is the joint
strategy for coalition C ∪ C ′ to achieve both ϕ and ψ at the next state. Thus,
M, δ, j |= [C ∪ C ′](ϕ ∧ ψ).
6. Suppose that 6|= ¬terminal ∧ [C]ϕ → ¬[N\C]¬ϕ, then there is an ST-model
M , a complete path δ and a stage j such that M, δ, j 6|= ¬terminal ∧ [C]ϕ →
¬[N\C]¬ϕ, then M, δ, j |= ¬terminal ∧ [C]ϕ and M, δ, j |= [N\C]¬ϕ. Since
C ∩N\C = ∅, so by 5 we have M, δ, j |= ¬terminal ∧ [N ]⊥, contradicting with 1.
Thus, |= ¬terminal ∧ [C]ϕ→ ¬[N\C]¬ϕ.
Regarding the C-Maximality, since not all games are determined, so this property
fail to hold in general. Here is a counter-example for the N -Maximality: ¬[∅]¬ϕ→
[N ]ϕ. Consider the following initial segment of a complete path δ in a single-player
game: w→ a→ w b→ · · · and formula does(a) ∧©does(b), which says “do action a
first and then do action b”. It is not hard to check that
M, δ, 0 6|= ¬[∅]¬(does(a) ∧©does(b))→ [1](does(a) ∧©does(b)).
We have M, δ, 0 |= does(a)∧©does(b), but according to the definition of strategy,
it is impossible for player 1 to take different actions at the same state w, i.e.,
M, δ, 0 6|= [1](does(a) ∧©does(b)).
3.2 Strategic Reasoning
In this section, we show how to use the logical framework GDR to reason about
game strategies and coalitional abilities. Inherited from GDL, GDR is able to
describe the rules of perfect information games. Furthermore, with prioritized
connectives and coalition operators, it allows us to represent game strategies and
specify coalitional abilities. More importantly, with a unified semantics for GDL-
and ATL-formulas, GDR can be used for strategic reasoning.
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3.2.1 Game-Oriented Principles
We first formalize Johan Benthem’s description of game-oriented principles [van Ben-
them, 2013], and then use them to derive two well-known results in combinatorial
game theory [Albert et al., 2007].
The game-oriented principles specify the fundamental properties of any finite turn-
taking games of perfect information. These games can be treated as concurrent
games, where the players who do not have the turn take the action noop. These
principles can be represented and proved in GDR as follows:
Theorem 3.2. Let F be the ST-frame for the class of finite turn-taking games
of perfect information. For r ∈ N and ϕ ∈ LGDR, if ϕ does not contain © and
does(.), then
(A1) F |= [[r]]ϕ↔ ϕ ∧
 terminal ∨ (turn(r) ∧ [N ][[r]]ϕ)
∨
∨
r′∈N\{r}
(turn(r′) ∧ [∅][[r]]ϕ)
.
(A2) F |= ϕ ∧ [[∅]]
 (turn(r) ∧ ϕ→ [N ]ϕ)
∧
∧
r′∈N\{r}
(turn(r′) ∧ ϕ→ [∅]ϕ)
→ [[r]]ϕ.
Before proving this theorem, let us first give the intuitions behind the two prin-
ciples. Principle (A1) is a fixed-point recursion, which says that to maintain a
property for a whole game, a player must make sure that it is true now and, be-
fore the game is terminated, either there is a strategy so that she can maintain the
property at next state if it is her turn, or she can maintain the property at next
state for all strategies of other player who has the turn. Note that the property
under consideration must be state-wise (no time spanning). Principle (A2) pro-
vides a sufficient condition for a player to construct a strategy that maintains a
property from now on. A player has a strategy to maintain a property for a whole
game if (i) this property holds at the current state; (ii) the player can achieve this
property at the next state if it is her turn, and (iii) this property always holds at
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the next state if it is not her turn. (ii)-(iii) hold recursively. We now prove the
theorem. The following lemma will be used for the main proof.
Lemma 3.3. Given an ST-model M and two complete paths δ, λ in M , let j1 be
a stage on δ and j2 a stage on λ, if δ[j1] = λ[j2], then for all formulas ϕ ∈ LGDR
without © and does(.) operators,
M, δ, j1 |= ϕ iff M,λ, j2 |= ϕ.
Proof. Given any formula ϕ ∈ LGDR without © and does(.) operators, we next
prove this result by induction on the structure of ϕ except does(ar) and ©ψ.
• It is straightforward for p,¬ψ, ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2, initial, terminal, legal(ar), wins(r);
• ϕ := ϕ1Oϕ2.
Assume M, δ, j1 |= ϕ1Oϕ2, then M, δ, j1 |= ϕ1, or P(ϕ1, δ[0, j1]) = ∅ and
M, δ, j1 |= ϕ2. So by Induction Hypothesis we have M,λ, j2 |= ϕ1, or
P(ϕ1, δ[0, j1]) = ∅ andM,λ, j2 |= ϕ2. And δ[j1] = λ[j2], then P(ϕ1, λ[0, j2]) =
∅, otherwise by Lemma 3.3 P(ϕ1, δ[0, j1]) 6= ∅, a contradiction. Thus,
M,λ, j2 |= ϕ1Oϕ2. The other direction is proved in a similar way.
• ϕ := [C]ψ.
Assume M, δ, j1 |= [C]ψ, then ∃fC such that ∀δ′ ∈ P(fC, δ[j1]), ∀i ∈ N, if
δ[j1] = δ
′[i], then M, δ′, i + 1 |= ψ. Let us take the same joint strategy fC
at stage j2 on complete path λ. Then by Induction Hypothesis and Lemma
3.3, we have ∀λ′ ∈ P(fC, λ[j2]), ∀l ∈ N, if λ[j2] = λ′[l], then M,λ′, l+ 1 |= ψ.
Thus, M,λ, j |= [C]ψ. The other direction is proved in a similar way.
• ϕ := [[C]]ψ. It is proved in a similar way of [C]ϕ.
Thus, the result holds.
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In particular, if δ[j1] = λ[j2] ∈ T , this result holds for all ϕ ∈ LGDR. With this
lemma, we are now in the position to prove Theorem 3.2.
Proof. (A1) For any ST-model M based on F , any complete path δ in M and
any stage j on δ, assume M, δ, j |= (terminal ∧ ϕ) ∨ (turn(r) ∧ ϕ ∧ [N ][[r]]ϕ) ∨∨
r′∈N\{r}(turn(r
′) ∧ ϕ ∧ [∅][[r]]ϕ). We next prove by cases.
• If M, δ, j |= terminal ∧ ϕ, then by Lemma 3.3, for all λ ∈ P(δ[j]) with
λ[j′] = δ[j], M,λ, j′ |= ϕ, so M, δ, j |= [[r]]ϕ.
• If M, δ, j |= turn(r) ∧ ϕ ∧ [N ][[r]]ϕ, then turn(r) ∈ pi(δ[j]) and M, δ, j |=
[N ][[r]]ϕ. By the latter, we have that there is a unique complete path λ ∈
P(fN , δ[j]) such that ∀j′ ∈ N with λ[j′] = δ[j] M,λ, j′ + 1 |= [[r]]ϕ. We
take the same strategy fr at stage j
′ + 1 on path λ to achieve ϕ except
fr(δ[j]) = θr(λ, j
′). Then ∀δ′ ∈ P(fr, δ[j]) ∀i ∈ N with δ′[i] = δ[j], by
turn(r) ∈ pi(δ[j]) and fr(δ[j]) = θr(λ, j′), we have δ′[i + 1] = λ[j′ + 1], so
δ′ ∈ P(fr, λ[j′ + 1]). By the assumption, we obtain M, δ′, i′ |= ϕ for all
i′ ≥ i+ 1. And M, δ, j |= ϕ, so by Lemma 3.3, we obtain M, δ′, i |= ϕ. Thus,
M, δ, j |= [[r]]ϕ.
• If M, δ, j |= ∨r′∈N\{r}(turn(r′)∧ϕ∧[∅][[r]]ϕ), then turn(r′) ∈ pi(δ[j]) for some
r′ ∈ N\{r}, M, δ, j |= ϕ and M, δ, j |= [∅][[r]]ϕ, so for all λ ∈ P(f∅, δ[j]) for
all j′ ∈ N if λ[j′] = δ[j], then M,λ, j′+1 |= [[r]]ϕ. We take the same strategy
fr at stage j
′ + 1 on complete path λ to achieve ϕ. Then ∀δ′ ∈ P(fr, δ[j])
∀i ∈ N with δ′[i] = δ[j], we obtain M, δ′, i′ |= ϕ for all i′ ≥ i + 1. And
M, δ, j |= ϕ, then by Lemma 3.3, we get M, δ′, i |= ϕ. Thus, M, δ, j |= [[r]]ϕ.
Therefore, M, δ, j |= [[r]]ϕ.
Conversely, assume M, δ, j |= [[r]]ϕ, then we next prove by two cases: either δ[j] ∈
T or δ[j] 6∈ T .
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• If δ[j] ∈ T , then M, δ, j |= terminal. And by assumption M, δ, j |= [[r]]ϕ and
Lemma 3.3, so M, δ, j |= ϕ.
• If δ[j] 6∈ T , then either turn(r) ∈ pi(δ[j]) or turn(r′) ∈ pi(δ[j]) for some
r′ ∈ {N}\{r}.
– If turn(r) ∈ pi(δ[j]), then M, δ, j |= turn(r). Suppose not for a contra-
diction that M, δ, j 6|= ϕ or M, δ, j 6|= [N ][[r]]ϕ.
∗ If M, δ, j 6|= ϕ, then by Lemma 3.3, we have that for all λ ∈ P(δ[j])
and for all j′ ∈ N with λ[j′] = δ[j], M,λ, j′ 6|= ϕ, so there is no fr
to maintain ϕ from δ[j]. Thus, M, δ, j 6|= [[r]]ϕ, contradicting with
the assumption.
∗ If M, δ, j 6|= [N ][[r]]ϕ, then for any δ1 ∈ P(fN , δ[j]) and for any
j1 ∈ N with δ1[j1] = δ[j] we have M, δ1, j1 + 1 6|= [[r]]ϕ, so for any
fr, there is δ2 ∈ P(fr, δ1[j1 + 1]) such that for any j2 ∈ N with
δ1[j1 + 1] = δ2[j2], there is l ≥ j2 such that M, δ2, l 6|= ϕ. Thus,
M, δ, j 6|= [[r]]ϕ, contradicting with the assumption.
Therefore, M, δ, j |= turn(r) ∧ ϕ ∧ [N ][[r]]ϕ.
– If turn(r′) ∈ pi(δ[j]), then M, δ, j |= turn(r′). Suppose not for a con-
tradiction that M, δ, j 6|= ϕ or M, δ, j 6|= [∅][[r]]ϕ.
∗ If M, δ, j 6|= ϕ, then by Lemma 3.3, we have that for all λ ∈ P(δ[j])
and for all j′ ∈ N with λ[j′] = δ[j], M,λ, j′ 6|= ϕ, so there is no fr
to maintain ϕ from δ[j]. Thus, M, δ, j 6|= [[r]]ϕ, contradicting with
the assumption.
∗ If M, δ, j 6|= [N ][[r]]ϕ, then for all δ1 ∈ P(fN , δ[j]) there is j1 ∈ N
such that δ1[j1] = δ[j] and M, δ1, j1 + 1 6|= [[r]]ϕ, so for any fr, there
is δ2 ∈ P(fr, δ1[j1+1]) such that for all j2 ∈ N with δ1[j1+1] = δ2[j2]
there is l ≥ j2 such that M, δ2, l 6|= ϕ. Let fr′ be a strategy for r′
such that fr′(δ[j]) = θr′(δ1, j1). Then there is no winning strategy
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for r to achieve ϕ from δ[j], so M, δ, j 6|= [[r]]ϕ, contradicting with
the assumption.
Thus, M, δ, j |= ∨r′∈N\{r}(turn(r′) ∧ ϕ ∧ [∅][[r]]ϕ).
Thus, M, δ, j |= ϕ∧(terminal∨(turn(r)∧[N ][[r]]ϕ)∨∨r′∈N\{r}(turn(r′)∧[∅][[r]]ϕ)).
(A2) For any ST-model M based on F , any complete path δ in M and any stage
j on δ, assume
M, δ, j |= ϕ ∧ [[∅]]((turn(r) ∧ ϕ→ [N ]ϕ) ∧∧r′∈N\{r}(turn(r′) ∧ ϕ→ [∅]ϕ))
iff M, δ, j |= ϕ and M, δ, j |= [[∅]]((turn(r)∧ϕ→ [N ]ϕ)∧∧r′∈N\{r}(turn(r′)∧ϕ→
[∅]ϕ))
iff M, δ, j |= ϕ, and ∀λ ∈ P(δ[j]) ∀j′ ∈ N if δ[j] = λ[j′], then ∀i ≥ j′,M, λ, i |=
turn(r) ∧ ϕ→ [N ]ϕ and M,λ, i |= ∧r′∈N\{r}(turn(r′) ∧ ϕ→ [∅]ϕ) (?)
Next we prove by three cases: δ[j] ∈ T , or turn(r) ∈ pi(δ[j]), or turn(r′) ∈ pi(δ[j])
for some r′ ∈ N\{r}.
• If δ[j] ∈ T , then M, δ, j |= terminal. And M, δ, j |= ϕ, so ∀λ ∈ P(δ[j])
∀j′ ∈ N with λ[j′] = δ[j], we have λ[j′] ∈ T and M,λ, j′ |= ϕ by Lemma 3.3.
Thus, M, δ, j |= [[r]]ϕ.
• If turn(r) ∈ pi(δ[j]), then M, δ, j |= turn(r). And by (?), we have M, δ, j |=
[N ]ϕ, then ∃δ1 ∈ P(δ[j]) such that ∀j1 ∈ N with δ1[j1] = δ[j], M, δ1, j1 +1 |=
ϕ. And from M, δ, j |= ϕ and by Lemma 3.3, we have M, δ1, j1 |= ϕ. Let
fr be a strategy of r such that fr(δ[j]) = θr(δ1[j1]). Then δ1[j1 + 1] ∈ T
or t(δ1[j1 + 1]) = r or t(δ1[j1 + 1]) = r
′ for some r′ ∈ N\{r}. Repeat this
process until reaching a terminal state where ϕ holds.
• If turn(r′) ∈ pi(δ[j]) for some r′ ∈ N\{r}, then M, δ, j |= turn(r′). And
by (?) and M, δ, j |= [∅]ϕ, so ∀δ2 ∈ P(δ[j]) ∀j2 ∈ N with δ2[j2] = δ[j], we
have M, δ2, j2 + 1 |= ϕ. Then by Lemma 3.3, we obtain M, δ2, j2 |= ϕ, so
δ2[j2 + 1] ∈ T or t(δ2[j2 + 1]) = r or t(δ2[j2 + 1]) = r′ for some r′ ∈ N\{r}.
Repeat this process until reaching a terminal state where ϕ holds.
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In this way, we construct agent r’s strategy fr step by step, which is a strategy to
maintain ϕ from δ[j]. Thus, M, δ, j |= [[r]]ϕ.
It is easy to see that these two statements are the generalisation of Benthem’s
game-oriented principles (Fact 3: C1-C2 in [van Benthem, 2013]). We generalise
them into the multi-agent case. Interestingly, the well-known results for finite
turn-taking two-player games of perfect information, namely weak determinacy
and Zermelo’s theorem, are corollaries of the above theorem.
Proposition 3.4 (Weak Determinacy). Let F∗ be a state transition frame for
the class of finite turn-taking two-player games of perfect information with N =
{r1, r2}, then F∗ |= [[r1]](terminal→ wins(r1))∨[[r2]]¬[[r1]](terminal→ wins(r1)).
Proof. According to (A1), we have the following valid formulas:
F∗ |= turn(r1) ∧ ϕ ∧ ¬[[r1]]ϕ→ [∅]¬[[r1]]ϕ (3.1)
F∗ |= turn(r2) ∧ ϕ ∧ ¬[[r1]]ϕ→ [N ]¬[[r1]]ϕ (3.2)
We substitute ϕ with terminal→ wins(r1), then
F∗ |= turn(r1) ∧ ¬[[r1]](terminal→ wins(r1))→ [∅]¬[[r1]](terminal→ wins(r1))
(3.3)
F∗ |= turn(r2) ∧ ¬[[r1]](terminal→ wins(r1))→ [N ]¬[[r1]](terminal→ wins(r1))
(3.4)
So, we get
F∗ |= [[∅]]((turn(r1)∧¬[[r1]](terminal→ wins(r1))→ [∅]¬[[r1]](terminal→ wins(r1))
∧ (turn(r2) ∧ ¬[[r1]](terminal→ wins(r1))→ [N ]¬[[r1]](terminal→ wins(r1))))
(3.5)
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According to (A2), we have
F∗ |= ϕ ∧ [[∅]]((turn(r2) ∧ ϕ→ [N ]ϕ) ∧ (turn(r1) ∧ ϕ→ [∅]ϕ))→ [[r2]]ϕ (3.6)
We substitute ϕ with ¬[[r1]](terminal→ wins(r1)), then
F∗ |= ¬[[r1]](terminal→ wins(r1)) ∧ [[∅]]((turn(r2) ∧ ¬[[r1]](terminal→ wins(r1))
→ [N ]¬[[r1]](terminal→ wins(r1))) ∧ (turn(r1) ∧ ¬[[r1]](terminal→ wins(r1))
→ [∅]¬[[r1]](terminal→ wins(r1))))→ [[r2]]¬[[r1]](terminal→ wins(r1)) (3.7)
Then by 3.5 and 3.7, we get
F∗ |= ¬[[r1]](terminal→ wins(r1))→ [[r2]]¬[[r1]](terminal→ wins(r1)) (3.8)
Thus, F∗ |= [[r1]](terminal→ wins(r1)) ∨ [[r2]]¬[[r1]](terminal→ wins(r1)).
Weak determinacy says in any finite two-player game with perfect information
either one player has a winning strategy or the other player has a strategy that
ensures her opponent has no winning strategy. Moreover, if the outcomes of such
a game are restricted to three cases: win, lose and tie. Then we obtain Zermelo’s
Theorem.
Proposition 3.5 (Zermelo’s theorem).
F∗ |= [[r1]](terminal→ wins(r1)) ∨ [[r2]](terminal→ wins(r2))
∨([[r1]](terminal→ Tie) ∧ [[r2]](terminal→ Tie))
where Tie =def (¬wins(r1) ∧ ¬wins(r2)).
Proof. We have the following valid formulas in F∗:
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1. F∗ |= ([[r1]](terminal→ wins(r1))∨[[r1]](terminal→ Tie))↔ [[r1]](terminal→
¬wins(r2))
2. F∗ |= ([[r2]](terminal→ wins(r2))∨[[r2]](terminal→ Tie))↔ [[r2]](terminal→
¬wins(r1))
3. F∗ |= [[r1]](terminal→ wins(r1))→ [[r1]](terminal→ ¬wins(r2))
4. F∗ |= [[r2]]¬[[r1]](terminal→ wins(r1))↔ [[r2]](terminal→ ¬wins(r1))
The result is directly followed from 1-4 and Proposition 3.4.
Intuitively, Zermelo’s theorem says in any finite two-player game with perfect
information and three outcomes (win, lose and tie), if the game cannot end in a
draw, then one of the two players has a winning strategy [Polak, 2007].
3.2.2 Reasoning about Strategies: A Case Study
Let us now demonstrate with mk-games how to verify whether a game strategy is
a winning or no-losing strategy for an agent, and how to reason about coalitional
abilities.
A standard strategy stealing argument from combinatorial game theory shows that
there is no winning strategy for the second player in any mk-game. This can be
described as follows:
Proposition 3.6. Fmk |= ¬[[o]](terminal→ wins(o))
Proof. Suppose not for a contradiction that the second player o has a winning
strategy S in some mk-game. Let the first player x fill an arbitrary grid to begin
with, then she pretends to be o, “stealing” o’s strategy S and complying with
S. And by assumption, x will win the game. If strategy S specifies her to fill
a grid that she has already filled, she should choose to fill a square at random
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again. This will not interfere with the execution of S, and this strategy is always
at least as good as S since having an extra marked grid on the board is never
a disadvantage. Thus, the existence of a winning strategy S for o implies the
existence of a similarly winning strategy for x: a contradiction since the players
cannot both have winning strategies in one game.
As mk-games are a special family of finite two-player games with perfect informa-
tion, so by Proposition 3.5, we derive that in mk-games the first player x has a
no-losing strategy:
Corollary 3.7. Fmk |= [[x]](terminal→ ¬wins(o))
Instead of the strategy stealing argument, we next use a constructive approach to
illustrate this result by showing that the strategies developed in Section 2.2.3 are
actually no-losing or winning strategies for players in 53−game and Tic-Tac-Toe,
respectively.
Let us first consider 53-game. We now show that the strategy specified by strategy
rule Sr53 (2.1) is a winning strategy for player x. To this end, we say that a state
transition model M complies with player r’s strategy fr specified by a strategy
rule Sr, denoted by MSr , if for all complete paths δ ∈ P(MSr), δ complies with fr.
Formally, P(MSr) = {δ ∈ P(M) : M, δ |= ¬terminal → Sr}. With this notion,
we can verify that the strategy specified by Sx53 is a winning strategy for player x
in 53-game.
Observation 3.8. For all δ ∈ P(MSx53), M53, δ |= terminal→ wins(x)
Proof. For all δ ∈ P(MSx53), we have M53, δ |= turn(x) → Ŝx53. Then x fills the
center (fill centerx) at the initial state. Whatever o chooses to do, according to
Sx53, player x can form a two in a row in her third move by filling the smallest
empty square next to the center.
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• If this two is an open two (i.e., with both end open), then player x guarantees
to win in her next move by taking action check;
• Otherwise, this two can be blocked by o. Such situation only occurs when o
fills the square above the center, i.e., c3,4 at her first turn. Then x fills the
smallest empty square below the center, i.e., c3,2 in her second turn which
forms a two with one end open. Then in o’s second turn he has no choice
but to block the threat by filling the open end. Then according to Ŝx53, x
fills the smallest empty square next to c3,2, i.e., c2,2 at her third turn, which
forms an open two. Then in her forth turn, x wins by taking action check
no matter what o does.
Thus, the strategy specified by Sx53 is a winning strategy for player x.
It follows that there is a winning strategy for player x in 53-game.
Corollary 3.9. M53 |= [[x]](terminal→ wins(x))
We next show Tic-tac-toe game can be forced in a draw by proving the strategy
specified by strategy rule Sx33 (2.2) and the strategy specified by strategy rule S
o
33
(2.3) are no-losing strategies for player x and player o, respectively. The key idea
for proving a no-losing strategy for a player is to ensure that once the player adopts
the strategy, there is no possibility for her opponent to have two simultaneous check
actions, called a double threat.
First of all, it is not hard to check that once player x adopts the strategy specified
by Sx33, her opponent o has no possibility to create a double threat. Thus, we have
the following observation saying Sx33 specifies a no-losing strategy for player x in
Tic-Tac-Toe.
Observation 3.10. For all δ ∈ P(MSx33), M33, δ |= terminal→ ¬wins(o)
On the other hand, the following observation shows that the strategy specified by
So33 is a no-losing strategy for player o.
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Observation 3.11. For all δ ∈ P(MSo33), M33, δ |= terminal→ ¬wins(x)
Proof. For all δ ∈ P(MSo33), we have M33, δ |= ¬terminal → So33. Then we next
prove by three cases: at the initial state player x fills a corner, or fills the center,
or fills an edge.
• Case 1. If player x fills a corner at the initial state, then M33, δ |= initial→
fill cornerx, then when it is player o’s turn, he fills the center as his first
move.
– If x fills the opposite corner, then according to So33, o fills the smallest
edge, then x has to block o, which in turn makes o to block x. After-
wards, there is no way for player x to create a double threat, so x cannot
win;
– If x does not fill the opposite corner, then according to So33, o fills it if
there is no threat to him, which directly causes that x cannot create a
double threat, which implies that x cannot win.
• Case 2. If player x fills the center at the initial state, then o fills the smallest
corner at his first turn. Then x either fills the opposite corner or not.
– If x fills the opposite corner at her second turn, then o fills the smallest
corner at his second turn leading to a threat to player x, then x has
to block it, which in turn leads to a threat to o, so o has to block it.
Afterwards, there is no possibility for x to win.
– If x does not fill the opposite corner at her second turn, then two players
have to block each other until there is no possibility for player x to create
a double threat.
• Case 3. If player x fills an edge at the initial state, then o fills the center at
his first turn. Then x either or not fills a square next to the filled edge.
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– If x fills a square which is not next to the filled edge, then o fills the
smallest corner, then there is no possibility for player x to create a
double threat.
– Otherwise, if there is a threat to him, block it; if not, then o fills the
smallest besieged corner to avoid a double threat. In both cases, x has
to block o, then there is no possibility for x to win.
Thus, M33, δ |= terminal→ ¬wins(x).
Therefore, it follows from Observation 3.10 and Observation 3.11 that Tic-tac-toe
can be forced in a draw.
3.3 Model Checking
Checking whether a game or a strategy has a property specified by a GDR-formula
is reduced to the model checking problem. In this section, we investigate this issue.
The model-checking problem for GDR is the following: for a given GDR formula
ϕ, a state transition model M , a complete path δ and a stage j in M , determine
whether or not M, δ, j |= ϕ. By establishing a translation from GDR to ATL∗, we
show an upper bound of the model-checking problem for GDR, which is not worse
than the model-checking problem for ATL∗.
Let us first give a brief review of the logic ATL∗ [Alur et al., 2002]. There are
two types of formulas in ATL∗: state formulas and path formulas. They are
simultaneously defined as follows:
Let Φ be a finite set of atomic propositions and N = {r1, · · · , rk} be a nonempty
finite set of agents. The language of ATL∗, denoted by LATL∗ , is defined by the
following grammar:
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | 〈〈C〉〉ψ
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ψ ::= ϕ | ¬ψ | ψ ∧ ψ | ©ψ | ψUψ
where p ∈ Φ and C ⊆ N .
The semantics of ATL∗ is based on the action-based alternating transition sys-
tem (AATS) [van der Hoek et al., 2005]. An AATS T is a tuple (Φ, N,W,w,
Ar1 , · · · , Ark , ρ, τ, pi) where
• Φ is a nonempty finite set of atomic propositions;
• N = {r1, · · · , rk} be a nonempty finite set of agents;
• W ia a nonempty set of states;
• w ∈ W is the initial state;
• Ar is a nonempty finite set of actions for each agent r ∈ N , where Ari∩Arj =
∅ for all ri 6= rj ∈ N ;
• ρ : ⋃r∈N Ar → 2W is an action precondition function, which for any action
a ∈ ⋃r∈N Ar specifies the set of states ρ(a) from which a may be executed;
• τ : W ×∏r∈N Ar ↪→ W is a partial system transition function, which for
w ∈ W and joint action d ∈ ∏r∈N Ar defines the state τ(w, d) that would
result by the performance of d from state w;
• pi : Φ→ 2W is a standard valuation function.
Given d ∈ ∏r∈N Ar, let d(r) denote the individual action of agent r in d. A
computation λ is an infinite sequence of states and actions w
d1→ w1 d2→ w2 · · · ,
where for each j ≥ 1 and r ∈ N , wj−1 ∈ ρ(dj(r)) and τ(wj−1, dj) = wj. A
computation λ starting in state w is referred to as a q-computation. We use λ[j]
to denote the j-th state on computation λ, and λ[j,∞] to denote the infinite suffix
of λ starting from j.
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A strategy fr for an agent r ∈ N is a total function fr : W → Ar mapping
every state to an action of agent r such that for any w ∈ W , w ∈ ρ(fr(w)). A
joint strategy for coalition C ⊆ N , denoted by FC, is a vector of its members’
individual strategies, i.e., 〈fr〉r∈C . The function out(w, fr) returns the set of all
possible computations that may occur when agent r’s strategy fr executes, starting
from state w ∈ W . Formally, λ ∈ out(w, fr) iff λ[0] = w and for any j ≥ 0,
fr(λ[j]) = θr(λ, j) where θr(λ, j) is the action of agent r taken at stage j on
computation λ. The set of all computations complying with joint strategy FC
from state w is defined as out(w,FC) =
⋂
r∈C out(w, fr).
The semantics of ATL∗ can now be given as follows: for an AATS T , a state
w ∈ W and a computation λ of T , the satisfiability relation |= for w and λ of T
is defined inductively as follows:
T , w |= p iff p ∈ pi(w)
T , w |= ¬ϕ iff T , w 6|= ϕ
T , w |= ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 iff T , w |= ϕ1 and T , w |= ϕ2
T , w |= 〈〈C〉〉ψ iff ∃FC ∀λ ∈ out(w,FC) T , λ |= ψ
T , λ |= ϕ iff T , λ[0] |= ϕ, where ϕ is a state formula
T , λ |= ¬ψ iff T , λ 6|= ψ
T , λ |= ψ1 ∧ ψ2 iff T , λ |= ψ1 and T , λ |= ψ2
T , λ |=©ψ iff T , λ[1,∞] |= ψ
T , λ |= ψ1Uψ2 iff ∃j ≥ 0 T , λ[j,∞] |= ψ2 and ∀0 ≤ i < j λ[i,∞] |= ψ1
It has been proved that the model-checking problem for ATL∗ with respect to above
semantics is PSPACE-complete [Schobbens, 2004].
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3.3.1 From GDR Model to ATL∗ Model
Let us first show that any state transition model can be transformed into a ATL∗
model, using the methods introduced by Ruan et al. [2009]. The main idea is
that we encode notions like terminal, legal, wins through valuation pi, rather than
through separate relations or functions. For this purpose, we redefine the set of
atomic propositions of GDR, denoted by AtGDR, as follows:
AtGDR =def Φ ∪ {terminal} ∪ {legal(ar)) | ar ∈ Ar} ∪ {wins(r) | r ∈ N}
Given a state transition model M = (W,w, T, L, U, g, pi) with a game signa-
ture S = (N,A,AtGDR), we define an associated AATS TM = (Φ′, N,W ′, w,
A′r1 , · · · , A′rk , ρ, τ, pi′) with the same set of agents N and the same initial state
w such that Φ′ is constructed in the following manner.
• for all p˜ ∈ AtGDR∗ , p˜ ∈ Φ′.
• done(ar) ∈ Φ′ for all ar ∈ A′r representing actions that are done in the
transition from the previous state to the current state1.
• initial ∈ Φ′ and s⊥ ∈ Φ′ where s⊥ is a special atom to specify a ‘sink state’
which is the only successor of a terminal state and itself.
The other components of TM are constructed as follows:
• W ′ = W1 ∪W2 where W1 = W and W2 = {sw | w ∈ W1} including sink
states.
• A′r = Ar ∪ {finr} where for all r ∈ N Ar is in M and finr is an action for
the terminal and sink states.
• ρ : ⋃r∈N A′r 7→ W ′ is an action precondition function such that
1Note this concept as well as the following two concepts (sink state and finr) is borrowed
from [Ruan et al., 2009].
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– for any a ∈ A, ρ(a) = {w ∈ W | (w, a) ∈ L};
– for any r ∈ N , ρ(finr) = W2 ∪ T .
• τ : A′r1 × · · · × A′rk ×W ′ → W ′ is a system transition function such that
– for all d ∈ Πr∈NAr and w ∈ W , τ(d, w) = U(d, w);
– for all w ∈ T , τ(〈finr1 , · · · , finrk〉 , w) = sw;
– for all sw ∈ W2, τ(〈finr1 , · · · , finrk〉 , sw) = sw.
• pi′ : W ′ 7→ 2Φ′ is a valuation function such that for any w ∈ W ′ pi′(w) is a
set of atoms satisfying the following conditions:
(1) for all w ∈ W1,
– for any p ∈ Φ, p ∈ pi(w) iff p ∈ pi′(w);
– w ∈ T iff terminal ∈ pi′(w);
– for any r ∈ N , w ∈ g(r) iff wins(r) ∈ pi′(w);
– for any ar ∈ A, (w, ar) ∈ L iff legal(ar) ∈ pi′(w);
– initial ∈ pi′(w);
– done(ar) ∈ pi′(w) iff θr(δ, j) = ar and δ[j + 1] = w2.
(2) for all sw ∈ W2,
pi′(sw) = pi′(w)∪{s⊥}∪{done(finr) | r ∈ N}\{done(ar) | ar ∈ A}.
Given a complete path δ in M , we extend δ to a computation in TM with the sink
state labelled by the terminal state of δ. We denote it by δ˜. In particular, we use
δ˜[j,∞] to denote the infinite subsequence of δ˜ starting at stage j.
3.3.2 From GDR Descriptions to ATL∗ Specifications
We next define a translation map from GDR formulas to ATL∗ formulas to embed
GDR into ATL∗.
2The idea is that there is a unique action for each player to take at every state and the
update is deterministic, so formula does(.) can be translated to a state formula done(.) at the
next state.
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Definition 3.5. A translation Tr∗ from GDR formulas to ATL∗ formulas is defined
as follows:
• Tr∗(p˜) = Tr(p˜) for all p˜ ∈ AtGDR
• Tr∗(initial) = initial
• Tr∗(¬ϕ) = ¬Tr∗(ϕ)
• Tr∗(ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2) = Tr∗(ϕ1) ∧ Tr∗(ϕ2)
• Tr∗(does(ar)) = ©done(ar)
• Tr∗(ϕ1Oϕ2) = Tr∗(ϕ1)∨(〈〈∅〉〉¬Tr∗(ϕ1) ∧ Tr∗(ϕ2))
• Tr∗(©ϕ) = ©(¬s⊥ → Tr∗(ϕ))
• Tr∗([C]ϕ) = 〈〈C〉〉 © (¬s⊥ → Tr∗(ϕ))
• Tr∗([[C]]ϕ) = 〈〈C〉〉Tr∗(ϕ)
Then we have the following corresponding result between the state transition
model and its associated AATS with respect to the translation.
Lemma 3.12. Given a state transition model M , a complete path δ in M , a stage
j on δ and any formula ϕ ∈ LGDR,
(1) if Tr∗(ϕ) is an ATL∗ state formula, M, δ, j |=GDR ϕ iff TM , δ˜[j] |=ATL∗ Tr∗(ϕ);
(2) if Tr∗(ϕ) is an ATL∗ path formula, M, δ, j |=GDR ϕ iff TM , δ˜[j,∞] |=ATL∗
Tr∗(ϕ).
Proof. Given a state transition model M , a complete path δ in M , a stage j on δ
and for any GDR formulas ϕ ∈ LGDR, we prove the two statements by induction
on the structure of ϕ simultaneously.
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• ϕ := p. Assume M, δ, j |= p iff p ∈ pi(δ[j]) iff p ∈ pi′(δ[j]) iff TM , δ˜[j] |= p iff
TM , δ˜[j] |= Tr∗(p).
• ϕ := initial. Assume M, δ, j |= initial iff δ[j] = w iff initial ∈ pi′(δ[j]) iff
TM , δ˜[j] |= initial iff TM , δ˜[j] |= Tr∗(initial).
• ϕ := terminal. Assume M, δ, j |= terminal iff δ[j] ∈ T iff terminal ∈
pi′(δ[j]) iff TM , δ˜[j] |= terminal iff TM , δ˜[j] |= Tr∗(terminal).
• ϕ := legal(ar). Assume M, δ, j |= legal(ar) iff (δ[j], ar) ∈ L iff legal(ar) ∈
pi′(δ[j]) iff TM , δ˜[j] |= legal(ar) iff TM , δ˜[j] |= Tr∗(legal(ar)).
• ϕ := wins(r). Assume M, δ, j |= wins(r) iff δ[j] ∈ g(r) iff wins(r) ∈ pi′(δ[j])
iff TM , δ˜[j] |= wins(r) iff TM , δ˜[j] |= Tr∗(wins(r)).
• ϕ := does(ar). Assume M, δ, j |= does(ar) iff θr(δ, j) = ar iff done(ar) ∈
pi(δ[j+ 1]) iff TM , δ˜[j+ 1] |= done(ar) iff TM , δ˜[j] |=©done(ar) iff TM , δ˜[j] |=
Tr∗(does(ar)).
• ϕ := ¬ψ.
– If Tr∗(¬ψ) is an ATL∗-state formula, then M, δ, j |= ¬ψ iff M, δ, j 6|= ψ
iff TM , δ˜[j] 6|= Tr∗(ψ) iff TM , δ˜[j] |= Tr∗(¬ψ);
– If Tr∗(¬ψ) is an ATL∗-path formula, then M, δ, j |= ¬ψ iff M, δ, j 6|= ψ
iff TM , δ˜[j,∞] 6|= Tr∗(ψ) iff TM , δ˜[j,∞] |= Tr∗(¬ψ).
• ϕ := ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2.
– If Tr∗(ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2) is an ATL∗-state formula, then M, δ, j |= ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 iff
M, δ, j |= ϕ1 and M, δ, j |= ϕ2 iff TM , δ˜[j] |= Tr∗(ϕ1) and TM , δ˜[j] |=
Tr∗(ϕ2) iff TM , δ˜[j] |= Tr∗(ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2);
– If Tr∗(ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2) is an ATL∗-path formula, then M, δ, j |= ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 iff
M, δ, j |= ϕ1 andM, δ, j |= ϕ2 iff TM , δ˜[j,∞] |= Tr∗(ϕ1) and TM , δ˜[j,∞] |=
Tr∗(ϕ2) iff TM , δ˜[j,∞] |= Tr∗(ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2).
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• ϕ := ©ψ. Assume M, δ, j |= ©ψ iff M, δ, j + 1 |= ψ iff TM , δ˜[j + 1,∞] |=
¬s⊥ → Tr∗(ψ) iff TM , δ˜[j,∞] |=©(¬s⊥ → Tr∗(ψ)) iff TM , δ˜[j,∞] |= Tr∗(©ψ).
• ϕ := ϕ1Oϕ2.
Assume M, δ, j |= ϕ1Oϕ2
iff M, δ, j |= ϕ1, or P(ϕ1, δ[0, j]) = ∅ and M, δ, j |= ϕ2
iff TM , δ˜[j] |= Tr∗(ϕ1), or P(ϕ1, δ[0, j]) = ∅ and TM , δ˜[j] |= Tr∗(ϕ2)
iff TM , δ˜[j] |= Tr∗(ϕ1), or for all λ ∈ out(δ[j]) TM , λ[0] 6|= Tr∗(ϕ1) and
TM , δ˜[j] |= Tr∗(ϕ2)
iff TM , δ˜[j] |= Tr∗(ϕ1) ∨ (〈〈∅〉〉¬Tr∗(ϕ1) ∧ Tr∗(ϕ2))
iff TM , δ˜[j] |= Tr∗(ϕ1Oϕ2).
• ϕ := [C]ψ.
Assume M, δ, j |= [C]ψ
iff ∃fC such that for all δ′ ∈ P(fC, δ[j]) and for all j′ ∈ N, if δ′[j′] = δ[j] and
j′ < |δ′| then M, δ′, j′ + 1 |= ψ
iff ∃fC such that for all λ ∈ out(fC, δ[j′]), M,λ[1] |= ¬s⊥ → Tr∗(ψ)
iff TM , δ˜[j] |= 〈〈C〉〉 © (¬s⊥ → Tr∗(ψ))
iff TM , δ˜[j] |= Tr∗([C]ψ).
• ϕ := [[C]]ψ.
Assume M, δ, j |= [[C]]ψ
iff ∃fC such that for all δ′ ∈ P(fC, δ[j]) and for all j′ ∈ N, if δ′[j′] = δ[j] then
M, δ′, i |= ψ for all i ≥ j′.
iff ∃fC such that for all λ ∈ out(fC, δ[j]), for all i ≥ 0, M,λ[i] |= Tr∗(ψ)
iff TM , δ˜[j] |= 〈〈C〉〉Tr∗(ψ)
iff TM , δ˜[j] |= Tr∗([[C]]ψ).
Thus, the result holds.
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And the size of the transformations from GDR to ATL∗ is polynominal. Thus,
the model-checking problem for GDR is not worse than that for ATL∗. Since the
model-checking problem for ATL∗ is PSPACE-complete [Schobbens, 2004], so we
have the following result.
Theorem 3.13. The model-checking problem for GDR is in PSPACE.
At last it should be noted that the reduction of GDR to ATL∗ does not mean that
ATL∗ can be used for strategy representation. It is not hard to find that once
we translate the strategies we designed for the mk-games into ATL∗, we will lose
all the intuitions behind these strategies. ATL∗ is an expressive logical language
for specifying strategic abilities of players but certainly not suitable for describing
game strategies.
3.4 Summary
Up to now, we have fulfilled our goal by presenting a comprehensive logical frame-
work for reasoning about perfect information games. The language of the frame-
work combines GDL with prioritized connectives for representing game strategies
and coalition operators for specifying strategic abilities of game players. To mini-
mize the complexity of this language, we have taken a cautious way of doing that.
We did not introduce until operator U and coalition operators binded with next©
and always . We have demonstrated with a running example that our language
is able to describe game rules, express game properties, represent game strategies
and specify coalitional abilities. More importantly, the framework allows us to for-
malize generic game results such as Weak Determinacy and Zermelo’s Theorem,
verify whether or not a game strategy is winning or no-losing, and reason about
coalitional abilities. We have also investigated the model-checking problem for the
logic. To the best of our knowledge, there is no other logical system with such
computational complexity that can have the same expressive power.
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Most of the related work has been discussed in Section 1.2. Besides that, the
following is also worth mentioning.
Ruan et al. [2009] investigate the relationship between GDL and ATL. Different
from our motivation and method, their goal is to use ATL to reason about GDL-
specified games. And instead of integrating language components, they focus on
how to transfer a GDL game specification into an ATL specification. Therefore,
there is no new logic produced in their paper but using ATL for reasoning about
properties of GDL-defined games.
There has been some work to make strategies explicit in ATL by adding a strat-
egy term into coalition operators, meaning that a coalition commits to a strat-
egy [Herzig et al., 2013, van der Hoek et al., 2005, Walther et al., 2007]. In such
a way, strategies can be expressed syntactically. However, as pointed out by [Ra-
manujam and Simon, 2008b, van Eijck, 2013], these strategies are atomic terms
in the language level without showing their structures. Thus, it is difficult to use
the language to design a strategy so as to achieve a goal state.
Chapter 4
Reasoning about Games with
Imperfect Information
Games can be classified as perfect information games or imperfect information
games [Osborne, 1994]. Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 deal with perfect information
games. In this chapter, we turn to investigating games with imperfect information,
such as Poker, Kriegspiel (chess).
4.1 Background
Playing games with imperfect information poses an intricate reasoning challenge
for players, since imperfect information requires a player to use the rules of a
game to infer useful game information, draw conclusions from her own knowledge
about the current game state and about knowledge of other players. In order
to incorporate imperfect information games, GDL has recently been extended to
GDL-II [Thielscher, 2010]. However, as a purely descriptive language, GDL-II is
only a tool for describing the rules of an imperfect information game, but does
not provide a facility for reasoning about how a player infers unveiled information
based on the rules [Schiffel and Thielscher, 2011, 2014]. Indeed, some information
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is essential for players to proceed with a game. For example, players should always
know their own available actions in non-terminal states and know their results
in terminal states. Such epistemic properties of a game are normally implied
by the game rules and thus need reasoning facilities to infer and verify them.
Unfortunately, GDL-II (or GDL) is not designed for this purpose.
To handle this issue, a few approaches have been proposed, mostly embedding GDL-
II into a logical system, such as Situation Calculus or Alternating-time Temporal
Epistemic Logic (ATEL), to use their reasoning facilities [Huang et al., 2013, Ruan
and Thielscher, 2011, 2012, Schiffel and Thielscher, 2011]. As long as the target-
ing logics are expressive enough to interpret any GDL description, it is possible to
use the inference mechanisms of these logics for reasoning about GDL-II games.
However, a highly expressive logic may incur high complexity for reasoning tasks.
For instance, Ruan and Thielscher [2012] propose an adaption of ATEL to verify
epistemic properties of GDL-II games, and show that the model-checking problem
in that setting is 2EXPTIME-hard. Such high computational complexity may be
not what we want.
This chapter aims to propose a different approach to deal with this problem. We
introduce a logical framework, called EGDL, equipped with a language for de-
scribing imperfect information games and a semantical model that can be used
for reasoning about game information and players’ epistemic status. Most im-
portantly, we develop a model-checking algorithm for EGDL and show that the
complexity of the model-checking problem for the logic can be significantly re-
duced to ∆p2. There are two major reasons that help us to reduce the complexity.
Firstly, our language is a conservative extension of GDL with standard epistemic
operators [Fagin et al., 2003b]. We take a cautious way of doing that without intro-
ducing the until operator or coalition operators. Secondly, we provide an imperfect
recall semantics for knowledge. Other cases could be considered; nevertheless, the
addition of perfect recall to GDL-II renders the model-checking problem of ATEL
undecidable in general [Ruan and Thielscher, 2012]. Also, in many applications,
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especially when modeling extremely large games, imperfect recall may provide
considerably empirical and practical advantages [Busard et al., 2015, Piccione and
Rubinstein, 1997, Waugh et al., 2009]. Despite moderate expressive power, we
demonstrate with an example that the language is able to express game rules,
formalize essential epistemic properties and specify the interactions of knowledge
and actions. In this sense, EGDL makes a good balance between expressive power
and computational efficiency.
4.2 Epistemic State Transition Structures
Following Chapter 2, in this chapter, all concepts will be based on the same game
signature S = (N,A,Φ) defined in Section 2.1. We begin by introducing the
semantic structures used to model synchronous games with imperfect information.
The underlying structures of these games are specified by epistemic state transition
frames which are obtained by adding an epistemic relation for each agent to state
transition frames.
Definition 4.1. An epistemic state transition (ET) frame F is a tuple (W,w, T, L, U,
g, {Rr}r∈N), where
• W is a nonempty set of states.
• w ∈ W is the initial state.
• T ⊆ W is the set of terminal states.
• L ⊆ W ×A is a legality relation, describing the legal actions at each state.
• U : W ×D → W is an update function, specifying the state transitions for
each joint action, where D =
∏
r∈N A
r is the set of joint actions.
• g : N → 2W is a goal function, specifying the winning states for each agent.
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• Rr ⊆ W ×W is an equivalence relation for agent r, indicating the states
that are indistinguishable for r.
Associating an ET-frame with a standard valuation function, we obtain an epis-
temic state transition model which can be used to specify a particular game with
imperfect information.
Definition 4.2. An epistemic state transition (ET) model M is is a pair (F , pi)
where
• F is an ET-frame;
• pi : W → 2Φ is a standard valuation function.
Given an ET-model, the definitions of path and complete path as well as the nota-
tions are the same as those in Section 2.1.1.
The following definition, by extending equivalence relations over states to complete
paths, characterizes precisely what an agent with imperfect recall and perfect
reasoning can in principle know at a specific stage of a game.
Definition 4.3. Two complete paths δ, δ′ ∈ P are imperfect recall (also called
memoryless) equivalent for agent r at stage j ∈ N, written δ ≈jr δ′, iff δ[j]Rrδ′[j].
That is, imperfect recall requires an agent to be only aware of the present state
but forget everything that happened. This is similar to the notion of imperfect
recall in ATL [Schobbens, 2004]. It should be noted that similar to [Halpern and
Vardi, 1989], in synchronous games we assume every agent has access to a global
clock, so the agents always know the time (game stage).
To demonstrate the flexibility of the framework, we next present three interesting
equivalence relations which specify different memory types of agents.
Definition 4.4. Two complete paths δ, δ′ ∈ P are state-based equivalent for agent
r at stage j ∈ N, written (δ, j) ≈srr (δ′, j), iff δ[l]Rrδ′[l] for any 0 ≤ l ≤ j.
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Intuitively, this equivalence relation describes agents who remember all the past
states of the system, but forget their own actions. This is also called perfect recall
in epistemic ATL-style logics [Jamroga and van der Hoek, 2004]. Similarly, we
define the equivalence relation for agents who remember all their own actions, but
forget the past states, such as agents in a maze [van Ditmarsch and Knight, 2014].
Definition 4.5. Two complete paths δ, δ′ ∈ P are action-based equivalent for
agent r at stage j ∈ N, written (δ, j) ≈arr (δ′, j), iff θr(δ, l) = θr(δ′, l) for any
0 ≤ l < j.
It follows that in the limit case j = 0, we have that (δ, 0) ≈ari (δ′, 0) always holds.
Finally we give the equivalence relation for agents who remember both past states
of the system and their own actions. This is similar to the notion of perfect recall
in GDL-II [Thielscher, 2010].
Definition 4.6. Two complete paths δ, δ′ ∈ P are perfect recall equivalent for
agent r at stage j ∈ N, written (δ, j) ≈prr (δ′, j), iff δ[l]Rrδ′[l] for any 0 ≤ l ≤ j,
and θr(δ, i) = θr(δ
′, i) for all 0 ≤ i < j.
The following proposition displays the interrelations of above memory types.
Proposition 4.1. For all δ, δ′ ∈ P, any j ∈ N and any r ∈ N ,
1. if (δ, j) ≈srr (δ′, j), then δ ≈jr δ′
2. (δ, j) ≈prr (δ′, j) iff (δ, j) ≈srr (δ′, j) and (δ, j) ≈arr (δ′, j).
3. if (δ, j) ≈xr (δ′, j), then (δ, t) ≈xr (δ′, t) for any 0 ≤ t ≤ j, where x ∈
{sr, ar, pr}.
For practical and computational reasons, we focus on agents with imperfect recall
and the other cases are left for future work. To illustrate the framework, let us
consider a variant of mk-games in Example 2.1, called Krieg-mk-games. In the
rest of this chapter we use it as a running example.
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Example 4.1. A Krieg-mk-game is played by two players, cross x and naught
o, who take turns marking grids on a m × m board. Different from a standard
mk-game, each player can see her own marks, but not those of her opponent, just
like the chess variant Kriegspiel [Pritchard, 1994]. Players are informed of the
turn-taking. The game ends if the board is completely filled or one player wins by
having completed a horizontal, vertical or diagonal line of k with her own symbol.
Obviously, a Krieg-mk-game is a generalisation of Krieg-Tictactoe (m = k = 3)
in [Schiffel and Thielscher, 2011].
To represent a Krieg-mk-game in terms of the ET-model, we first describe the
game signature, written SKG, as follows:
• NKG = {x, o};
• ArKG = {ari,j | 1 ≤ i, j ≤ m} ∪ {noopr}, where ari,j denotes the action that
player r fills grid (i, j) with her symbol, and noopr denotes that player r does
action noop;
• ΦKG = {pri,j, tried(ari,j), turn(r) | r ∈ {x, o} and 1 ≤ i, j ≤ m}, where pri,j
represents the fact that grid (i, j) is filled with player i’s symbol, tried(ari,j)
represents the fact that player r has tried to fill grid (i, j) before, and turn(r)
says that it is player r’s turn now.
Based on this, we specify the ET-frame for this game, written FKG, as follows:
• WKG = {(tx, to, c1,1, · · · , cm,m) : tx, to ∈ {0, 1} & c1,1, · · · , cm,m ∈ {,, ,⊗,
}} be the set of possible states, where tx, to specify the turn taking and ci,j
represents the fact that grid (i, j) is empty , or occupied by
– the cross and not tried by the nought ,
– the nought and not tried by the cross  ,
– the nought and tried by the cross ⊗,
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– the cross and tried by the nought .
• wKG = (1, 0,, · · · ,).
• gKG(x) = {(tx, to, c1,1, · · · , cm,m) : ci,j, · · · , ch,l ∈ Gk & ci,j, · · · , ch,l ∈ {,}},
and
gKG(o) = {(tx, to, c1,1, · · · , cm,m) : ci,j, · · · , ch,l ∈ Gk & ci,j, · · · , ch,l ∈ { ,⊗}},
where 1 ≤ i, j, h, l ≤ m, and
Gk = {ci,j, · · · , ci,j+k−1 : 1 ≤ i ≤ m, 1 ≤ j ≤ m− k + 1}
∪ {ci,j, · · · , ci+k−1,j : 1 ≤ i ≤ m− k + 1, 1 ≤ j ≤ m}
∪ {ci,j, · · · , ci+k−1,j+k−1 : 1 ≤ i, j ≤ m− k + 1}
∪ {ci,j, · · · , ci+k−1,j−k+1 : 1 ≤ i ≤ m− k + 1, k ≤ j ≤ m}1.
• TKG = gKG(x) ∪ gKG(o)
∪ {(tx, to, c1,1, · · · , cm,m) : ci,j ∈ {, ,⊗,} for 1 ≤ i, j ≤ m}.
• For all states w = (tx, to, c1,1, · · · , cm,m) and w′ = (t′x, t′o, c′1,1, · · · , c′m,m) in
WKG,
– wRKGx w
′ iff (1) tr = t′r for any r ∈ NKG; (2) ci,j ∈ {,} iff c′i,j ∈
{,} for any 1 ≤ i, j ≤ m; (3) ci,j = ⊗ iff c′i,j = ⊗ for any 1 ≤ i, j ≤
m.
– wRKGo w
′ iff (1) tr = t′r for any r ∈ NKG; (2) ci,j ∈ { ,⊗} iff c′i,j ∈
{ ,⊗} for any 1 ≤ i, j ≤ m; (3) ci,j =  iff c′i,j =  for any 1 ≤ i, j ≤
m.
• For all (tx, to, c1,1, · · · , cm,m) ∈ WKG,
– for any axi,j ∈ AKG,
((tx, to, c1,1, · · · , cm,m), axi,j) ∈ LKG iff tx = 1 and ci,j ∈ {, }.
– for any aoi,j ∈ AKG,
((tx, to, c1,1, · · · , cm,m), aoi,j) ∈ LKG iff to = 1 and ci,j ∈ {,⊗}.
1Gk is the set of all lines of k grids. For instance, on 3× 3 board, G3 has 8 elements.
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– for noopr ∈ AKG,
((tx, to, c1,1, · · · , cm,m), noopr) ∈ LKG iff t−r = 1.
• UKG : WKG×DKG → WKG is defined as follows: for all (tx, to, c1,1, · · · , cm,m) ∈
WKG and for all 〈ari,j, noop−r〉 ∈ DKG, let
UKG((tx, to, c1,1, · · · , cm,m), 〈ari,j, noop−r〉) = (t′x, t′o, c′1,1, · · · , c′m,m)
such that (t′x, t
′
o, c
′
1,1, · · · , c′m,m) is the same as (tx, to, c1,1, · · · , cm,m) except its
components t′x, t
′
o and c
′
i,j which are updated as follows: t
′
r = t-r and
c′i,j =

 if ci,j =  and r = x;
  if ci,j =  and r = o;
⊗ if ci,j =   and r = x;
 if ci,j =  and r = o;
ci,j otherwise.
Finally, for each state w = (tx, to, c1,1, · · · , cm,m) ∈ WKG, piKG(w) = {turn(r) :
tr = 1} ∪ {pxi,j : ci,j ∈ {,}} ∪ {poi,j : ci,j ∈ { ,⊗}} ∪ {tried(axi,j) : ci,j =
⊗} ∪ {tried(aoi,j) : ci,j = }. Let MKG = (FKG, piKG) be the ET-model for this
game.
In addition, we assume that each player takes the same action at the stage of
all her indistinguishable complete paths, i.e., for any δ, δ′ ∈ P(MKG), j ∈ N and
r ∈ NKG, if δ ≈jr δ′, then θr(δ, j) = θr(δ′, j).
4.3 Epistemic Game Description Logic
In this section, we introduce the logical framework EGDL for representing and
reasoning about imperfect information games.
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4.3.1 The Language
The language, denoted by LEGDL, is obtained by extending GDL with the standard
epistemic operators [Fagin et al., 2003b].
Definition 4.7. A formula ϕ in LEGDL is defined by the following BNF:
ϕ ::= p | initial | terminal | legal(ar) | wins(r) | does(ar) |
¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ψ | ©ϕ | Krϕ | Cϕ
where p ∈ Φ, r ∈ N and ar ∈ Ar.
Other connectives ∨, →, ↔, >, ⊥ are defined by ¬ and ∧ in a standard way.
The intuitions of all the components inherited from GDL are the same as those
in Section 2.1.2.1. The epistemic operators K and C are taken from the Modal
Epistemic Logic [Fagin et al., 2003b]. The formula Krϕ is read as “agent r knows
ϕ”, and Cϕ as “ϕ is common knowledge among all the agents in N”.
We use the following abbreviations in the rest of the chapter:
K̂rϕ =def ¬Kr¬ϕ Ĉϕ =def ¬C¬ϕ Eϕ =def
∧
r∈N
Krϕ
where K̂r and Ĉ are the dual operators of Kr and C, respectively. The formula
K̂rϕ says “ϕ is compatible with agent r’s knowledge” and it is similar to Ĉϕ. The
formula Eϕ says “every agent in N knows ϕ”.
Let us illustrate the intuition of the language with Krieg-mk-games.
Example 4.1 (continued.) The rules of a Krieg-mk-game are specified by EGDL
in Figure 4.1 (where r ∈ {x, o} and −r represents r’s opponent).
The initial state, each player’s winning states, the terminal states and the turn-
taking are given by rules 1-4.
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1. initial↔ turn(x) ∧ ¬turn(o) ∧∧mi,j=1(¬(pxi,j ∨ poi,j) ∧¬(tried(axi,j) ∨ tried(aoi,j)))
2. wins(r)↔

m∨
i=1
m−k+1∨
j=1
k−1∧
l=0
pri,j+l ∨
m−k+1∨
i=1
m∨
j=1
k−1∧
l=0
pri+l,j
∨
m−k+1∨
i=1
m−k+1∨
j=1
k−1∧
l=0
pri+l,j+l ∨
m−k+1∨
i=1
m∨
j=k
k−1∧
l=0
pri+l,j−l

3. teminal↔ wins(x) ∨ wins(o) ∨
m∧
i,j=1
(pxi,j ∨ poi,j)
4. turn(r)→©¬turn(r) ∧©turn(−r)
5. legal(noopr)↔ turn(−r)
6. legal(ari,j)↔ turn(r) ∧ ¬pri,j ∧ ¬tried(ari,j)
7. ©pri,j ↔ terminal ∨ pri,j ∨ (does(ari,j) ∧ ¬(pxi,j ∨ poi,j))
8. ©tried(ari,j)↔ terminal ∨ tried(ari,j) ∨ (does(ari,j) ∧ p−ri,j )
9. does(ari,j)→ Kr(does(ari,j))
10. initial→ E initial
11. (turn(r)→ E turn(r)) ∧ (¬turn(r)→ E¬turn(r))
12. (pri,j → Krpri,j) ∧ (¬pri,j → Kr¬pri,j)
13. (tried(ari,j)→ Krtried(ari,j)) ∧ (¬tried(ari,j)→ Kr¬tried(ari,j))
Figure 4.1: An EGDL description of a Krieg-mk-game.
The preconditions of each action (legality) are specified by rules 5 and 6. The
player who has the turn can fill any grid such that (i) it is not filled by herself, and
(ii) she has never tried to fill it before. The other player can only do action noop.
Rules 7 and 8 are the combination of the frame axioms and the effect axioms [Re-
iter, 1991]. Rule 7 states that a grid is marked with a player’s symbol in the next
state if the player takes the corresponding action at the current state, or the grid
has been filled by her symbol before, or the game ends. Similarly, Rule 8 says that
an action is tried by a player in the next state if the action is ineffective while still
taken by the player at the current state, or this action has been tried before, or the
game ends.
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The others are the epistemic rules. Rule 9 states each player knows which action
she is taking. Rule 10 and Rule 11 say both players know the initial state and the
turn-taking, respectively. Rule 12 says that each player knows which grid is filled
or not by her own symbol. Similarly, Rule 13 states that each player knows which
grid is tried or not by herself.
Let ΣKG be the set of rules 1-13. It should be noted that rules 11-13 together specify
the epistemic relation for each player: two states are indistinguishable for a player
if their configurations of the game board are the same in her view.
4.3.2 The Semantics
Let us now interpret the formulas of EGDL based on the epistemic state transition
model.
Definition 4.8. Let M be an ET-model. Given a complete path δ in M , a stage
j of δ and a formula ϕ ∈ LEGDL, we say ϕ is true (or satisfied) at j of δ under M ,
denoted by M, δ, j |= ϕ, according to the following definition:
M, δ, j |= p iff p ∈ pi(δ[j])
M, δ, j |= ¬ϕ iff M, δ, j 6|= ϕ
M, δ, j |= ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 iff M, δ, j |= ϕ1 and M, δ, j |= ϕ2
M, δ, j |= initial iff δ[j] = w
M, δ, j |= terminal iff δ[j] ∈ T
M, δ, j |= wins(r) iff δ[j] ∈ g(r)
M, δ, j |= legal(ar) iff ar ∈ L(δ[j])
M, δ, j |= does(ar) iff θr(δ, j) = ar
M, δ, j |=©ϕ iff if j < |δ|, then M, δ, j + 1 |= ϕ
M, δ, j |= Krϕ iff for any δ′ ∈ P with δ ≈jr δ′, M, δ′, j |= ϕ
M, δ, j |= Cϕ iff for any δ′ ∈ P with δ ≈jN δ′ M, δ′, j |= ϕ
where ≈jN is its transitive closure of
⋃
r∈N ≈jr.
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A formula ϕ is globally true in an ET-model M , written M |= ϕ, if M, δ, j |= ϕ for
any δ ∈ P and any 0 ≤ j ≤ |δ|. A formula ϕ is valid in an ET-frame F , written
F |= ϕ, if M |= ϕ for any ET-model M based on F . A formula ϕ is valid, written
|= ϕ, iff F |= ϕ for any ET-frame F . In particular, a formula ϕ is true at a state
w in M , written M,w |= ϕ, if it is true for all complete paths going through w,
i.e., M, δ, j |= ϕ for any δ ∈ P and any j ≥ 0 with δ[j] = w. Finally, let Σ be a
set of formulas in LEGDL, then M is a model of Σ, if M |= ϕ for all ϕ ∈ Σ.
Let us recall that MKG = (FKG, piKG) is the ET-model for the Krieg-mk-game, and
ΣKG is the set of rules in Figure 4.1. We are now able to show that EGDL provides
a sound description for the Krieg-mk-game.
Proposition 4.2. MKG is a model of ΣKG.
Proof. Given any complete path δ, any stage t of δ in MKG, we need to verify that
each rule is true at t of δ under MKG.
Let us first verify Rule 1. Assume MKG, δ, t |= initial, then δ[t] = wKG. And
by the definition of piKG, we obtain that turn(x) ∈ piKG(w), turn(o) 6∈ piKG(w),
pri,j 6∈ piKG(w) and tried(ari,j) 6∈ piKG(w) for any r ∈ {x, o} and any 1 ≤ i, j ≤
m. Thus, MKG, δ, t |= turn(x) ∧ ¬turn(o) ∧
∧m
i,j=1(¬(pxi,j ∨ poi,j) ∧ ¬(tried(axi,j) ∨
tried(aoi,j))). Conversely, assume MKG, δ, t |= turn(x) ∧ ¬turn(o) ∧
∧m
i,j=1(¬(pxi,j ∨
poi,j) ∧ ¬(tried(axi,j) ∨ tried(aoi,j))), then by the definition of VKG, we have δ[t] =
(1, 0,, · · · ,), so δ[t] = wKG. Thus, MKG, δ, t |= initial.
Rule 2 and Rule 3 are verified in a similar way of Rule 1.
We now consider Rule 4. Assume MKG, δ, t |= turn(r), then t(r) = 1. If |δ| ≤ t, it is
straightforward. Otherwise, by the definition of UKG and wKG, we have t(−r) = 0.
And again by them we obtain that in δ[t + 1], t′(r) = 0 and t′(−r) = 1, then
MKG, δ, t + 1 |= ¬turn(r) ∧ turn(−r), so MKG, δ, t |= ©(¬turn(r) ∧ turn(−r)).
Thus, MKG, δ, t |=©¬turn(r) ∧©turn(−r).
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We then consider Rule 6, and Rule 5 is proved in a similar way. AssumeMKG, δ, t |=
legal(ari,j) iff a
r
i,j ∈ LKG(δ[t]) iff turn(r) ∈ piKG(δ[t]), pri,j 6∈ piKG(δ[t]) and tried(ari,j) 6∈
piKG(δ[t]) (by definitions of LKG and piKG) iffMKG, δ, t |= turn(r)∧¬pri,j∧¬tried(ari,j).
We now verify Rule 7, and Rule 8 is verified in a similar way. Assume MKG, δ, t |=
terminal ∨ pri,j ∨ (does(ari,j) ∧ ¬(pxi,j ∨ poi,j)). We next prove by three cases.
(1) If MKG, δ, t |= terminal, then t = |δ|, so it is trivial that MKG, δ, t |=©pri,j;
(2) If MKG, δ, t |= pri,j, by the definition of UKG, we have MKG, δ, t + 1 |= pri,j, so
MKG, δ, t |=©pri,j;
(3) If MKG, δ, t |= does(ari,j) ∧ ¬(pxi,j ∨ poi,j), then by the definition of UKG, we have
MKG, δ, t+ 1 |= pri,j, so MKG, δ, t |=©pri,j.
Thus, in all cases we have MKG, δ, t |=©pri,j.
Conversely, assume MKG, δ, t 6|= terminal ∨ pri,j ∨ (does(ari,j) ∧ ¬(pxi,j ∨ poi,j)), then
|δ| > t, MKG, δ, t 6|= pri,j and MKG, δ, t 6|= (does(ari,j) ∧ ¬(pxi,j ∨ poi,j)). And by the
definition of UKG, we obtain MKG, δ, t 6|=©pri,j.
We finally verify the epistemic rules 9-13. Rule 9 directly follows from the assump-
tion of MKG, and Rule 10 follows from the fact that R
KG
r (wKG) = {wKG} for any
r ∈ {x, o}. It is straightforward for rules 11-13 by the definition of RKGr .
It follows that these game rules are common knowledge among two players, which
is just what we expect.
Corollary 4.3. MKG |= Cϕ for all ϕ ∈ ΣKG.
4.4 Epistemic and Strategic Reasoning
In this section, we demonstrate the expressive power and flexibility of EGDL by
showing how it allows us to specify epistemic properties and reason about agents’
knowledge during game playing.
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4.4.1 Epistemic Properties
The introduction of imperfect information raises new epistemic properties of a
game. For instance, to make a game playable, each player should always know
her own legal actions in the course of the game. This property as well as other
well-known properties can be naturally formulated by EGDL. Given r ∈ N and
ar ∈ Ar,
(1) initial→ C initial (2) legal(ar)→ Kr(legal(ar))
(3) does(ar)→ Kr(does(ar)) (4) wins(r)→ Kr(wins(r))
(5) terminal→ C terminal
Formulas (1) and (5) express that the initial state, the terminal states are common
knowledge among agents, respectively. Formula (2) says that each agent knows
her own legal actions. In ATEL, this is a required semantic property yet with no
syntactic expression [A˚gotnes, 2006]. Formula (3) asserts that each agent is aware
of her own actions. This is called the “uniform” property of actions (strategies)
also with no syntactic counterpart in ATEL [Jamroga and van der Hoek, 2004,
van der Hoek and Wooldridge, 2003]. Finally, Formula (4) specifies that each
agent should know her winning result.
The above epistemic properties are precisely characterised by indistinguishable
complete paths as follows:
Proposition 4.4. Let F be an ET-frame. Then
1. F |= initial → C initial iff for all δ, δ′ ∈ P and any j ∈ N, if δ ≈jN δ′,
then (δ[j] = w iff δ′[j] = w).
2. F |= legal(ar) → Kr(legal(ar)) iff for all δ, δ′ ∈ P and any j ∈ N, if
δ ≈jr δ′, then (ar ∈ L(δ[j]) iff ar ∈ L(δ′[j])).
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3. F |= does(ar) → Kr(does(ar)) iff for all δ, δ′ ∈ P and any j ∈ N, if
δ ≈jr δ′, then (θr(δ, j) = ar iff θr(δ′, j) = ar).
4. F |= wins(r)→ Kr(wins(r)) iff for all δ, δ′ ∈ P and any j ∈ N, if δ ≈jr δ′,
then (δ[j] ∈ g(r) iff δ′[j] ∈ g(r)).
5. F |= terminal → C terminal iff for all δ, δ′ ∈ P and any j ∈ N, if
δ ≈jN δ′, then (δ[j] ∈ T iff δ′[j] ∈ T ).
Proof. 1. Assume there are some model M based on F , two complete paths δ, δ′ ∈
P and some j ∈ N such that δ ≈jN δ′, δ[j] = w and δ′[j] 6= w, then M, δ, j |= initial
and M, δ′, j 6|= initial, so M, δ, j 6|= C initial. Then M, δ, j 6|= initial → C initial,
so F 6|= initial → C initial. Conversely, assume F 6|= initial → C initial, then
there are some model M based on F , some δ ∈ P and some j ∈ N such that
M, δ, j 6|= initial → C initial, then M, δ, j |= initial and M, δ, j 6|= C initial, so
δ[j] = w, and there is some δ ∈ P such that δ ≈jN δ′ and M, δ′, j 6|= initial. Thus,
δ′[j] 6= w.
The other statements are proved in a similar way.
Obviously, not all games with imperfect information satisfy these epistemic prop-
erties. For instance, epistemic property (5) does not hold for Krieg-mk-games.
Consider the two reachable states depicted in Figure 4.2. They are indistinguish-
o x o
x
x
o o
x
x x
Figure 4.2: The indistinguishable states for o.
able for player o in Krieg-Tictactoe. Yet the left one is a terminal state while the
right one is not. Indeed, according to the game rules, a Krieg-mk-game satisfies
all the other properties.
Observation 4.5. Formulas (1)-(4) are globally true in MKG.
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Proof. Formula (1) follows from Rule 10. Formula (2) follows from rules 5-6 and
11-13. Formula (3) follows from Rule 9, and formula (4) follows from rules 2 and
11-13.
Furthermore, we have the following result in terms of the underlying structure of
a Krieg-mk-game.
Observation 4.6. Formulas (1)-(4) are valid in FKG.
It should be noted that each EGDL-formula may be interpreted as a property of a
game. Typically, globally true formulas describe properties of a particular game,
such as the rules for a Krieg-mk-game, while valid formulas specify general prop-
erties of a class of games, and thus can be used to classify games. For instance,
different from Krieg-style board games, most card games have the epistemic prop-
erty (5).
4.4.2 Strategic Reasoning
Let us now show how to use EGDL to reason about agents’ knowledge and actions
based on game rules. In the context of imperfect information, epistemic reasoning
is closely related to strategic reasoning. To start with, the following proposition
shows that EGDL is suitable for reasoning about players’ knowledge, as it is a
conservative extension of the standard Epistemic Modal Logic S5Cn [Fagin et al.,
2003b].
Proposition 4.7. Given an EGDL-formula ϕ without involving the operator ©
and the pre-defined propositions, ϕ is valid in EGDL iff it is valid in S5Cn .
Proof. We prove this result in two steps. Let us first associate a multi-agent epis-
temic model E with an ET-model ME as follows:
Given a multi-agent epistemic model E = (S, {Ei}i∈Agt , V ) with a set Agt of
agents and a set Atm of propositional variables, we define the game signature
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S = (Agt ,A,Atm) with the same set Agt of agents and the same set Atm of
propositional variables such that Ax = {select(s) | s ∈ S} and Ar = {noopr} for
any r ∈ Agt\{x}.
Based on this, we construct an associate ET-model ME = (W,w, T, {Rr}r∈N ,
L, U, g, pi) as follows:
• W = S ∪ {w} where w 6∈ S is the initial state.
• T = g = S.
• s1Rrs2 iff s1Ers2 for any s1, s2 ∈ S and r ∈ Agt .
• L = W\T ×A.
• For any d ∈ D and any w ∈ W ,
– if w ∈ S, U(w, d) = w;
– if w = w, U(w, d) = s iff d(x) = select(s).
• For any w ∈ W ,
– if w ∈ S, p ∈ pi(w) iff p ∈ V (w) for every p ∈ Atm;
– if w = w, pi(w) ∩ Atm = ∅.
We write ds for joint action d with player x selects state s, i.e., d(x) = select(s).
Then the successor state s = U(w, ds) corresponds to a complete path w
ds→ s,
denoted by δs. Let P be the set of all complete paths so obtained, i.e., P =
{δs | s ∈ S}. By a routine induction on the structure of ϕ, we obtain the following
claim.
Claim 4.8. Given a multi-agent epistemic model E and a state s in E,
E, s |=S5Cn ϕ iff ME, δs, 1 |=EGDL ϕ.
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Next we transform an ET-model M into a multi-agent epistemic model EM in the
following way.
Fix an ET-model M = (W,w, T, {Rr}r∈N , L, U, g, pi) with a game signature S =
(N,A,Φ). We construct EM = (S, {Er}r∈N , V ) with the same set of agents in
M and the same set of propositional variables in Φ. Let δ[0, j] denote the initial
segment of complete path δ up to stage j. For convenience, we call it a history.
Then the components of EM are defined as follows:
• S = {δ[0, j] | δ ∈ P , j ≥ 0} is the set of all histories in M .
• for all δ[0, j], δ′[0, j′] ∈ S and r ∈ N , δ[0, j]Erδ′[0, j′] iff j = j′ and δ ≈jr δ′.
• p ∈ V (δ[0, j]) iff p ∈ pi(δ[j]) for any p ∈ Φ.
By induction on the structure of formula ϕ, we have the following claim.
Claim 4.9. Given an ET-model M , a complete path δ and a stage j ≥ 0,
M, δ, j |=EGDL ϕ iff EM , δ[0, j] |=S5Cn ϕ.
Thus, the result follows directly from the two claims.
This result indicates that EGDL is sufficient to provide a static characterization
of agents’ knowledge at a certain stage. For instance, with S5Cn , we can derive the
following formulas from the rules of a Krieg-mk-game.
Observation 4.10.
1. MKG |= turn(r)→ C turn(r)
2. MKG |= Kr(K−rp−ri,j ∨ K−r¬p−ri,j )
3. MKG |= Krtried(ari,j)→ Krp−ri,j
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Proof. Clause 1 follows from Rule 11 and Induction Rule (RC1). Clause 2 follows
from Rule 12 and Theorem 3.1.1(d). The last clause follows from rules 7-8 and
A2, Theorem 3.1.1 in [Fagin et al., 2003b].
Clause 1 says the turn-taking is common knowledge. Clause 2 says a player knows
the opponent knows whether or not a grid is filled by herself. The last one says if
a player knows she has tried an action, then she knows the corresponding grid has
been filled by the opponent. The last two properties are important when players
gather information.
Furthermore, with the full expressive power of the language, we can use EGDL
to specify agents’ knowledge of particular game features and reason about how
agent’s knowledge changes as a game progresses.
Observation 4.11.
1. MKG |= Krpri,j → Kr© pri,j
2. MKG |= Kr© tried(ari,j)→©Krtried(ari,j)
3. MKG |= initial→ C (
∧m
i,j=1 legal(a
x
i,j) ∧ legal(noopo))
4. MKG |= does(ari,j)→©Kr(pri,j ∨ tried(ari,j))
Proof. Clause 1 follows from Rule 7. Clause 2 follows from rules 8 and 13. Clause
3 follows from rules 1, 5-6 and 10. The last clause follows from rules 7-8.
Intuitively, clause 1 says that if a player knows a grid has been filled by herself,
then she still knows this fact at the next state. Clause 2 says that a player is able
to remember the grid she has tried to fill before. Clause 3 says that at the initial
state the legal actions are common knowledge among two players, and Clause 4
expresses that if a player takes an action now, then at the next state she will know
either the corresponding grid has been filled by her symbol, or she has tried that
action.
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Most importantly, the interactions of actions and knowledge can be naturally
formulated using EGDL. Specifically, they interact in three different ways:
(i) Knowledge is necessary for an agent to perform an action, which may be for-
mulated as does(ar) → Krϕ. For instance, in a Krieg-mk-game, with partial
observation, a player might take an ineffective action by trying to fill a grid
which has been filled by the opponent. Then we say a player r takes a good
action ari,j, written good(a
r
i,j), if it is effective. It follows that, to take a good
action, a player needs to know the grid she attempts to fill is empty. Formally,
MKG |= good(ari,j)→ Kr(¬(pxi,j ∨ poi,j)).
(ii) Performing an action may increase an agent’s knowledge, which may be speci-
fied by does(ar)→©Krϕ. For example, if a player takes an ineffective action, then
she would know the corresponding grid has been filled by the opponent. Consider
the following complete path
δ = w
〈ax2,2,noopo〉−−−−−−→ w1
〈noopx,ao2,2〉−−−−−−→ w2
〈ax1,1,noopo〉−−−−−−→ w3 · · ·
At stage 2 after player o tries to fill grid (2,2), by Rule 7 and Rule 13, she
knows that the grid has been filled by player x. Thus, MKG, δ, 1 |= does(ao2,2) →
©Ko(tried(ao2,2) ∧ px2,2).
(iii) An agent makes her choice of actions based on her knowledge, which may be
captured by Krϕ→ does(ar). Let us consider the following two basic actions:
attackr =def Kr(does(a
r
i,j) ∧©wins(r))→ does(ari,j)
blockr =def Kr©(does(a−ri,j ) ∧©wins(−r))→ does(ari,j)
Intuitively, attack says if a player knows that filling a grid leads to win, then she
should fill that grid. Instead, block says if a player knows her opponent makes to
win by filling a grid in the next state, then the player must fill that grid at the
current state to avoid an immediate loss.
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4.5 Model Checking
To systematically check whether an imperfect information game satisfies a given
property, we now investigate the model-checking problem for EGDL and develop
a model-checking algorithm for this logic.
The model checking problem for EGDL, denoted by EGDL-MC, is the following:
Given an EGDL-formula ϕ, an ET-model M , a path δ of M and a stage j on
δ, determine whether M, δ, j |= ϕ or not. In principle, two variants of EGDL-
MC can be defined as follows: Given an ET-model M , a state w of M and an
EGDL-formula ϕ, determine whether M,w |= ϕ and determine whether M |= ϕ.
It should be noted that all the bounds presented in this section remain true for
these variants. Proofs are similar to those of EGDL-MC, or can be obtained by
simple reductions to/from EGDL-MC.
Before presenting the results, let us first recall some notations in the theory of
computational complexity. By PTIME (respectively, NP) we denote the class
of languages (i.e., decision problems) decidable in polynomial-time deterministic
(respectively, nondeterministic) Turing machines. Let ∆p2 (respectively, Θ
p
2) denote
the class of languages each of which is decidable in a polynomial-time deterministic
Turing machine with a polynomial (respectively, logarithmic) number of queries
to an NP language as an oracle (or simply, an NP-oracle). It is worth noting that
both ∆p2 and Θ
p
2 lie in the 2
nd level of the polynomial hierarchy; both of them
contain NP and coNP, i.e. the complement of NP. It remains open whether Θp2 is
a proper subclass of ∆p2 or not.
Let us first consider the upper bound of the complexity for model-checking. Our
goal is to show the following bound.
Theorem 4.12. EGDL-MC is in ∆p2.
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To prove this upper bound, according to the definition of ∆p2, we need to show
that there is a polynomial-time deterministic Turing machine M with an NP-
oracle such thatM solves the model-checking problem for EGDL. To this end, let
us start with a simple property of EGDL.
Let ϕ be an EGDL-formula, and M = (F , pi) be an ET-model over S. Take ψ to
be any subformula of ϕ of the form ⊕ϑ, where ⊕ is either C or Kr for some r ∈ N .
We introduce a fresh propositional variable pψ for ψ. Let Mψ be the ET-model
(F , piψ) where piψ is a valuation function defined as follows: For each state w of
M ,
piψ(w) =

pi(w) ∪ {pψ} if M,w |= ψ;
pi(w) otherwise.
Let ϕψ denote the formula obtained from ϕ by replacing ψ by pψ. Then, by the
definition of semantics for EGDL, the following property is true.
Lemma 4.13. For every path δ of M and every stage j on δ, it holds that M, δ, j |=
ϕ iff Mψ, δ, j |= ϕψ.
Thus, by applying the above lemma, the epistemic operators can be eliminated
from the formula in a recursive way. For any EGDL-formula without involving
any epistemic operator, we can show that its model-checking problem is tractable.
Lemma 4.14. The following problem is in PTIME: Given an ET-model M , a path
δ of M , a stage j on δ and an EGDL-formula ϕ without involving any epistemic
operators, determine whether M, δ, j |= ϕ or not.
Proof. It is routine to design an algorithm to traverse over the parse tree of ϕ
and work in the following way: For each visit of a node ψ (which is a subformula
of ϕ) in the tree, the algorithm first evaluates the truth values of all the proper
subformulas of ψ; with these truth values, the truth value of ψ can be then easily
obtained by the definition of semantics. As the algorithm visits each node at most
once, and the number of nodes in the tree is not greater than the size of ϕ, such an
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algorithm can be clearly implemented in a polynomial-time deterministic Turing
machine, which is as desired.
To construct the model Mψ, the truth value of ψ at a given state under M is
needed to be evaluated. To simplify the question, let us first consider a simple
case as follows:
Lemma 4.15. The following problem is in NP: Given an ET-model M , a state
w of M and an EGDL-formula ⊕ϕ where ⊕ ∈ {Ĉ} ∪ {K̂r : r ∈ N} and ϕ does not
involve any epistemic operators, determine whether M,w |= ⊕ϕ or not.
Proof. Let k be the number of occurrences of © in ϕ. Take δ be any path of
M , and i ≥ 0 be a stage . According to the definition, it is routine to show that
M, δ, i |= ϕ if, and only if, M, δ[0, k], i |= ϕ. Thus, one can easily verify that the
nondeterminitic algorithm istrueE (see Algorithm 4.5.1) is sound for the problem
given in the lemma. By Lemma 4.14, we can see that istrueE can be implemented
in a polynomial time nondeterminstic Turing machine. Note that k is not greater
than the size of ϕ, which means that the machine only needs to guess O(n log n)
bits of information, where n is the size of ϕ. This then proves the lemma.
To eliminate all the epistemic operators, it remains to consider the formulas with
nested epistemic operator. With this complexity result for the non-nested case,
we are now able to design an algorithm for the general case. Roughly speaking,
the idea is to carry out the elimination of epistemic operator in a bottom-up way.
As we can see in Algorithm 4.5.2, such an idea is implemented in the algorithm
elimeop.
It’s not hard to check that the algorithm can be implemented in a polynomial-
time deterministic Turing machine, but with an NP-oracle. Here the procedure of
checking N0, w |= ⊕̂¬ψ0 is used as the NP-oracle. By Lemma 4.15, the checking
is in NP. In addition, the algorithm elimeop visits each subformula of ϕ at most
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Algorithm 4.5.1: istrueE(M,w, ϕ)
Input : an ET-model M , a state w of M , and an EGDL-formula of the form
⊕ϕ where ⊕ ∈ {Ĉ} ∪ {K̂r : r ∈ N} and no epistemic operator occurs in ϕ
Output: true if M,w |= ⊕ϕ, and false otherwise
1 begin
2 if ⊕ is K̂r for some r ∈ N then
3 R← Rr;
4 else
5 R← the transitive closure of ⋃r∈N Rr;
6 end
7 k ← the number of occurrences of © in ϕ;
8 guess a path δ of M of a length ≤ k;
9 if δ is complete and (w, δ[0]) ∈ R then
10 return M, δ, 1 |= ϕ;
11 else
12 return false;
13 end
14 end
once, and the number of subformulas of ϕ is not greater than the size of ϕ. These
assure that the Turing machine will terminate in a polynomial number of stages.
With this algorithm, we then devise an algorithm mc for the model-checking prob-
lem of EGDL such that, given any proper M, δ, j and ϕ as input, mc works as
follows:
• First, mc calls the algorithm elimeop(M,ϕ), and let (M0, ϕ0) be the results
of this call.
• Next, mc checks whether M0, δ, j |= ϕ0 or not, and return “true” if it holds,
“false” otherwise.
By Lemma 4.13 and the definition of algorithm elimeop, it is not difficult to verify
that M, δ, j |= ϕ if, and only if, M0, δ, j |= ϕ0. This assures the soundness of the
algorithm mc. On the other hand, by the previous analysis, the first stage can be
implemented in a polynomial-time determinitic Turing machine with an NP-oracle;
by Lemma 4.14, the second stage can be done in PTIME. Thus, the algorithm mc
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Algorithm 4.5.2: elimeop(M,ϕ)
Input : an ET-model M and an EGDL-formula ϕ
Output: an ordered pair (M0, ϕ0)
1 begin
2 switch ϕ do
3 case ϕ is atomic
4 M0 ←M ;
5 ϕ0 ← ϕ;
6
7 case ϕ is of the form ⊕ψ, where ⊕ ∈ {¬,©}
8 (N0, ψ0)← elimeop(M,ψ);
9 M0 ← N0;
10 ϕ0 ← ⊕ψ0;
11
12 case ϕ is of the form ψ ∧ χ
13 (N0, ψ0)← elimeop(M,ψ);
14 (N0, χ0)← elimeop(N0, χ);
15 M0 ← N0;
16 ϕ0 ← ψ0 ∧ χ0;
17
18 case ϕ is of the form ⊕ψ, where ⊕ ∈ {C} ∪ {Kr : r ∈ N}
19 (N0, ψ0)← elimeop(M,ψ);
20 pi ← the valuation function of N0;
21 for all w in W do
22 if N0, w |= ⊕̂¬ψ0 is false, where ⊕̂ ∈ {Ĉ, K̂r} then
23 pi(w)← pi(w) ∪ {p⊕ψ};
24 end
25 end
26 M0 ← the model obtained from N0 by replacing the valuation
function with pi;
27 ϕ0 ← p⊕ψ;
28
29 endsw
30 return (M0, ϕ0);
31 end
can be implemented in a polynomial-time determinitic Turing machine with an
NP-oracle, which proves Theorem 4.12.
Next we will identify a lower bound of the complexity of model-checking for EGDL.
This bound shows that the above algorithm is nearly optimal. Let us present the
bound.
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Theorem 4.16. EGDL-MC is Θp2-hard.
To prove this, we reduce the validity problem for Carnap’s modal logic C, which
has been proved to be Θp2-complete by [Gottlob, 1995], to the problem stated in
the proposition. Below let us first recall some notions for logic C.
The logic C is armed with a standard language of the basic modal logic. The
validity in C is defined as follows:
• For each propositional formula ϕ, |=C ϕ iff ϕ is valid in the classical propo-
sitional logic P.
• For each formula ϕ of form ψ, |=C ϕ iff ψ+ is valid in P.
• For each formula ϕ of other forms, |=C ϕ iff ϕ+ is valid in P.
In above, by ϕ+ we denote the formula obtained from ϕ by replacing each occur-
rence of subformulas ψ of the form ϑ by > if |=C ψ, and ⊥ otherwise.
It should be noted that in C, as usual, ♦ is defined as ¬¬. Now we are in
the position to present the reduction. Let ϕ be a modal formula. We want to
construct an ET-model M , a path δ, a stage j on δ and an EGDL-formula ψ such
that |=C ϕ iff M, δ, j |= ψ. The feasibility of such a reduction is based on the
following observations: Carnap’s modal operators  can be simulated by K, and
each valuation in P can be encoded by a complete path.
Next let us define the construction. Suppose p1, . . . , pn is an enumeration of all the
propositional variables that occur in ϕ. Set S = (N,A,Φ) to be a game signature
such that |N | = 1, A = {+,−} and Φ = {q} is a singleton, where q is a fresh
propositional variable. Let F be an ET-frame (W,w, T,R, L, U, g) over S such
that
• W = {w} ∪ {w+i , w−i : 1 ≤ i ≤ n};
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• T = {w+n , w−n };
• R = W ×W ;
• L = W\T ×A;
• U(w, ∗) = w∗1 for ∗ ∈ {+,−}, and
U(w∗i , ?) = w
?
i+1 for ∗, ? ∈ {+,−} and 1 ≤ i < n.
With these settings, let us now show how valuations in the classical propositional
logic can be related to complete paths of M . Let v : {pi : 1 ≤ i ≤ n} → {0, 1} be
a valuation. We construct a complete path, denoted by λv, of M as follows:
w
s1−→ ws11 s2−→ ws22 s3−→ · · · sn−→ wsnn (4.1)
where, for each i with 1 ≤ i ≤ n, si denotes “+” if v(pi) = 1, and “−” otherwise.
On the other hand, take λ to be any complete path of M . It is clear that λ must
be of the form (4.1). Now we define a valuation, denoted vλ, such that vλ(pi) is 1
if si is “+”, and 0 otherwise.
Let pi : W → 2Φ be a valuation function based on F such that
pi(w) =

∅ if w is w or w−i where 1 ≤ i ≤ n;
{q} if w is w+i where 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Let M be the ET-model (F , pi). Clearly, given any valuation v in P, we have
v(pi) = 1 if, and only if, M,λv, 0 |=©iq. Based on this property, we then define a
transformation Tr from the formulas in C to EGDL-formulas as follows:
Tr(ϕ) =

©i q if ϕ = pi where 1 ≤ i ≤ n;
¬Tr(ψ) if ϕ = ¬ψ;
Tr(ψ) ∧ Tr(χ) if ϕ = ψ ∧ χ;
K(initial→ Tr(ψ)) if ϕ = ψ.
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It is obvious that, with a natural approach for encoding, both M and Tr(ϕ) are
of polynomial sizes w.r.t. ϕ. Thus, to prove Theorem 4.16, it suffices to show the
following lemma.
Lemma 4.17. Let ϕ be a modal formula, and let δ be any path of M . Then |=C ϕ
iff M, δ, 0 |= K(initial→ Tr(ϕ)).
Proof. Let us first consider the “if” direction of the claim. Assume that |=C ϕ is
not true. By definition, ϕ must be invalid in P. This means that there exists a
valuation v in P such that v(ϕ) = 0. By a routine induction on the structure of
ϕ, we obtain that M,λ, 0 |= ¬Tr(ϕ). From this we have M, δ, 0 |= ¬K(initial →
Tr(ϕ)), as desired.
For the converse, let us assume M, δ, 0 |= ¬K(initial → Tr(ϕ)). There is thus a
complete path λ of M such that M,λ, 0 |= ¬Tr(ϕ). Again by an induction on ϕ,
we have vλ(ϕ) = 0, which means that ϕ is invalid. By definition, |=C ϕ must be
false. This completes the proof.
4.6 Summary
In this chapter, we have presented a logical framework for representing and rea-
soning about imperfect information games with imperfect recall players. We have
demonstrated that the framework allows us to represent game rules, formalize
epistemic properties, specify the interactions of knowledge and actions as well as
reason about agents’ knowledge during game playing. We have also investigated
the model-checking problem for the logic. These results show that the framework
has made a reasonable compromise between expressive power and computational
efficiency.
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Most of related work has been discussed in Section 1.2. Besides that, the following
is also worth mentioning. Ruan and Thielscher [2011] study the epistemic struc-
ture and expressiveness of GDL-II in terms of epistemic modal logic. Yet they only
provide a static characterization of players’ knowledge at a certain stage without
involving the temporal dimension. Haufe and Thielscher [2012] develop an auto-
mated reasoning method to deal with epistemic properties for GDL-II. Different
from ours, their method is restricted to positive-epistemic formulas. Our underly-
ing language is from [Zhang and Thielscher, 2015b]. It is originally proposed for
reasoning about strategies of asynchronous games with perfect information, while
we study its epistemic extension for representing and reasoning about synchronous
games with imperfect information. Finally, it should be noted that EGDL has sim-
ilarities with epistemic temporal logics such as CKLm [Halpern et al., 2004], but
they are significantly different in the following ways: (i)With does(.) operator,
EGDL can express actions and their effects, thus it is essentially a logic for rea-
soning about actions, while epistemic temporal logics are not. (ii) EGDL contains
a single temporal operator (“next”), and can only represent finite steps of time.
(iii) Model checking for EGDL is in ∆p2, while, for epistemic temporal logics, it
is PSPACE-hard as the complexty for the underlying logic linear temporal time
logic is already PSPACE-complete [Sistla and Clarke, 1985].
Directions of future research are manifold. As we have mentioned, besides im-
perfect recall, the framework is flexible enough to specify other memory types.
We plan to study properties of these memory types, and further investigate the
interplay between agents’ memory abilities and their knowledge; We also want to
investigate the satisfiability problem and the axiomatization of EGDL based on
the current literature [Halpern et al., 2004, Zhang and Thielscher, 2015a]; In addi-
tion, it would be interesting to explore the dynamic epistemic extension of EGDL
so as to study the update of players’ knowledge during game play [van Ditmarsch
et al., 2007].
Chapter 5
Knowledge Sharing in Coalitions
With imperfect information, agents’ abilities are associated with their knowledge.
For instance, assuming a few agents are trying to open a safe, only the ones who
know the code have the ability to open the safe. One question arises naturally:
which kind of group knowledge is required for a group to achieve some goal in the
context of imperfect information? [Herzig, 2015]. Most of the time when a set of
agents forms a coalition, their cooperation is not merely limited to acting together,
but, more importantly, sharing their knowledge when acting. Safe opening is an
example. Based on this consideration, we assume that whenever a set of agents
forms a coalition to achieve a goal, they share their knowledge before acting.
With this assumption, this chapter proposes a variant of semantics for ATL with
imperfect information to investigate the interplay between knowledge shared by a
group of agents and its coalitional abilities. We also show that this semantics is
sufficient to preserve the plausible properties of coalitional abilities in Section 3.1.
5.1 A Motivating Example
Let us begin with the following example to highlight our motivation to study
coalitional abilities under the assumption of knowledge sharing within coalitions.
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Example 5.1. Figure 5.1 depicts a variant of the shell game [Bulling et al., 2014]
with three players: the shuffler s, the guessers g1 and g2. Initially the shuffler
places a ball in one of the two shells (the left (L) or the right (R)). Guesser g1
can observe which action the shuffler does, while guesser g2 cannot. A guesser or
a coalition of two wins, if she picks up the shell containing the ball. We assume
that only guesser g2 can choose the shell (the left (l) or the right (r)) and guesser
g1 can only take action noop (n).
Figure 5.1: Model T1. Figure 5.2: Model T2.
The tuple (α1, α2, α3) represents an action profile,.i.e, action α1 of shuffler s, action α2 of
guesser g1, and action α3 of guesser g2. The dotted line represents g2’s indistinguishability
relation: reflexive loops are omitted. State q2 is labelled with the proposition win.
Clearly, g1 knows the location of the ball but cannot choose. Instead g2 does not
know where the ball is, though he can choose the shell. Thus, neither g1 nor g2 can
win this game individually. But if g1 and g2 form a coalition, it should follow that
by sharing their knowledge they can cooperate to win. However, according to most
of existing semantics for ATL with imperfect information [Jamroga and van der
Hoek, 2004, van der Hoek and Wooldridge, 2003, van Ditmarsch and Knight, 2014]
including the latest one, called truly perfect recall (also referred as no-forgetting
semantics) [Bulling et al., 2014], the coalition of g1 and g2 does not have such an
ability to win, since they claim that coalitional abilities require general knowledge
or even common knowledge.
Moreover, these semantic variants fail to preserve the coalition monotonicity which
is a desirable property for coalitional abilities in Section 3.1, that is, if a coalition
can achieve some goal, then its superset can achieve this goal as well. To demon-
strate this idea, consider Figure 5.2 depicting a variant of the game in Example 5.1
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by only switching the available actions of two guessers. i.e., let guesser g1 choose
the shell and guesser g2 take no action. Then it is clear that guesser g1 can win
no matter what the others do, as she sees the location of the ball and can pick up
the right shell. It should follow that as a coalition, the coalition of two guessers
g1 and g2 can still win this game. However, according to most existing semantics,
though guesser g1 has the ability to win, this ability no longer holds once she forms
a coalition with guesser g2.
These counterintuitive phenomena motivate a variant of semantics for ATL based
on the assumption of knowledge sharing within coalitions.
5.2 ATL with Knowledge Sharing
In this section, we provide a variant semantics for ATL based on the assumption of
knowledge sharing in coalitions, and then investigate the properties of ATL under
this semantics.
5.2.1 The Language
Let Φ be a finite set of atomic propositions and N be a nonempty finite set
of agents. The language of ATL, denoted by LATL, is defined by the following
grammar:
ϕ := p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | 〈〈C〉〉©ϕ | 〈〈C〉〉ϕ | 〈〈C〉〉ϕUϕ
where p ∈ Φ and C ⊆ N .
A coalition operator 〈〈C〉〉ϕ intuitively expresses that group C can cooperate to
ensure that ϕ. The temporal operator  means “from now on (always)” and other
temporal operators are U (“until”) and© (“in the next state”). The dual operator
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♦ of  (“either now or at some point in the future”) is defined as ♦ϕ =def ¬¬ϕ
or ♦ϕ =def >Uϕ.
In particular, the standard epistemic operators [Fagin et al., 2003b] can be defined
as follows:
Krϕ =def 〈〈r〉〉ϕUϕ DCϕ =def 〈〈C〉〉ϕUϕ
K̂r =def ¬Kr¬ϕ D̂Cϕ =def ¬DC¬ϕ
As we will show in the semantics, these abbreviations capture their standard intu-
itions, i.e., “Krϕ” says agent r knows ϕ, and DCϕ means it is distributed knowledge
among coalition C that ϕ. The dual operators of K and D, denoted by K̂ and D̂,
respectively, are defined as usual.
5.2.2 The Semantics
The semantics is built upon the imperfect information concurrent game structure
(iCGS) [Schobbens, 2004, van der Hoek and Wooldridge, 2003].
Definition 5.1. An iCGS is a tuple T = (N,Φ,W,A, {Rr}r∈N , d, δ, pi) where
• N = {r1, · · · , rk} is a nonempty finite set of agents.
• Φ is a finite set of atomic propositions.
• W is a nonempty finite set of states.
• A is a nonempty finite set of actions.
• Rr ⊆ W ×W is an equivalence relation for agent r indicating the states that
are indistinguishable from her viewpoint.
• d : N ×W → 2A\{∅} is a mapping specifying a nonempty set of available
actions at each state for each agent with the requirement that every agent
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always knows which actions are available to her, i.e., for all w,w′ ∈ W and
r ∈ N , d(r, w) = d(r, w′) whenever wRrw′. The set of joint actions at w for
N is denoted as D(w) = Πr∈Nd(r, w).
• δ : W ×D(W ) → W is the transition function specifying an outcome state
δ(w, α) ∈ W for each pair (w, α) ∈ W ×D(W ).
• pi : Φ→ 2W is a standard valuation function.
A computation λ is an infinite sequence of states and actions w0
α1→ w1 α2→ w2 · · · ,
where for each j ≥ 1, αj ∈ D(wj−1) and δ(wj−1, αj) = wj. Any finite segment of a
computation is called a history. The set of all histories in T is denoted by H. We
use λ[j] to denote the j-th state of computation λ, λ[j, k] (0 ≤ j ≤ k) to denote
the segment of λ from the j-th state to the k-th state, and λ[j,∞] to denote the
subcomputation of λ starting from stage j ≥ 0. The length of a history h ∈ H,
denoted by |h|, is defined as the number of actions. Given α ∈ D(w), let α(r)
denote agent r’s individual action in joint action α.
The following definition specifies what an agent with perfect recall and perfect
reasoning capabilities can in principle know at a special stage of an imperfect
information game.
Definition 5.2. Two histories h = w0
α1→ w1 α2→ · · · αm→ wm and h′ = w′0
α′1→ w′1
α′2→
· · · α
′
n→ w′n are equivalent for agent r ∈ N , denoted by h ≈r h′, iff
1. m = n,
2. wjRrw
′
j for any 0 ≤ j ≤ m, and
3. αk(r) = α
′
k(r) for any 1 ≤ k ≤ m.
In particular, two computations λ and λ′ are equivalent up to stage j ≥ 0 for agent
r ∈ N , denoted by λ ≈jr λ′, iff λ[0, j] ≈r λ′[0, j].
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Intuitively, two histories are indistinguishable for an agent if (1) they have the same
length, (2) their corresponding states are indistinguishable for this agent, and (3)
the agent takes the same action at each corresponding stage. This notion of perfect
recall is more like the notion of perfect recall in [Thielscher, 2010, van Ditmarsch
and Knight, 2014] as well as the notion of perfect recall in extensive games [Kuhn,
1953] by requiring that an agent remember the past states as well as her own
actions. This is stronger than that in most epistemic ATL-style logics which use
the state-based equivalence without taking the actions into consideration.
It should be noted that Ruan and Thielscher [2012] propose a way to embed actions
to a state so that the state-based equivalence can achieve the same meaning;
nevertheless, the advantages to explicitly add actions are at least twofold: on
the one hand, it can deal with situations where different actions may lead to
indistinguishable states. For instance, consider the following game structure with
a single agent 1 in Figure 5.3. According to the state-based equivalence, the agent
Figure 5.3: A game structure T .
cannot distinguish the two histories q0
b→ q1 and q0 c→ q1, then at q0 she does
not know whether or not p holds next, but according our notion of perfect recall,
the two histories are different to her, since she takes different actions at state
q0, then at q0 she should know whether p holds or not at the next state; on the
other hand, as we will see in the following sections, the introduction of actions
plays an important role to prove the results about the interactions of coalition and
epistemic operators.
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As mentioned before, we assume that whenever a set of agents form a coalition
to achieve their goals, these agents share their own knowledge before acting. To
make this idea precise, we extend the indistinguishability relation of an agent to
a group as the intersection of all its members’ individual equivalence relation, i.e.,
≈jC=
⋂
r∈C ≈jr. Let ≈jC (λ) denote the set of all computations that coalition C can
not distinguish from λ up to stage j, i.e., ≈jC (λ) = {λ′ | λ ≈jC λ′}.
A strategy is a plan of actions telling one agent what to do at each stage of a game.
With knowledge sharing among members of a coalition, we say a strategy of agent
r ∈ C ⊆ N is uniform w.r.t C, if the strategy specifies the same action for r at
all histories which are indistinguishable for coalition C.
Definition 5.3. Given C ⊆ N and r ∈ C, a uniform perfect recall strategy for
agent r w.r.t C is a function fCr : H → A such that for all histories h, h′ ∈ H,
1. if h ≈C h′ then fCr (h) = fCr (h′), and
2. fCr (h) ∈ dr(last(h)), where last(h) denotes the last state of h.
Intuitively, a uniform perfect recall strategy for an agent in a group tells her a
unique legal action to take at each history such that the actions for indistinguish-
able histories of the group are the same. In particular, the standard notion of
uniform strategies with respect to individual knowledge can be viewed as a special
case when C is a singleton. In the rest of the chapter, we simply write fCr for fr
when C is clear, and call a uniform perfect recall strategy a strategy for short.
A joint strategy for coalition C ⊆ N , denoted by FC, is a vector of its mem-
bers’ individual strategies, i.e., 〈fr〉r∈C . Function P(fr, h) returns the set of all
computations that can occur when agent r’s strategy fr executes after an ini-
tial history h. Formally, λ ∈ P(fr, h) iff λ[0, |h|] = h and for any j ≥ |h|,
fr(λ[0, j]) = θr(λ, j) where θr(λ, j) is the action of agent r taken at stage j on
computation λ. Then the set of all computations complying with joint strategy
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FC after h, denoted by P(FC, h), is defined as the intersection of its members’ sets,
i.e., P(FC, h) =
⋂
r∈C P(fr, h). This also indicates that if a group is characterized
by full coordination both on the level of strategies and knowledge, we may view
the group as a single agent whose abilities and knowledge are the sum of those of
all the members [Kaz´mierczak et al., 2014].
We are now in the position to provide a semantics for ATL based on the assumption
of knowledge sharing in coalitions. Formulas are interpreted over triples consisting
of a model, a computation and an index which indicates the current stage.
Definition 5.4. Let T be an iCGS. Given a computation λ in T , a stage j ∈ N
and a formula ϕ ∈ LATL, ϕ is true (or satisfied) at j of λ under T , denoted by
T , λ, j |= ϕ, according to the following definition:
T , λ, j |= p iff p ∈ pi(λ[j])
T , λ, j |= ¬ϕ iff T , λ, j 6|= ϕ
T , λ, j |= ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 iff T , λ, j |= ϕ1 and T , λ, j |= ϕ2
T , λ, j |= 〈〈C〉〉©ϕ iff ∃FC ∀λ′ ≈jC λ ∀λ′′ ∈ P(FC, λ′[0, j])
T , λ′′, j + 1 |= ϕ
T , λ, j |= 〈〈C〉〉ϕ iff ∃FC ∀λ′ ≈jC λ ∀λ′′ ∈ P(FC, λ′[0, j])
∀k ≥ j T , λ′′, k |= ϕ
T , λ, j |= 〈〈C〉〉ϕ1Uϕ2 iff ∃FC ∀λ′ ≈jC λ∀λ′′ ∈ P(FC, λ′[0, j])
∃k ≥ j, T , λ′′, k |= ϕ2, and
∀j ≤ t < k, T , λ′′, t |= ϕ1
The interpretation for coalition operator 〈〈C〉〉ϕ captures its precise meaning that
coalition C by sharing its members’ knowledge can cooperate to enforce that ϕ.
Alternatively, the agents in C distributedly know that they can enforce that ϕ. A
formula ϕ is valid in an iCGS T , written T |= ϕ, if T , λ, j |= ϕ for any computation
λ ∈ T and any stage j. A formula ϕ is valid, denoted by |= ϕ, if it is valid in
every iCGS T .
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The following proposition shows that the abbreviations for the epistemic operators
capture their intended meanings, just as we expected.
Proposition 5.1. Given an iCGS T , a computation λ of T and a stage j ∈ N,
1. T , λ, j |= Krϕ iff for all λ′ ≈jr λ, T , λ′, j |= ϕ.
2. T , λ, j |= DCϕ iff for all λ′ ≈jC λ, T , λ′, j |= ϕ.
Proof. We only prove the first clause, and the second one is proved in a similar
way. Let us show that T , λ, j |= 〈〈r〉〉ϕUϕ iff for all λ′ ≈jr λ, T , λ′, j |= ϕ.
Suppose T , λ, j |= 〈〈r〉〉ϕUϕ and for all λ′ ≈jr λ, then there is fr such that for
any λ′′ ∈ P(λ′[0, j], fr), T , λ′′, j |= ϕ. And λ′[0, j] = λ′′[0, j], so T , λ′, j |= ϕ. The
other direction is straightforward according to the truth condition for the coalition
operator with U .
Let us go back to the shell game. We now show that this semantics justifies
the intuition that the coalition of two guessers can cooperate to win by sharing
knowledge.
Example 5.1 (continued.) Consider the model T1 in Figure 5.1. It is easy to
check that at stage 1 on the left computation λ1 := q0q1q2 · · · , neither guesser g1
nor guesser g2 has the ability to win at the next stage, i.e., T1, λ1, 1 6|= 〈〈g1〉〉©win
and T1, λ1, 1 6|= 〈〈g2〉〉©win. On the other hand, when g1 and g2 form a coalition,
they can cooperate to win, as guesser g2 is able to distinguish the history q0q1 from
the history q0q
′
1 after sharing knowledge. Thus, T1, λ1, 1 |= 〈〈{g1, g2}〉〉©win.
Regarding the coalition monotonicity, consider the model T2 in Figure 5.2. At stage
1 on the left computation λ1 := q0q1q2 · · · , guesser g1 has the ability to win at the
next stage by choosing the left shell, i.e., T2, λ1, 1 |= 〈〈g1〉〉©win. Furthermore,
when g1 and g2 form a coalition, guesser g1 still has the ability to make the coalition
win, i.e., T2, λ1, 1 |= 〈〈{g1, g2}〉〉©win.
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It should be noted that the reason why alternative semantics fail to keep the
coalition monotonicity property is that their interpretations of coalition operator
〈〈C〉〉ϕ are given without allowing knowledge sharing in coalitions. Specifically, the
coalition operator is interpreted with respect to either the union of each member’s
equivalence relation or its transitive reflexive closure, which means the coalitional
abilities implicitly require general knowledge or common knowledge. Neither gen-
eral knowledge nor common knowledge is coalitionally monotonic. Different from
them, distributed knowledge has the coalition monotonicity property.
5.3 Properties of Coalition Operators
We begin by showing that the coalitional abilities specified by coalition operators
satisfy the plausible properties in Section 3.1
Proposition 5.2. For all C, C ′ ⊆ N and all ϕ, ψ ∈ LATL,
1. |= ¬ 〈〈C〉〉© ⊥
2. |= 〈〈C〉〉© >
3. |= 〈〈C〉〉©(ϕ ∧ ψ)→ 〈〈C〉〉©ϕ
4. |= 〈〈C〉〉©ϕ→ 〈〈C ′〉〉©ϕ where C ⊆ C ′
5. |= 〈〈C〉〉©ϕ ∧ 〈〈C ′〉〉©ψ → 〈〈C ∪ C ′〉〉©(ϕ ∧ ψ) where C ∩ C ′ = ∅
6. |= 〈〈C〉〉©ϕ→ ¬〈〈N\C〉〉©¬ϕ
7. |= ¬ 〈〈∅〉〉¬©ϕ→ 〈〈N〉〉©ϕ
Similarly for the  and U operators.
Proof. Given an arbitrary iCGS T , for any computation λ of T and any stage
j ∈ N,
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1 follows from the fact that T , λ′, j + 1 6|= ⊥ for any computation λ′ ≈jC λ.
2 follows from the fact that T , λ′, j + 1 |= > for any computation λ′ ≈jC λ.
3 is straightforward by |= ϕ ∧ ψ → ϕ.
4 Assume T , λ, j |= 〈〈C〉〉©ϕ, then there is FC = 〈fr〉r∈C such that for all λ′ ≈jC λ,
for all λ′′ ∈ P(FC, λ′[0, j]), T , λ′′, j+1 |= ϕ. Let FC′ be the same as FC for any r ∈
C. Then for all λ1 ≈jC′ λ, for all λ2 ∈ P(FC′ , λ1[0, j]), we have λ2 ∈ P(FC, λ′[0, j]),
so T , λ2, j + 1 |= ϕ. Thus, T , λ, j |= 〈〈C ′〉〉©ϕ.
5 Assume T , λ, j |= 〈〈C〉〉©ϕ∧〈〈C ′〉〉©ψ, then there is F 1C = 〈f 1r 〉r∈C such that for
all λ1 ≈jC λ, for all λ′1 ∈ P(F 1C , λ1[0, j]), T , λ′1, j+1 |= ϕ, and there is F 2C′ = 〈f 2r 〉r∈C′
such that for all λ2 ≈jC′ λ, for all λ′2 ∈ P(F 2C′ , λ2[0, j]), T , λ′2, j + 1 |= ψ. We define
the joint strategy FC∪C′ = 〈fr〉r∈C∪C′ as follows: for any history h ∈ H and any
r ∈ C ∪ C ′,
fr(h) =

f 1r (h) if r ∈ C;
f 2r (h) if r ∈ C ′.
This is well-defined by C ∩ C ′ = ∅. It is easy to check that FC∪C′ is the joint
strategy for coalition C ∪ C ′ to achieve both ϕ and ψ at the next state. So
T , λ, j |= 〈〈C ∪ C ′〉〉©(ϕ ∧ ψ).
6 follows from 1 and 5.
7. Assume T , λ, j |= ¬ 〈〈∅〉〉¬©ϕ, then there is λ′ ∈ P(F∅, λ[0, j]), T , λ′, j+1 |= ϕ.
We construct a joint coalition FN = 〈fr〉r∈N for the grand coalition in terms of λ′
as follows: for any history h ∈ H and any r ∈ N ,
fr(h) =

θr(λ
′, j) if h = λ′[0, i] for some i ∈ N;
ar ∈ dr(last(h)) otherwise.
This is well defined as the proper initial segment of λ′ is unique. Then P(FN , λ[0, j]) =
{λ′}, so M,λ, j |= 〈〈N〉〉©ϕ.
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Clause 1 says that no coalition C can enforce the falsity, and Clause 2 states
every coalition C can enforce the truth. Clauses 3 and 4 specify the outcome-
monotonicity and the coalition-monotonicity, respectively. Clause 5 is the super-
additivity property specifying disjoint coalitions can combine their strategies to
achieve more. Clause 6 is called C-regularity specifying that it is impossible for
a coalition and its complementary set to enforce inconsistency. The last clause is
N -maximality prescribing that the grand coalition can bring about something, if
it is not impossible, i.e., there is a computation to achieve it.
The next proposition provides interesting validities about epistemic and coalition
operators.
Proposition 5.3. For any C ⊆ N and all ϕ, ψ ∈ LATL,
1. |= 〈〈C〉〉©ϕ↔ 〈〈C〉〉©DCϕ
2. |= 〈〈C〉〉©ϕ↔ DC 〈〈C〉〉©ϕ
3. |= 〈〈C〉〉ϕ↔ 〈〈C〉〉DCϕ
4. |= 〈〈C〉〉ϕ↔ DC 〈〈C〉〉ϕ
5. |= 〈〈C〉〉DCϕUDCψ → 〈〈C〉〉ϕUψ
6. |= 〈〈C〉〉ϕUψ ↔ DC 〈〈C〉〉ϕUψ
Proof. We only give proof for the first two clauses, and the proof for the others is
similar.
1. For every iCGS T , every computation λ of T and every stage j ∈ N, assume
T , λ, j |= 〈〈C〉〉©ϕ, then there is FC = 〈fr〉r∈C such that for all λ′ ≈jC λ, for all
λ′′ ∈ P(FC, λ′[0, j]), T , λ′′, j + 1 |= ϕ. We next show that FC is the joint strategy
to verify 〈〈C〉〉©DCϕ. Suppose not for a contradiction that there is λ1 ≈jC λ,
there is λ2 ∈ P(FC, λ1[0, j]), there is λ3 ≈j+1C λ2 such that T , λ3, j + 1 6|= ϕ, then
λ3 ≈jC λ. And θr(λ3, j) = θr(λ2, j) = fr(λ2[0, j]) for every r ∈ C, so there is some
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λ∗ ∈ ⋃λ′≈jCλP(FC, λ′[0, j]) such that λ∗[0, j + 1] = λ3[0, j + 1]. By assumption we
have T , λ∗, j + 1 |= ϕ, then T , λ3, j + 1 |= ϕ: a contradiction. Thus, T , λ, j |=
〈〈C〉〉©DCϕ. The other direction is straightforward by |= DCϕ→ ϕ.
2. For every iCGS T , every computation λ of T and every stage j ∈ N, assume
T , λ, j |= 〈〈C〉〉©ϕ, then there is FC = 〈fr〉r∈C such that for all λ′ ≈jC λ, for
all λ′′ ∈ P(FC, λ′[0, j]), T , λ′′, j + 1 |= ϕ. We next prove that for any λ∗ ≈jC λ,
T , λ∗, j |= 〈〈C〉〉©ϕ. Let us take the strategy FC. It is easy to check that for all
λ1 ≈jC λ∗, for all λ2 ∈ P(FC, λ1[0, j]), by ≈jC (λ∗) =≈jC (λ), we have T , λ2, j + 1 |=
ϕ. Thus, T , λ, j |= DC 〈〈C〉〉©ϕ. The other direction is straightforward.
Note that it is not the case that |= 〈〈C〉〉ϕUψ → 〈〈C〉〉DCϕUDCψ. Here is a
counter-example. Consider the model T3 in Figure 5.4 with two agents 1, 2, and
states {q0, q1, q′1, q2, q′2}, where q1R1q′1, but not for 2, and all the other states can
be distinguished by both agents. There are two propositions p and q such that
pi(p) = {q1} and pi(q) = {q′1, q2}. The transitions are depicted as in the Figure.
Figure 5.4: Counter-model T3. Figure 5.5: Counter-model T4.
Consider the left computation λ := q0q1q2 · · · . It is easy to check that T3, λ, 1 |=
〈〈1〉〉pUq, but T3, λ, 1 6|= 〈〈1〉〉K1pUK1q.
It follows from Proposition 6.4 that the distributed knowledge operator and the
coalition operator are interchangeable w.r.t temporal operators © and .
Corollary 5.4. For any C ⊆ N and any ϕ ∈ LATL,
1. |= 〈〈C〉〉©DCϕ↔ DC 〈〈C〉〉©ϕ
Chapter 5. Knowledge Sharing in Coalitions 114
2. |= 〈〈C〉〉DCϕ↔ DC 〈〈C〉〉ϕ
5.4 Knowledge Sharing and Coalitional Abilities
In this section, we investigate the interplay between knowledge shared by a group
of agents and its coalitional abilities in ATL with the proposed semantics. To start
with, we show that, similar to [Belardinelli, 2014, 2015], the standard fixed-point
characterizations of coalition operators for ATL [Goranko and van Drimmelen,
2006] fail under this semantics.
Proposition 5.5. For any C ⊆ N and all ϕ, ψ ∈ LATL,
1. 6|= ϕ ∧ 〈〈C〉〉©〈〈C〉〉ϕ→ 〈〈C〉〉ϕ
2. 6|= ϕ ∨ 〈〈C〉〉©〈〈C〉〉♦ϕ→ 〈〈C〉〉♦ϕ
3. 6|= 〈〈C〉〉♦ϕ→ ϕ ∨ 〈〈C〉〉©〈〈C〉〉♦ϕ
4. 6|= ψ ∨ (ϕ ∧ 〈〈C〉〉©〈〈C〉〉ϕUψ)→ 〈〈C〉〉ϕUψ
5. 6|= 〈〈C〉〉ϕUψ → ψ ∨ (ϕ ∧ 〈〈C〉〉©〈〈C〉〉ϕUψ)
Here is a counter-example for the first one. Consider the model T4 in Figure 5.5,
which is obtained from T3 by only changing the valuations. There is one propo-
sition p such that pi(p) = {q1, q2, q′2}. Consider ϕ := p and the left computation
λ := q0q1q2 · · · . Then it is easy to check that T4, λ, 1 |= p, T4, λ, 1 |= 〈〈1〉〉©〈〈1〉〉p,
but T4, λ, 1 6|= 〈〈1〉〉p. Thus, T4, λ, 1 6|= p ∧ 〈〈1〉〉©〈〈1〉〉p→ 〈〈1〉〉p.
On the other hand, the next proposition shows that the converse direction for 
holds under the proposed semantics.
Proposition 5.6. For any C ⊆ N and any ϕ ∈ LATL,
|= 〈〈C〉〉ϕ→ ϕ ∧ 〈〈C〉〉©〈〈C〉〉ϕ.
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Proof. For every iCGS T , every computation λ of T and every stage j ∈ N, assume
T , λ, j |= 〈〈C〉〉ϕ, then there is FC = 〈fr〉r∈C such that for all λ′ ≈jC λ, for all
λ′′ ∈ P(FC, λ′[0, j]), T , λ′′, k |= ϕ for all k ≥ j. In particular, λ ≈jC λ. Then for all
λ∗ ∈ P(FC, λ[0, j]), T , λ∗, j |= ϕ. And by λ[0, j] = λ∗[0, j], we obtain T , λ, j |= ϕ.
We next prove that T , λ, j |= 〈〈C〉〉©〈〈C〉〉ϕ. It suffices to show that FC is just
the joint strategy to verify the both coalition operators. That is, for all λ1 ≈jC λ,
for all λ2 ∈ P(FC, λ1[0, j]), for all λ3 ≈j+1C λ2, for all λ4 ∈ P(FC, λ3[0, j + 1]), we
want to prove that T , λ4, i |= ϕ for all i ≥ j + 1. By λ4 ∈ P(FC, λ3[0, j + 1]),
we have λ4[0, j + 1] = λ3[0, j + 1], then λ4 ≈j+1C λ2, so λ4 ≈jC λ2 and λ4 ∈⋃
λ1≈jCλP(FC, λ1[0, j]). And by the assumption, we have T , λ4, i |= ϕ, so T , λ, j |=
〈〈C〉〉©〈〈C〉〉ϕ.
Thus, T , λ, j |= ϕ ∧ 〈〈C〉〉©〈〈C〉〉ϕ.
We now present the main result about the interactions of distributed knowledge
and coalitional abilities in the context of imperfect information. Recall that K̂ and
D̂ are the dual operators of K and D, respectively.
Theorem 5.7. For any C ⊆ N and for all ϕ, ψ ∈ LATL,
1. |= 〈〈C〉〉ϕ↔ DCϕ ∧ 〈〈C〉〉©〈〈C〉〉ϕ
2. |= 〈〈C〉〉♦ϕ→ D̂Cϕ ∨ 〈〈C〉〉©〈〈C〉〉♦ϕ
3. |= DCϕ ∨ 〈〈C〉〉©〈〈C〉〉♦ϕ→ 〈〈C〉〉♦ϕ
4. |= 〈〈C〉〉ϕUψ → D̂Cψ ∨ (DCϕ ∧ 〈〈C〉〉©〈〈C〉〉ϕUψ)
5. |= DCψ ∨ (DCϕ ∧ 〈〈C〉〉©〈〈C〉〉ϕUψ)→ 〈〈C〉〉ϕUψ
Clause 1 says that a coalition by sharing their knowledge can cooperate to maintain
ϕ if, and only if the coalition distributedly knows ϕ at the current stage, and there
is a joint strategy for this coalition to possess this ability at the next stage. Clause
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2 states that a coalition by sharing their knowledge can eventually achieve ϕ, only
if either the coalition considers it is possible that ϕ at the current stage, or it
has a joint strategy to possess this ability at the next stage. Clause 3 provides
a sufficient condition that a coalition by sharing their knowledge can eventually
achieve ϕ, if either it is distributed knowledge among the coalition that ϕ holds, or
the coalition can cooperate to achieve this ability at the next stage. The intuitions
behind the last two clauses are similar. We next provide the proof.
Proof. 1. For every iCGS T , every computation λ of T and every stage j ∈ N,
assume T , λ, j |= DCϕ ∧ 〈〈C〉〉©〈〈C〉〉ϕ, then T , λ, j |= DCϕ and T , λ, j |=
〈〈C〉〉©〈〈C〉〉ϕ. By the latter, we obatin that there is F 1C = 〈f 1r 〉r∈C such that
for all λ1 ≈jC λ, for all λ2 ∈ P(F 1C , λ1[0, j]), T , λ2, j + 1 |= 〈〈C〉〉ϕ, then there
is F 2·xC = 〈f 2·xr 〉r∈C , where x = λ2[0, j + 1], such that for all λ3 ≈j+1C λ2, for all
λ4 ∈ P(F 2·xC , λ3[0, j + 1]), T , λ4, t |= ϕ for all t ≥ j + 1. We next construct a
new joint strategy FC = 〈fr〉r∈C based on F 1C and F 2·xC . To this end, we need the
following notation1. Let
X = {λ′[0, j] α→ w | λ′ ≈jC λ,∀r ∈ C(α(r) = f 1r (λ′[0, j])), and w = δ(λ′[j], α)}.
Intuitively, X is the set of all possible outcomes generated by the agents in C
taking the next actions specified by F 1C from a history that is indistinguishable
from history λ[0, j]. With this notation, we now define strategy FC = 〈fr〉r∈C as
follows: For all h ∈ H(T ) and for all r ∈ C,
fr(h) =
 f 2·lr (h) if ∃l ∈ X such that l is a segment of h;f 1r (h) otherwise.
Note that this is well-defined, because if a history h has a segment in X, there is
only one such segment because according to the definition of equivalence relations
over histories all histories in X has the same length.
1It should be noted that this idea is borrowed from [van Ditmarsch and Knight, 2014].
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We now show that FC is just the joint strategy we need to verify 〈〈C〉〉ϕ. That
is, for all λ′ ≈jC λ, for all λ′′ ∈ P(FC, λ′[0, j]), we want to prove that for all s ≥ j,
T , λ′′, s |= ϕ. By |l| > |λ′[0, j]| for any l ∈ X, we have that there is no l ∈ X
such that l is a segment of λ′[0, j], then by the definition of FC, FC(λ′[0, j]) =
F 1C(λ
′[0, j]), so λ′′[0, j + 1] ∈ X and T , λ′′, j + 1 |= 〈〈C〉〉ϕ. From the latter, we
obtain that for all λ• ≈j+1C λ′′, for all λ∗ ∈ P(F 2·yC , λ•[0, j+1]), where y = λ′′[0, j+
1], T , λ∗, t |= ϕ for all t ≥ j+1. And by λ′′[0, j+1] ∈ X, we have λ•[0, j+1] ∈ X.
Then by the definition of FC and the assumption λ
′′ ∈ P(FC, λ′[0, j]), we obtain
λ′′ ∈ P(F 2·yC , λ•[0, j+1]), so for all s ≥ j+1, T , λ′′, s |= ϕ. And by the assumption
T , λ, j |= DCϕ, we have T , λ′′, j |= ϕ. Thus, T , λ′′, s |= ϕ for all s ≥ j, so
T , λ, j |= 〈〈C〉〉ϕ.
The other direction is proved by a similar method in Proposition 5.6.
2. Assume T , λ, j |= 〈〈C〉〉♦ϕ, then there is FC = 〈fr〉r∈C such that for all λ′ ≈jC
λ, for all λ′′ ∈ P(FC, λ′[0, j]), T , λ′′, k |= ϕ for some k ≥ j. Further assume
T , λ, j |= DC¬ϕ, then for all λ∗ ≈jC λ, T , λ∗, j |= ¬ϕ, so for all λ′ ≈jC λ, for all
λ′′ ∈ P(FC, λ′[0, j]), there is k > j such that T , λ′′, k |= ϕ. It is not hard to show
that FC is just the joint strategy to verify 〈〈C〉〉©〈〈C〉〉♦ϕ.
Clause 3 and Clause 5 are proved by a similar method of Clause 1, and Clause 4
is proved by a similar method of Clause 2.
It should be noted that with knowledge sharing, the fixed-point characterization
only holds for the coalition operator with box 〈〈C〉〉. Here are two simple counter-
examples for the other two cases.
Figure 5.6: Counter-model T5. Figure 5.7: Counter-model T6.
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Consider the counter-model T5 in Figure 5.6 with one single agent 1 and states
{q1, q′1, q2.q′2} where q1R1q′1. There is one single atomic proposition p such that
pi(p) = {q′1, q2}. The transitions are depicted in the figure and the reflexive loops
are omitted. Consider the computation λ := q1q2 · · · . Then T5, λ, 1 |= 〈〈1〉〉♦p,
but T5, λ, 1 6|= K1ϕ ∨ 〈〈1〉〉©〈〈1〉〉♦p. T6 is obtained by changing the valuations.
There are two atomic propositions p and q such that pi(p) = {q1} and pi(q) =
{q′1, q2}. Consider the computation λ := q1q2 · · · . Then T6, λ, 1 |= 〈〈1〉〉pUq, but
T6, λ, 1 6|= K1q ∨ (K1ϕ ∧ 〈〈1〉〉©〈〈1〉〉pUq).
In particular, we have the following result for a single agent.
Corollary 5.8. For any r ∈ N and all ϕ, ψ ∈ LATL,
1. |= 〈〈r〉〉ϕ↔ Krϕ ∧ 〈〈r〉〉©〈〈r〉〉ϕ
2. |= 〈〈r〉〉♦ϕ→ K̂rϕ ∨ 〈〈r〉〉©〈〈r〉〉♦ϕ
3. |= Krϕ ∨ 〈〈r〉〉©〈〈r〉〉♦ϕ→ 〈〈r〉〉♦ϕ
4. |= 〈〈r〉〉ϕUψ → K̂rψ ∨ (Krϕ ∧ 〈〈r〉〉©〈〈r〉〉ϕUψ)
5. |= Krψ ∨ (Krϕ ∧ 〈〈r〉〉©〈〈r〉〉ϕUψ)→ 〈〈r〉〉ϕUψ
5.5 Discussion and Summary
Reasoning about coalitional abilities and strategic interactions is fundamental in
analysis of games and multi-agent systems. In recent years, many logical for-
malisms have been proposed for this purpose. For a latest survey of this topic,
please refer to [Herzig, 2015, van Ditmarsch et al., 2015] . In this following, we
review the literature which is most related to our work.
In the context of imperfect information, several semantic variants have been pro-
posed for ATL based on different interpretations of agents’ abilities [A˚gotnes et al.,
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2007, Alechina et al., 2016, Jamroga and van der Hoek, 2004, Schobbens, 2004,
van der Hoek and Wooldridge, 2003]. In particular, Jamroga and Bulling [2014,
2011] provide formal comparisons of validity sets for semantic variants of ATL,
and Dima et al. [2015] point the subtle expressiveness properties of ATL with
imperfect information and perfect recall. Similar to the no forgetting semantics
of Bulling et al. [2014], our semantics is also history-based w.r.t a computation
and an index, but there are fundamental differences between their work and ours.
Firstly, we consider a finer notion of perfect recall by taking both past states and
actions into consideration so as to deal with situations where different actions may
have the same effects. Secondly, our notion of joint strategies is defined in terms
of distributed knowledge instead of general knowledge, as we assume that when
a set of agents form a coalition, they are able to share their knowledge before
cooperating to ensure a goal.
A few epistemic-ATL style logics have been proposed to investigate the interaction
of group knowledge and coalitional abilities [Bulling and Jamroga, 2014, Guelev
et al., 2011, Huang et al., 2016, Schobbens, 2004, van Ditmarsch and Knight, 2014].
Among them, Guelev et al. [2011] present a variant of ATL with knowledge, perfect
recall and past. Different from our motivation, they use distributed knowledge
of coalitions to have a decidable model-checking problem, since Dima and Tiplea
[2011] prove that model checking for ATL under imperfect information and perfect
recall is undecidable. Moreover, to facilitate the formulation of epistemic goals,
they also allow the unrestricted use of the past connectives which are not involved
in our work. van Ditmarsch and Knight [2014] propose three types of coalition
operators to specify different cases of how all agents in the coalition cooperate
to enforce a goal. Among them, the communication strategy operator 〈〈C〉〉c
captures the intuition behind our coalition operator. Specifically, we have the
following correspondence.
Given an iCGS T , a computation λ of T and a stage j ∈ N, let ϕ be any formula
of the form ©ψ, ψ or ψ1Uψ2. Then
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T , λ, j |= 〈〈C〉〉ϕ iff T , λ[0, j] |=euATL 〈〈C〉〉cϕ.
Their work is different from ours in the following aspects: firstly, they propose
two epistemic versions of ATL, namely uATL and euATL, to address the issue
of uniformity of strategies in the combination of strategic and epistemic systems,
while we introduce a variant of semantics without adding epistemic operators to
explore the interplay of epistemic and coalition operators; secondly, their results
mainly focus on the relations and logical properties of three coalition operators,
and the interplay of distributed knowledge and coalition operators is not involved
in their work; thirdly, their meaning of coalition is more subtle than ours. Besides
the communication strategy operator, there are the active coalitional strategy op-
erator and the passive coalitional strategy operator in their work. The comparison
with these two strategy operators is less straightforward, since they are based on
assumptions of coalitions without sharing knowledge.
It is also worth mentioning that Herzig and Troquard [2006] adopt a similar mean-
ing of coalition so as to capture the notion of “knowing how to play”. Besides the
different motivations, that work is based on STIT framework and only considers
one-step uniform strategies without investigating the interplay of epistemic and
coalition operators. The notion of uniform strategies and the relevant complexity
have been extensively investigated in [Bozzelli et al., 2015, Maubert and Pinchinat,
2013, 2014, Maubert et al., 2013]. Among them, Maubert and Pinchinat [2014]
propose a formula language to specify a general notion of uniform strategies and
study an automated procedure to synthesize strategies subject to a uniformity
property. In particular, their definition subsumes our notion of uniform strategies.
In summary, this chapter has proposed a variant of semantics for ATL with imper-
fect information and perfect recall so as to investigate the interplay of the knowl-
edge shared by a group of agents and its coalitional abilities. We have showed that
this semantics can not only preserve the plausible properties of coalitional abili-
ties, but also provide a finer notion of perfect recall requiring an agent remembers
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the past states as well as the past actions. More importantly, we have investi-
gated the interplay of epistemic and coalition operators, which can be seen as an
attempt towards the question: which kind of group knowledge is required for a
group to achieve some goal in the context of imperfect information [Herzig, 2015].
We did not investigate the computational complexity of ATL with this semantics;
nevertheless, Guelev et al. [2011] show a decidable model-checking algorithm for a
variant of ATL with knowledge, perfect recall and past based on the assumption
that strategies are uniform with respect to distributed knowledge of the coalition.
We expect a similar decidability result holds under our setting.
Chapter 6
Reason-Based Collective Choice
This chapter changes the focus from (joint) actions to (collective) preferences, and
use the approach to combine actions via their priorities in Chapter 2 to deal with
the collective decision-making. It proposes a modal logic by extending propo-
sitional logic with the prioritized connective O introduced in Section 2.2.2 for
modelling individual and collective choices in social choice theory.
6.1 Background
Social Choice Theory deals with the problem of how to aggregate individual prefer-
ences into a social or collective preference so as to reach a collective decision [Gaert-
ner, 2009]. In the simplest setting when individual preferences are given by order-
ings over available alternatives, social choice is to select a rule that maps a profile
of individual preference orderings into a social preference ordering over the same
alternatives, and then make a collective choice from the alternatives in terms of
the social preference ordering. However, in many situations, individual preferences
may not be given in the form of an ordering over alternatives but the “reasons”
that lead to the preference. For instance, when buying a property, we may express
our preference in the way of specifying which locations we like the house to be,
122
Chapter 6. Reason-based Collective Choice 123
how many bedrooms we want it to have and which price range we can afford.
These reasons not only induce a preference ordering over the set of alternatives,
say a ranking over the houses available on the market, but also convey more infor-
mation than the preference ordering, which is crucial for understanding rational
choice of an agent, i.e., reason-based choice [Clippel and Eliaz, 2012, Dietrich and
List, 2013b, 2016]. A reason-based choice of an agent is a choice based on reasons
and the agent acts on the basis of reasons [Dietrich and List, 2013b].
Representing reasons for a preference is more fundamental than representing the
preference itself. There are a number of ways that the concept of a reason can be
formalized. A simple way is to express a reason as a propositional formula [Lang,
2004]. For instance, if we want a four-bedroom house located in Mountain View,
the reason can be represented as Mountain V iew∧Four bedroom. However, most
often not all of the reasons can be satisfied, and we have to make some sort of
compromises. One of the most natural and convenient methods is to sort reasons.
If the best option is unavailable, the agent may be then satisfied by the second
best option (or third, etc). For instance, we might want to express that we want
to buy a four-bedroom house located in Mountain View most; if it is impossible, a
four-bedroom house located in Menlo Park is also fine. Here is the place where the
prioritized connective O introduced in Section 2.2.2 comes into play. For example,
our reasons for house choice with the above-mentioned priority over locations can
be naturally represented as (Mountain V iew∧Four bedroom) O (Menlo Park∧
Four bedroom).
Logical representation of reason-based choices does not provide a solution to the
problem of reason-based social choice. A first idea would be that we convert the
reason-based preference of each agent into a preference ordering over alternatives,
and then apply a conventional preference aggregation rule to deduce the social
preference ordering. Unfortunately, this does not provide a solution to the prob-
lem, because the outcome of the social preference is no longer reason-based, which
does not give reasons for collective choice.
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This chapter aims to address this problem by proposing a modal logic for modelling
individual and collective choices based on reasons. We first extend the language
of propositional logic with the prioritized connective O so that each formula in
this language can express not only reasons for choices (i.e., properties of alterna-
tives) but also priorities over the reasons. Each formula of this logic determines a
preference ordering over alternatives on the basis of priorities over the reasons. In
such a way, the problem of collective choice is reduced to how to aggregate a set
of formulas into a single formula. We then define a few plausible collective choice
rules within the same language, which are specified by Arrow’s conditions [Gaert-
ner, 2009]. Interestingly, all Arrowian conditions are plausible under this setting
except Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA). This gives us a natural way
to circumvent Arrow’s impossibility result [Gaertner, 2009]. We also show a pos-
sibility result by replacing IIA with Monotonicity [Fagin et al., 2003a]. Finally we
develop a model-checking algorithm for this logic so as to automatically generate
individual and collective choices, which is rarely achieved by the existing logics for
social choice theory [Endriss, 2011].
6.2 Reason-Based Choice Logic
In this section, we establish a modal logic for modelling reason-based choices. In
the rest of the chapter, we call this logic reason-based choice logic, denoted as RCL
for short.
6.2.1 The Language
The language of RCL is obtained by extending propositional logic with the prior-
itized connective O introduced in Section 2.2.2.
Definition 6.1. The language, denoted by LRCL, consists of:
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• a nonempty finite set Φ0 of atomic propositions;
• propositional connectives ¬ and ∧;
• a binary modality O, representing priority over reasons instead of actions in
Chapter 2.
A formula ϕ in LRCL is generated by the following BNF:
ϕ ::= A | ϕ O ϕ
where A is a standard propositional formula built as follows:
A ::= p | ¬A | A ∧ A
where p ∈ Φ0.
The formulas are in two levels. The formulas in the lower level are the standard
propositional formulas, used for describing reasons or properties of alternatives.
The other logical connectives ∨, →, ↔ and the logical constants >, ⊥ are in-
troduced in the standard way. The formulas in the upper level are designed to
express priorities over reasons. A formula ϕ1 O ϕ2 means “choose an alternative
to make ϕ1 true; if no alternatives make it true, choose one to make ϕ2 true”. In
other words, the agent gives a higher priority to the reason specified by ϕ1 than
to that specified by ϕ2 in decision making.
It should be noted that the prioritized connective O is from Section 2.2.2. We
use it to give priorities over reasons instead of actions. Here we do not allow the
prioritized connective being nested in any propositional connective. The reason is
that once this is allowed, the intuition behind prioritized choice will be lost. For
instance, it is unclear what the prior reasons are determined by the conjunction
of two prioritized choices ϕ1 O ψ1 and ϕ2 O ψ2. There are many ways to merge
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prioritized choices. In fact, this is exactly a problem of choice aggregation, which
is the main theme of this chapter.
As the BNF shows, nesting prioritized choice formulas is allowed. For example,
(ϕ1 O ϕ2) O ϕ3 is a well-formed formula in LRCL. As we will show in next section,
O is associative, so the following abbreviation becomes meaningful:
ϕ1 O ϕ2 O · · · O ϕm =def ((ϕ1 O ϕ2) O · · · ) O ϕm
6.2.2 The Semantics
The semantics for the classical propositional logic interprets each atomic propo-
sition with a truth value either true or false. Formally, an interpretation I is a
function that maps Φ0 to {true, false}. Alternatively, an interpretation can also
be expressed as a set of literals1, in which the positive literals represent the atomic
propositions that are true under the interpretation, while the negative literals
represent the atomic propositions which are false.
Let W be the set of alternatives from which an agent has to choose. Assume
that each alternative is uniquely specified by its properties/attributes/characters
expressed by atomic propositions. Take the restaurant menu as an example. As-
sume a restaurant offers a number of dishes W = {x, y, z, ...} for us to choose.
Each dish is characterised by its ingredients and styles. For instance, Bouill-
abaisse Royale is a French dish made up of fish fillets, prawns, scallops, scampi,
mussels and cooked in a fish-and-tomato stock. If each character is expressed by
an atomic proposition in Φ0 = {p, q, r, ...}, a dish can be uniquely identified by
an interpretation of Φ0. In general, we can simply view each alternative in W
as an interpretation over Φ0, if we represent each property/attribute/character of
the alternatives by an atomic proposition in Φ0. Therefore, W becomes a set of
interpretations over Φ0, i.e., W ⊆ 2Φ0 . In the following, we assume any set W of
1A literal is an atomic proposition or its negation.
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alternatives is non-empty. Note that W is finite and does not have to contain all
interpretations of Φ0.
Next we consider how to interpret a propositional formula. Suppose that you want
to eat seafood in a restaurant. You will then choose a dish from the restaurant
menu that contains seafood, such as fish, prawn or others. Assume that, as we
mentioned above, we represent the characters of food in atomic propositions. Then
the statement seafood can be expressed in a propositional formula, such as (fish∨
prawn) ∧ lemon. You choose the dishes (represented as interpretations of the
language) that can satisfy this formula. In general, an alternative w in W is a
candidate of our choice if it satisfies our reasons for selection represented by A,
i.e., w |= A.
Finally, we consider the interpretation of a prioritized formula. As we mentioned
above, ϕ O ψ means “choose an alternative to meet ϕ; if it is impossible, choose
one to meet ψ”. Consider an alternative w ∈ W , if w satisfies ϕ, it certainly
satisfies ϕ O ψ. However, if none of the alternatives in W satisfies ϕ, then an
alternative w′ satisfies ϕ O ψ only if w′ satisfies ψ.
Based on above intuitive discussion, we are now ready to define the truth condi-
tions for all formulas in our language.
Definition 6.2. Given a set, W ⊆ 2Φ0 , of alternatives and for any w ∈ W , a
formula ϕ ∈ LRCL is true (or satisfied) at w in W , denoted by W,w |= ϕ, iff
W,w |= p iff p ∈ w
W,w |= ¬A iff w 6|= A
W,w |= A ∧B iff w |= A and w |= B
W,w |= ϕ1 O ϕ2 iff W,w |= ϕ1, or (W,w |= ϕ2 and W,w′ 6|= ϕ1 for all w′ ∈ W ).
We say ϕ is valid in W , denoted by W |= ϕ, if W,w |= ϕ for every w ∈ W ; ϕ is
valid, denoted by |= ϕ, if W |= ϕ for any W ⊆ 2Φ0 . Given any two formulas ϕ,
ψ ∈ LRCL, ϕ is a logical consequence of ψ, denoted by ϕ |= ψ, iff for any W and
any w ∈ W , if W,w |= ϕ, then W,w |= ψ.
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The following result shows that the prioritized connective is associative.
Proposition 6.1. For all ϕ1, ϕ2 and ϕ3 ∈ LRCL, for any W and any w ∈ W ,
W,w |= ϕ1 O (ϕ2 O ϕ3) iff W,w |= (ϕ1 O ϕ2) O ϕ3
Proof.
Assume W,w |= ϕ1 O (ϕ2 O ϕ3)
iff W,w |= ϕ1, or (for all v ∈ W,W, v 6|= ϕ1 and W,w |= ϕ2 O ϕ3)
iff W,w |= ϕ1, or (for all v ∈ W,W, v 6|= ϕ1 and (W,w |= ϕ2,
or (for all v ∈ W,W, v 6|= ϕ2 and W,w |= ϕ3)))
iff W,w |= ϕ1, or (for all v ∈ W,W, v 6|= ϕ1 and W,w |= ϕ2),
or (for all v ∈ W,W, v 6|= ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2 and W,w |= ϕ3)
iff W,w |= ϕ1, or (for all v ∈ W,W, v 6|= ϕ1 and W,w |= ϕ2),
or (for all v ∈ W (W, v 6|= ϕ1, and (there is u ∈ W
W,u |= ϕ1 or W, v 6|= ϕ2)) and W,w |= ϕ3)
iff W,w |= ϕ1 O ϕ2, or (for all v ∈ W,W, v 6|= ϕ1 O ϕ2 and W,w |= ϕ3)
iff W,w |= (ϕ1 O ϕ2) O ϕ3
Thus, W,w |= ϕ1 O (ϕ2 O ϕ3) iff W,w |= (ϕ1 O ϕ2) O ϕ3.
6.2.3 Expressiveness and Succinctness
In this subsection, we investigate the expressiveness and succinctness of the lan-
guage for preference representation.
6.2.3.1 Expressivity
Let us begin by how to extend priorities over reasons to a preference ordering
over alternatives. A preference ordering over alternatives is a reflexive, total and
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transitive relation over alternatives. Hereafter, we show that the proposed lan-
guage is simple, yet expressive enough to describe any preference ordering over
alternatives.
Basically, we generate a preference ordering over W in terms of a formula ϕ,
denoted by ϕ, in this way: an alternative w is preferred to an alternative w′,
denoted by w ϕ w′, if the maximal important reason that w satisfies is given at
least a similar priority as the maximal important reason that w′ satisfies.
Definition 6.3. Given ϕ ∈ LRCL of the form A1 O A2 O · · · O Am and an
alternative w ∈ W , let
h(w) =

Min{i : w |= Ai} if w |=
m∨
i=1
Ai;
m+ 1 otherwise.
Then for any two alternatives w,w′ ∈ W , w ϕ w′ iff h(w) ≤ h(w′).
As usual, w ≺ϕ w′ =def w ϕ w′ and not (w′ ϕ w), and w ∼ϕ w′ =def w ϕ w′
and w′ ϕ w. It follows that an alternative w with h(w) = m + 1 must fail to
satisfy ϕ itself, i.e., w 6∈ C(W,ϕ), since it dissatisfies all the reasons. We next use
a simple example to illustrate how this works.
Example 6.1. Given Φ0 = {p, q, r, s} and ϕ = (p ∧ q) O (r → s), let W =
{w1, w2, w3, w4}, where w1 = {p, q, r,¬s}, w2 = {p, q, r, s}, w3 = {¬p, q, r,¬s} and
w4 = {p,¬q, r, s}. Then we have h(w1) = h(w2) = 1, h(w3) = 3 and h(w4) = 2.
Hence, w1 ∼ϕ w2 ≺ϕ w4 ≺ϕ w3.
The following proposition says that the language LRCL can not only generate a
preference ordering over W , but also express any preference ordering over W .
Proposition 6.2. Given a set W of alternatives,
1. for any formula ϕ ∈ LRCL, ϕ is a preference ordering over W .
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2. for any preference ordering  over W , there is a formula ϕ ∈ LRCL such
that  = ϕ.
Proof. The first clause follows from the fact that ϕ is reflexive, total and transi-
tive according to Definition 6.3.
For the other one, since W is distinguishable, each alternative w can be uniquely
characterized by a propositional formula Γw. We construct a formula by compos-
ing propositional formulas with the prioritized connective according to the given
preference ordering such that: Γw O Γw′ if w ≺ w′, and Γw ∨ Γw′ if w ∼ w′.
6.2.3.2 Succinctness
We next investigate another property of this language: the relative space efficiency.
Specifically, we show that one of the standard and compact languages, called the
goal-based language RbestoutGB [Benferhat et al., 1993], can be translated to our
language in polynomial-size, and vice versa.
Definition 6.4. A goal base GB is a tuple 〈{G1, · · · , Gn}, r〉 where
• {G1, · · · , Gn} is a finite set of propositional formulas;
• r is an associated function from N to N.
If r(i) = j, then j is called the rank of formula Gi. By convention, a lower rank
means a higher priority. The priority on goals can be extended to a preference
ordering over alternatives via best-out ordering.
Definition 6.5. Let rGB(w) = Min{r(i) | w 6|= Gi}. Then for any two alternatives
w,w′ ∈ W , w boGB w′ iff rGB(w) ≥ rGB(w′).
The following result says that our language has the same degree of succinctness
with RbestoutGB .
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Proposition 6.3. There is a polynominal-size translation from LRCL to RbestoutGB ,
and vice versa.
Proof. The polynominal-size translation Tr1 from LRCL to RbestoutGB is given as fol-
lows: for any formula ϕ of the form A1 O · · · O Am, Tr1(ϕ) = 〈{G1, · · · , Gn}, r〉
such that m = n, Gi =
∨m−i+1
k=1 Ak for any 1 ≤ i ≤ m, and r(i) = i for any
1 ≤ i ≤ m.
Conversely, the polynominal-size translation Tr2 from R
bestout
GB to LRCL is given
as follows: for any base goal 〈{G1, · · · , Gn}, r〉, there is a priority relation over
{G1, · · · , Gn} according to their ranks given by r. Without loss of generalization,
suppose r is a permutation, and {G′1, · · · , G′n} is the prioritized goals generated
by r, then Tr2(〈{G1, · · · , Gn}, r〉) = A1 O · · · O Am such that m = n and
Ai =
∧m−i+1
k=1 G
′
k for any 1 ≤ i ≤ m.
It is not hard to show that for any two alternatives x, y ∈ W , x ϕ y iff
x boTr1(ϕ) y, and x boGB y iff x boTr2(GB) y.
It follows that RCL and RbestoutGB have the same space efficiency for preference
representation, and thus the succinctness results of RbestoutGB in [Coste-Marquis et al.,
2004] hold for RCL as well.
6.3 Reason-Based Collective Choice
In this section, we first show how to use RCL to represent a choice, then extend
this logic to the multi-agent case for collective choice, and finally define a set of
plausible collective choice rules specified by Arrow’s conditions.
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6.3.1 Choice Set
A choice set is a subset of alternatives that are selected by reasons specified by a
formula ϕ ∈ LRCL. We now introduce the syntactical representation of a choice
set.
Definition 6.6. Given a set W of alternatives and a formula ϕ ∈ LRCL, the choice
set specified by ϕ in W , denoted by C(W,ϕ), is defined as follows:
C(W,ϕ) = {w ∈ W : W,w |= ϕ}
Intuitively, choice set C(W,ϕ) includes all the alternatives in W that satisfy ϕ. To
illustrate how to use prioritized connectives for making a choice, let us consider
the following example.
Example 6.2. Three friends Ann, Kate and Bill are going to watch a movie
together. Ann is a super fan of cartoon comedies, therefore is eager to find one.
If nothing, other comedies are ok, and a fiction as the least option. Kate also
likes cartoons but only non-fiction cartoons. If nothing, she picks a comedy, and a
fiction if nothing else. Finally, Bill will surely go for a fiction, and a non-cartoon
is also ok. If nothing, any movie seems fine for him. They find three movies are
on show: Gravity, Flipped and Frozen. It is known that:
• Gravity is a fiction but not a comedy or cartoon;
• Flipped is a comedy but not a fiction or cartoon;
• Frozen is a cartoon comedy but not a fiction.
Let us first formalize this example. The set of atomic properties is Φ0 = {Fiction,
Comedy, Cartoon}. The set of feasible alternatives is W = {Gravity, F lipped,
Frozen}, where
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Gravity = {Fiction,¬Comedy,¬Cartoon};
Flipped = {¬Fiction,¬Cartoon, Comedy};
Frozen = {¬Fiction, Comedy, Cartoon}.
The prioritized reasons of Ann, Kate and Bill are expressed by RCL-formulas as
follows:
ϕAnn = (Comedy ∧ Cartoon) O Comedy O Fiction
ϕKate = (Cartoon ∧ ¬Fiction) O Comedy O Fiction
ϕBill = Fiction O ¬Cartoon O >
According to their individual reasons, Ann and Kate both choose the movie Frozen,
and Bill chooses the movie Gravity. This intuitive judgment is validated by the
model, i.e., W,Frozen |= ϕAnn, W,Frozen |= ϕKate, and W,Gravity |= ϕBill.
Then it follows that
• C(W,ϕAnn) = {Frozen} (that is, Frozen is chosen based on Ann’s reason.)
• C(W,ϕKate) = {Frozen} (that is, Frozen is chosen based on Kate’s reason.)
• C(W,ϕBill) = {Gravity} (that is, Frozen is chosen based on Bill’s reason.)
Since they would like to watch a movie together, so a natural question arises: which
movie should they choose? We will deal with this question in the next section.
Before handling the collective dimension, we now show that the approach to use
prioritized connectives for making choices is rational, that is, this approach sat-
isfies the two standard rationality conditions: the contraction condition and the
expansion condition [Gaertner, 2009].
Contraction Condition. Given two sets of alternatives W , W ′ with W ⊆ W ′,
for all w ∈ W and for all ϕ ∈ LRCL, if w ∈ C(W ′, ϕ), then w ∈ C(W,ϕ).
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This condition requires that if you choose some alternative from a set of
alternatives, and if this alternative remains available in a more restricted
set, then you also choose it from the restricted one.
Expansion Condition. Given two sets of alternatives W , W ′ with W ⊆ W ′, for
all alternatives w,w′ ∈ W and for any formula ϕ ∈ LRCL, if (w ∈ C(W,ϕ)
and w′ ∈ C(W,ϕ)), then (w ∈ C(W ′, ϕ) iff w′ ∈ C(W ′, ϕ)). This condition
requires that if you choose two alternatives from a set of alternatives, then
you choose them or not choose them at the same time from a lager set.
Proposition 6.4. For any set W of alternatives and any formula ϕ ∈ LRCL, the
choice set C(W,ϕ) satisfies the contraction condition and the expansion condition.
Proof. We prove this by induction on the structure of ϕ. It is straightforward
for the case when ϕ is a propositional formula. We only show the case when
ϕ := ϕ1 O ϕ2.
(Contraction Condition). The following claim is used for the main proof. It is
easily proved by induction on the structure of ϕ.
Claim 6.5. For any ϕ ∈ LRCL and W , W ′ with W ⊆ W ′, if W ′ |= ϕ, then W |= ϕ.
With this claim, assume w ∈ C(W ′, ϕ1 O ϕ2), then W ′, w |= ϕ1 O ϕ2, so W ′, w |=
ϕ1, or (for all v ∈ W ′,W ′, v 6|= ϕ1 and W ′, w |= ϕ2). And by induction hypothesis
and Claim 6.5, W,w |= ϕ1, or (for all v ∈ W,W, v 6|= ϕ1 and W,w |= ϕ2), we
obtain W,w |= ϕ1 O ϕ2. Thus, w ∈ C(W,ϕ1 O ϕ2).
(Expansion Condition). Assume w ∈ C(W,ϕ1 O ϕ2) and w′ ∈ C(W,ϕ1 O ϕ2), then
W,w |= ϕ1 O ϕ2 and W,w′ |= ϕ1 O ϕ2. Further suppose not for a contradiction
that for some W ′ ⊇ W such that w ∈ C(W ′, ϕ1 O ϕ2) and w′ 6∈ C(W ′, ϕ1 O ϕ2).
Then W ′, w |= ϕ1 O ϕ2 and W ′, w′ 6|= ϕ1 O ϕ2. That is,
(i) W ′, w |= ϕ1, or (ii) (for all v ∈ W ′,W ′, v 6|= ϕ1 and W ′, w |= ϕ2), and
(iii) (W ′, w′ 6|= ϕ1 and there is u ∈ W ′,W ′, u |= ϕ1), or (iv) (W ′, w′ 6|= ϕ1 and
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W ′, w′ 6|= ϕ2).
We next consider four cases. Thanks to the associative property. It suffices to
show the basic case when ϕ1, ϕ2 are propositional formulas.
If (i) and (iii), then W,w |= ϕ1 and W,w′ 6|= ϕ1, so W,w′ 6|= ϕ1 O ϕ2, contradicting
with the assumption;
If (i) and (iv), it is prove in a similar way;
If (ii) and (iii): a contradiction;
If (ii) and (iv), then W,w′ 6|= ϕ1 and W,w′ 6|= ϕ2, so W,w′ 6|= ϕ1 O ϕ2, contradict-
ing with the assumption.
Thus, if w ∈ C(W ′, ϕ1 O ϕ2), then w′ ∈ C(W ′, ϕ1 O ϕ2). The other case is proved
in a similar way.
6.3.2 The Multi-Agent Setting
Let us consider a finite set of agents N = {1, 2, · · · , n}. Each agent i ∈ N has her
own reasons which are specified by a formula ϕi ∈ LRCL of the form Ai1 O Ai2 O · · ·
O Aim such that
(Individual Completeness) W |=
m∨
k=1
Aik.
Individual completeness requires that each individual should take all the alterna-
tives in W into consideration, that is, her priority over these reasons induces a rank
for every alternative in W , which corresponds to the completeness requirement in
preference aggregation [Gaertner, 2009]. This requirement guarantees that each
individual has a non-empty choice set, i.e., C(W,ϕi) 6= ∅. In the following, we call
a formula an individual choice, if it satisfies individual completeness. Given each
individual choice ϕi, the vector 〈ϕi〉i∈N is called a profile (of individual choices).
Finally, a collective choice rule is a function F that assigns to each profile 〈ϕi〉i∈N
a single formula ϕ ∈ LRCL of the form A1 O A2 O · · · O Am such that
(Collective Completeness) W |=
m∨
k=1
Ak.
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This condition guarantees that the aggregate formula should always determinate
a collective alternative, i.e., C(W,ϕ) 6= ∅, and induce a collective preference or-
dering over alternatives based on priorities over reasons. The set of the profiles of
individual choices is called the domain of F , denoted by Dom(F ).
Similar to preference aggregation, a collective choice rule must behave in a rational
way and few constraints or conditions have to be set for enforcing this rationality.
The very first requirement is that logically equivalent formulas should determine
the same most preferable alternatives. However, the collective choice is actually
not completely dependent on the set of individual most preferable alternatives.
Most of the time individuals have to make some compromises, and the second,
the third, or even the last most preferred alternatives might be taken into con-
sideration. Since the standard notions of logical consequence and equivalence are
defined based on the most preferable alternatives, so they need to be strengthened
so as to handle collective choice.
Definition 6.7. Given a set W of alternatives, let ϕ = A1 O · · · O Am and
ψ = B1 O · · · O Bn. Then ψ is a strong consequence of ϕ w.r.t W , denoted by
ϕ W ψ, iff
1. m ≥ n, and
2. W |= Ak →
k∨
i=1
Bi for any 1 ≤ k ≤ n.
The intuitions behind this notion is the following: firstly, the length of the priority
over reasons specified by ϕ is at least as large as that by ψ. This means that the
number of ranks of alternatives generated by ϕ is at least as large as that given by
ψ (Condition 1); secondly, for any alternative in W , its rank given by ψ is at least
as high as the one given by ϕ (Condition 2). In particular, when k = 1, the most
important reason in ϕ implies the most important reason in ψ. It follows that the
most preferred alternative of ϕ (if exists) is also a most preferred alternative of ψ.
To illustrate this idea, let us consider a simple example.
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Example 6.3. Consider three alternatives W = {x, y, z}, where x = {p,¬q,¬r},
y = {q,¬p,¬r} and z = {r,¬q,¬p}. Let ϕ = p O q O r and ψ = (p ∨ r) O q.
Then ϕ W ψ because W |= p → (p ∨ r) and W |= q → (p ∨ r ∨ q). Figure
6.1 illustrates the relation between the ranks for each alternative (the higher, the
better).
Figure 6.1: ψ (right) is a strong
consequence of ϕ (left) w.r.t. W .
Figure 6.2: ψ (left) is strongly
equivalent to χ (right) w.r.t. W .
Furthermore, the strong notion of equivalence is defined as follows:
Definition 6.8. Given a set W of alternatives and for all ϕ, ψ ∈ LRCL, ϕ is
strongly equivalent to ψ w.r.t W , denoted by W ϕ ≡ ψ, iff ϕ W ψ and ψ W ϕ.
This definition says that two strongly equivalent formulas have the same priority
over reasons. In other words, they assign the same rank to every alternatives in
W . Let us continue Example 6.3. Consider another formula χ = ¬q O q, then
W ψ ≡ χ, as W |= ¬q ↔ (p∨r) and W |= q ↔ ¬(p∨r)∧q. Figure 6.2 illustrates
their strong equivalence.
The following proposition restates the strong equivalence in terms of the standard
logical equivalence. In fact, it also serves as an important lemma for proving our
main result, e.g., Theorem 6.8.
Proposition 6.6. Given a set W of alternatives, let ϕ = A1 O · · · O Am and
ψ = B1 O · · · O Bn. Then W ϕ ≡ ψ iff
1. m = n,
2. W |= A1 ↔ B1, and
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3. W |= (
k−1∧
i=1
¬Ai ∧ Ak)↔ (
k−1∧
i=1
¬Bi ∧Bk) for any 2 ≤ k ≤ n.
Proof. We first show the direction from left to right. Assume W ϕ ≡ ψ, then
ϕ W ψ and ψ W ϕ. By Definition 6.7, the first and second conditions hold
directly. We now show the third condition by induction on k.
• For k = 2, assume W |= ¬A1 ∧ A2, then for any w ∈ W , W,w |= ¬A1 ∧ A2,
so W,w |= ¬A1 and W,w |= A2. And by Definition 6.7, we obtain that
W,w |= ¬B1 and W,w |= B1 ∨B2, so W,w |= ¬B1 ∧B2. The other direction
is proved in a similar way.
• For k+ 1, assume W |=
k∧
i=1
¬Ai∧Ak+1, then for any w ∈ W , W,w |=
k∧
i=1
¬Ai
and W,w |= Ak+1, so W,w |=
k∧
i=1
¬Bi, otherwise W,w |=
k∨
i=1
Bi, then there is
some 1 ≤ j ≤ k such that W,w |= Bj, then by Definition 6.7, W,w |=
j∨
i=1
Ai,
so W,w |=
k∨
i=1
Ai, contradicting with W,w |=
k∧
i=1
¬Ai. By W,w |= Ak+1
and Definition 6.7, we have W,w |=
k+1∨
i=1
Bi, so W,w |= Bk+1. Thus, W |=
k∧
i=1
¬Bi ∧Bk+1. The other direction is proved in a similar way.
We next show the other direction from right to left. We need prove ϕ W ψ and
ψ W ϕ. Since they are symmetric, we only show ϕ W ψ, and the other one is
proved in a similar way. According to Definition 6.7, it suffices to show
1. m ≥ n, and
2. W |= Ak →
k∨
i=1
Bi for any 1 ≤ k ≤ n.
The first condition holds directly. We now prove the second condition by induction
on k. Assume for any 1 ≤ t < k, the result holds. Further suppose not for
a contradiction that W 6|= Ak →
k∨
i=1
Bi, then there is some w ∈ W such that
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W,w |= Ak and W,w 6|=
k∨
i=1
Bi, so W,w |=
k∧
i=1
¬Bi. And by the assumption we get
W,w 6|=
k−1∧
i=1
¬Ai∧Ak, then W,w 6|=
k−1∧
i=1
¬Ai, so W,w |=
k−1∨
i=1
Ai. Thus, there is some
1 ≤ j ≤ k − 1 such that W,w |= Aj. And by the induction hypothesis, we get
W,w |=
j∨
i=1
Bi, then W,w |=
k∨
i=1
Bi: a contradiction. Thus, W |= Ak →
k∨
i=1
Bi.
It should be noted that the strong consequence (equivalence) and the standard
consequence (equivalence) are the same, if ϕ is a propositional formula. However,
once ϕ is a formula with prioritized connectives, the two versions become differ-
ent. As we will see in the next section, the strong version is designed to specify
conditions for collective choice rules.
6.3.2.1 Conditions for Collective Choice Rules
We now investigate the conditions which a collective choice rule is expected to
satisfy. Let F be a collective choice rule.
Unrestricted domain (U). For any profile 〈ϕi〉i∈N of individual choices, 〈ϕi〉i∈N ∈
Dom(F ). The domain of the collective choice rule F includes all profiles of
individual choices.
Anonymity (A). For any profile 〈ϕi〉i∈N and any permutation σ : N → N ,
W F (〈ϕi〉i∈N) ≡ F (〈ϕσ(i)〉i∈N). This requires that the ordering among the
agents should not affect the collective result, and the collective rule should
treat each individual neutrally.
Monotonicity (M). For any two profiles Φ = 〈ϕi〉i∈N , Φ′ = 〈ϕ′i〉i∈N and for all
i ∈ N , if ϕi W ϕ′i, then F (Φ) W F (Φ′). This condition is the qualitative
counterpart of the monotonicity condition in [Fagin et al., 2003a]. It specifies
that if for each individual the rank of an alternative in one profile is at least
as high as that in the other, then the collective rank of the former is at least
as high as that of the latter.
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Pareto principle (P). For any profile Φ = 〈ϕi〉i∈N and for any formula ϕ ∈
LRCL, if W ϕi ≡ ϕ for any i ∈ N , then W F (Φ) ≡ ϕ. Intuitively, if all in-
dividual priority over reasons are the same, then this condition requires that
the collective priority over reasons should be the same as each individual’s.
The following proposition says Non-dictatorship can be derived from Anonymity.
Proposition 6.7. Every collective choice rule F satisfying A is non-dictatorial,
i.e., there is no i ∈ N such that W ϕi ≡ F (Φ) for any profile Φ ∈ Dom(F ).
Proof. Suppose not for a contradiction that there is a collective choice rule F
satisfying A such that some a ∈ N is a dictator for F . Consider a profile Φ =
〈ϕi〉i∈N , where 6W ϕa ≡ ϕj for some j 6= a. We next construct a new profile
Φ′ = 〈ϕ′i〉i∈N as follows: Let ϕ′a be ϕj, ϕ′j be ϕa, and ϕ′i be ϕi for all i ∈ N\{a, j}.
According to the dictator a, W F (Φ) ≡ ϕa and W F (Φ′) ≡ ϕ′a. Since 6W ϕa ≡
ϕj, so 6W F (Φ) ≡ F (Φ′). But Φ′ is a permutation of Φ, and by Condition A, we
have W F (Φ) ≡ F (Φ′): a contradiction.
Under this reason-based setting Universal domain, Non-dictatorship and Pareto
principle correspond to their counterparts of Arrowian conditions in preference
aggregation except Independence of Irrelevant alternatives which is replaced by
Monotonicity. In the next section we will show that there are collective choice
rules satisfying these conditions.
6.3.2.2 Collective Choice Rules
Besides representing choices and individual preferences, RCL is also able to express
collective choice rules.
Let Φ = 〈ϕi〉i∈N be a profile of individual choices where ϕi denotes the formula
Ai1 O Ai2 O · · · O Aimi .
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Without loss of generalization, assume m1 < m2 < · · · < mn. We begin with a
naive rule Fgrd called the grounded rule
2 defined as follows:
Definition 6.9.
Fgrd(Φ) =
∨n
i=1A
i
1 O
∨n
i=1A
i
2 O · · · O
∨n
i=1A
i
m1
.
The intuition behind the grounded rule is that the collective choice should be a
best choice for at least one of the agents. The grounded rule works in this way:
first check whether there is any alternative satisfying one of individual’s most
important reasons, if there is such an alternative, simply choose this alternative;
otherwise, go on and check whether there is any alternative satisfying one of the
individual’s second most important reasons. Continue this procedure until an
alternative is found. This rule is simple and easy to be executed. However, it has
drawbacks: it naively selects one of the individual’s most preferred alternatives to
be the collective choice without taking into account the ranks of this alternative
in the others’ preference orderings. Consider Example 6.2 again. According to
Fgrd, movie Gravity is a possible output for collective choice as Bill likes it most.
However, this is counter-intuition since both Ann and Kate like Gravity the least.
Hence, the worst-off dimension should be more considered.
The next rule Fmax called the maximal rule improves this aspect. It is defined as
follows:
Definition 6.10.
Fmax(Φ) =
( n∧
i=1
Ai1
)
O · · · O ( n∧
i=1
(
m1∨
j=1
Aij)
)
O
( n∧
i=2
(
m1+1∨
j=1
Aij)
)
O · · ·
O
( n∧
i=2
(
m2∨
j=1
Aij)
)
O · · · O ( n∧
i=n−1
(
mn−1∨
j=1
Aij)
)
O
( mn∨
j=1
Anj
)
The idea behind the maximal rule Fmax is to maximize the situation of the worst-
off. This rule guarantees that an alternative has to be collectively selected, only if
2The notion ’groundedness’ is borrowed from [Porello and Endriss, 2011].
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its lowest rank in all individual preference orderings is the highest among the lowest
ranks of all the other alternatives. This specification rules out the possibility of
movie Gravity to be a collective choice in Example 6.2. The maximal rule proceeds
as follows:
1. Check whether or not there is some alternative satisfying the most important
reasons of all individuals (the conjunction of the first prioritized disjunct of
each formula). If there is such an alternative, choose that alternative and
halt; otherwise, go to the next step.
2. Check whether or not there is some alternative satisfying either the first or
the second important reasons of all individuals (the conjunction of all the
disjunctions of the first two prioritized disjuncts of each individual formula).
If there is such an alternative, choose that alternative and halt; otherwise,
go to the next step.
3. Continue above procedure until there is k such that some alternative satisfies
the disjunction of first k prioritized disjuncts of all individual formulas.
Since each individual formula is complete and its length is finite, so k must exist.
Note that the last line take care of the case that individual formulas may have
different lengths. This rule is the qualitative counterpart of Fagin’s Algorithm in
database system, which is an efficient data aggregation algorithm with elegant
mathematical properties [Fagin, 1996].
Finally, we define a family of uniform quota rules [Dietrich and List, 2007b]. Given
a threshold τ ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n}, the corresponding uniform quota rule, denoted by
Fτ , is defined as follows:
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Definition 6.11.
Fτ (Φ) =
( ∨
C⊆N,|C|=τ
∧
i∈C
Ai1
)
O · · ·O( ∨
C⊆N,|C|=τ
∧
i∈C
(
m1∨
j=1
Aij)
)
( ∨
C⊆N\{1},|C|=τ
∧
i∈C
(
m1+1∨
j=1
Aij)
)
O · · ·O( ∨
C⊆N\{1},|C|=τ−1
∧
i∈C
(
m2∨
j=1
Aij)
)
O · · ·
O
( ∨
C⊆N\{1,2},|C|=τ−2
∧
i∈C
(
m3∨
j=1
Aij)
)
O · · ·O( ∨
C⊆N\{1,··· ,τ−1},|C|=1
∧
i∈C
(
mτ∨
j=1
Aij)
)
The rule proceeds in a similar way of Fmax: it checks if there is any subset of
agents C ⊆ N such that (i) the size of this subset is equal to τ , and (ii) the most
important reasons of every agent belonging to C is satisfied. All possible subsets
are evaluated (the first disjunction appearing in the first line). If no subset has
been satisfied then we repeat the process except that we consider their first two
most important reasons (the second disjunction appearing in the first line). The
process continues until some alternative satisfies τ agents (lines 2 and 3). The last
two lines consider the case that individual formulas may have different lengths.
This rule is a generalization of the majority rule as well as the other two rules.
Specifically,
• The simple majority rule, denoted by Fmaj, can be encoded by setting quota
τ = dn+1
2
e3.
• The grounded rule can be encoded by setting τ = 1.
• The maximal rule can be encoded by setting τ = n.
To illustrate how these rules work, let us go back to Example 6.2.
Example 6.2 (continued.) The model of this example is given as follows: Φ0 =
{Fiction, Comedy, Cartoon} and N = {Ann, Kate, Bill}. The set of feasible
alternatives W = {Gravity, F lipped, Frozen}, where
3dρe is defined as the smallest integer greater or equal to number ρ.
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Gravity = {Fiction,¬Comedy,¬Cartoon};
Flipped = {¬Fiction,¬Cartoon, Comedy};
Frozen = {¬Fiction, Comedy, Cartoon}.
The prioritized reasons of each agent are described as follows:
ϕAnn = (Comedy ∧ Cartoon) O Comedy O Fiction
ϕKate = (Cartoon ∧ ¬Fiction) O Comedy O Fiction
ϕBill = Fiction O ¬Cartoon O >
The collective formulas generated by the grounded rule, the maximal rule and the
simple majority rule are respectively calculated as follows: let Φ denote the profile
〈ϕAnn, ϕBill, ϕJim〉, then
• Fgrd(Φ) = (Fiction ∨ Cartoon) O (Comedy ∨ ¬Cartoon) O Fiction.
• Fmax(Φ) = ⊥ O (Comedy ∧ (Fiction∨¬Cartoon)) O (Comedy ∨ Fiction∨
Cartoon).
• Fmaj(Φ) = (Comedy∧Cartoon) O Comedy O (Comedy∨Fiction∨Cartoon).
It follows that the three aggregate formulas determine the following choice sets.
• C(W,Fgrd(Φ)) = {Gravity, Frozen};
• C(W,Fmax(Φ)) = {Flipped};
• C(W,Fmaj(Φ)) = {Frozen}.
That is, according to the grounded rule, the three friends are expected to choose
either Gravity or Frozen; according to the maximal rule, Flipped is the collective
choice, and according to the simple majority rule, they should choose Frozen.
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As stressed by the previous Example, the behaviors of these rules are different.
Thus, deciding which rule should be used for collective decision-making is normally
situation-dependent.
Let us now provide the main result: uniform quota rules satisfy Universal domain,
Anonymity, Monotonicity and Pareto principle.
Theorem 6.8. The uniform quota rule Fτ satisfies UAMP.
Proof. It is straightforward by the definition that Fτ satisfies Collective Complete-
ness and U. We next show Fτ satisfies A, M and P.
(A). For any profile Φ = 〈ϕi〉i∈N and any permutation σ : N → N , let Fτ (〈ϕi〉i∈N) =
A1 O · · · O Am and Fτ (〈ϕσ(i)〉i∈N) = B1 O · · · O Bn. By Proposition 6.6, it suffices
to show that
1. m = n,
2. W |= A1 ↔ B1, and
3. W |= (
k−1∧
i=1
¬Ai ∧ Ak)↔ (
k−1∧
i=1
¬Bi ∧Bk) for any 2 ≤ k ≤ m.
We first show m = n. Suppose not for a contradiction that m 6= n, then either m <
n or n < m. If m < n, without loss of generalization, let n = m+1, then according
to the definition of Fτ , there is some a ∈ N such that ϕa = Ba1 O · · · O Bam+1,
but for any ϕi = A
i
1 O · · · O Aimi , we have mi < m + 1, contradicting with the
assumption that σ is a permutation of N . The other case is proved in a similar
way.
We next show W |= A1 ↔ B1. Suppose not for a contradiction that W 6|= A1 ↔
B1, then there is some w such that W,w 6|= A1 ↔ B1, then either (W,w |= A1
and W,w 6|= B1) or (W,w 6|= A1 and W,w |= B1). If W,w |= A1 and W,w 6|=
B1, then by the definition of Fτ , we get W,w |=
∨
C⊆N,|C|=τ
∧
i∈C
Ai1 and W,w 6|=
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∨
C⊆N,|C|=τ
∧
i∈C
A
σ(i)
1 , contradicting with the assumption that σ is a permutation of
N . The other case is proved in a similar way.
We finally show that Condition 3 holds by induction on k.
• For k = 2, suppose for a contradiction that W 6|= ¬A1 ∧ A2 ↔ ¬B1 ∧ B2,
then there is some w ∈ W such that W,w 6|= ¬A1 ∧ A2 ↔ ¬B1 ∧ B2. Say
W,w |= ¬A1 ∧ A2 and W,w 6|= ¬B1 ∧ B2. Then by Condition 2, we have
W,w |= ¬B1, then W,w |= ¬B2 and W,w |= A2. But by the definition of Fτ ,
we have that A2 =
∨
C⊆N,|C|=τ
∧
i∈C
(Ai1∨Ai2) and B2 =
∨
C⊆N,|C|=τ
∧
i∈C
(A
σ(i)
1 ∨Aσ(i)2 ).
Since σ is a permutation of N , so W,w |= A2 ↔ B2: a contradiction. The
other case is proved in a similar way.
• For k = l + 1, we need the following claim.
Claim 6.9. Given Condition 2 and for any 2 ≤ l ≤ m, if W |=
l∧
t=2
(
(
t−1∧
i=1
¬Ai∧
At)↔ (
t−1∧
i=1
¬Bi ∧Bt)
)
, then W |=
l∧
i=1
¬Ai ↔
l∧
i=1
¬Bi.
We prove this claim by induction on l.
Forl = 2, suppose that W |= A1 ↔ B1 and W |= (¬A1 ∧A2)↔ (¬B1 ∧B2),
we need to show W |= (¬A1 ∧ ¬A2) ↔ (¬B1 ∧ ¬B2). Further assume that
W,w |= ¬A1∧¬A2 for any w ∈ W , then W,w |= ¬A1 and W,w |= ¬A2. And
by assumption, we get W,w |= ¬B1 and W,w 6|= ¬B1 ∧B2, so W,w |= ¬B2.
The other direction is proved in a similar way.
For l = r + 1, assume that W |= A1 ↔ B1 and W |=
r+1∧
t=2
(
(
t−1∧
i=1
¬Ai ∧ At) ↔
(
t−1∧
i=1
¬Bi ∧ Bt)
)
, we need to show W |=
r+1∧
i=1
¬Ai ↔
r+1∧
i=1
¬Bi. Further suppose
W,w |=
r+1∧
i=1
¬Ai, then W,w |=
r∧
i=1
¬Ai. And by induction hypothesis, we
get W,w |=
r∧
i=1
¬Bi. Since σ is a permutation of N , so by the definition
of F , W |= Ar+1 ↔ Br+1. And by assumption W,w |= ¬Ar+1 we get
W,w |= ¬Br+1. Thus, W,w |=
r+1∧
i=1
¬Bi. The other direction is proved in a
similar way.
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With this claim, we now prove the inductive case as follows: Suppose not
for a contradiction that W 6|= (
l∧
i=1
¬Ai ∧ Al+1) ↔ (
l∧
i=1
¬Bi ∧ Bl+1), then
there is w ∈ W such that W,w 6|= (
l∧
i=1
¬Ai ∧ Al+1) ↔ (
l∧
i=1
¬Bi ∧ Bl+1),
so either (W,w |=
l∧
i=1
¬Ai ∧ Al+1 and W,w 6|=
l∧
i=1
¬Bi ∧ Bl+1) or (W,w 6|=
l∧
i=1
¬Ai ∧ Al+1 and W,w |=
l∧
i=1
¬Bi ∧ Bl+1). If W,w |=
l∧
i=1
¬Ai ∧ Al+1 and
W,w 6|=
l∧
i=1
¬Bi ∧ Bl+1, then W,w |=
l∧
i=1
¬Ai. And by induction hypothesis
and Claim 6.9, we get W,w |=
l∧
i=1
¬Bi. Then by assumption we obtain that
W,w |= Al+1 and W,w 6|= Bl+1. Without loss of generalization, consider
mi ≥ l+1 and ni ≥ l+1 for all i ∈ N . Then according to the definition of Fτ ,
W,w |= ∨
C⊆N,|C|=τ
∧
i∈C
l+1∨
j=1
Aij and W,w 6|=
∨
C⊆N,|C|=τ
∧
i∈C
l+1∨
j=1
A
σ(i)
j , contradicting
with the assumption that σ is a permutation of N . The other case is proved
in a similar way.
Thus, W Fτ (〈ϕi〉i∈N) ≡ Fτ (〈ϕσ(i)〉i∈N).
(M). For any two profiles Φ = 〈ϕi〉i∈N , Φ′ = 〈ϕ′i〉i∈N and for all i ∈ N , assume
ϕi W ϕ′i, we need to show Fτ (Φ) W Fτ (Φ′). Let Fτ (〈ϕi〉i∈N) = A1 O · · · O Am
and Fτ (〈ϕ′〉i∈N) = B1 O · · · O Br. By Definition 6.7, it suffices to show
1. m ≥ r, and
2. W |= Ak →
k∨
i=1
Bi for any 1 ≤ k ≤ r.
Let ϕi = A
i
1 O · · · O Aimi and ϕ′i = Bi1 O · · · O Biri for any i ∈ N . By assumption
we get mi ≥ ri for any i ∈ N , then by the definition of Fτ , we have m ≥ r.
We next show the second condition by induction on k.
Consider the base case when k = 1. By the assumption we get W |= Ai1 → Bi1 for
any i ∈ N , then W |= ∨
C⊆N,|C|=τ
∧
i∈C
Ai1 →
∨
C⊆N,|C|=τ
∧
i∈C
Bi1, i.e., W |= A1 → B1.
For the induction step t + 1, suppose not for a contradiction that W 6|= At+1 →
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t+1∨
j=1
Bj, then there is some w ∈ W such that W,w 6|= At+1 →
t+1∨
j=1
Bj, then W,w |=
At+1 and W,w 6|=
t+1∨
j=1
Bj, so W,w 6|= Bt+1. By the definition of Fτ and from
W,w |= At+1, we have W,w |=
∨
C⊆N,|C|=τ
∧
i∈C
t+1∨
j=1
Aij, then there is some C ⊆ N
with |C| = τ such that W,w |=
t+1∨
j=1
Aij for any i ∈ C, so for any i ∈ C there is
1 ≤ di ≤ t+ 1 such that W,w |= Aidi . And by the assumption we get for any i ∈ C
there is 1 ≤ di ≤ t + 1 such that W,w |=
di∨
j=1
Bij, so W,w |=
∧
i∈C,|C|=τ
t+1∨
j=1
Bij. Thus,
by the definition of Fτ , W,w |= Bt+1, contradicting with W,w 6|= Bt+1.
(P). For any profile Φ = 〈ϕi〉i∈N and for any complete ϕ ∈ LRCL, assume |=W ϕi ≡
ϕ for any i ∈ N . Let Fτ (〈ϕi〉i∈N) = A1 O · · · O Am and ϕ = B1 O · · · O Br. By
Proposition 6.6, it suffices to show that
1. m = r,
2. W |= A1 ↔ B1, and
3. W |= (
k−1∧
i=1
¬Ai ∧ Ak)↔ (
k−1∧
i=1
¬Bi ∧Bk) for any 2 ≤ k ≤ m.
Since mi = r any i ∈ N , so m = r by the definition of F .
By assumption that |=W ϕi ≡ ϕ for any i ∈ N , we obtain that W |= Ai1 ↔ B1,
then W |= ∨
C⊆N,|C|=τ
∧
i∈C
Ai1 ↔ B1, i.e., W |= A1 ↔ B1.
We show the third condition by induction on k.
For k = 2, assume W,w |= ¬A1 ∧ A2, then by Condition 2, we get W,w |= ¬B1,
so by assumption W,w |=
n∧
i=1
¬Ai1. And by the definition of Fτ , we get W,w |=∨
C⊆N,|C|=τ
∧
i∈C
(Ai1 ∨ Ai2), then W,w |=
∨
C⊆N,|C|=τ
∧
i∈C
Ai2. And by the assumption, so
W,w |= ¬B1 ∧B2. The other direction is proved in a similar way.
For l+ 1, suppose not for a contradiction that W 6|= (
l∧
i=1
¬Ai ∧Al+1)↔ (
l∧
i=1
¬Bi ∧
Bl+1), then there is w ∈ W such that W,w 6|= (
l∧
i=1
¬Ai ∧Al+1)↔ (
l∧
i=1
¬Bi ∧Bl+1).
Say W,w |=
l∧
i=1
¬Ai∧Al+1 and W,w 6|=
l∧
i=1
¬Bi∧Bl+1. Then W,w |=
l∧
i=1
¬Ai. And
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by induction hypothesis and Claim 6.9, we get W,w |=
l∧
i=1
¬Bi, then by assumption
we obtain that W,w |= Al+1 and W,w 6|= Bl+1. And by the assumption that
|=W ϕa ≡ ϕ for any a ∈ N , we get W,w 6|=
l+1∧
i=1
¬Aai , so by the definition of Fτ , we
get W,w 6|= Al+1: a contradiction. The other direction is proved in a similar way.
Therefore, the uniform quota rule Fτ satisfies UAMP.
Corollary 6.10. The grounded rule Fgrd, the maximal rule Fmax and the simple
majority rule Fmaj satisfy UAMP.
It should be noted that the size of an aggregate formula can be significantly reduced
via the following two ways. Firstly, any aggregate formula represents a preference
ordering over alternative, and thus its size is virtually only determined by the num-
ber of alternatives as well as their properties, and has nothing to do with the num-
ber of individuals. As shown in Example 6.2, prioritized disjuncts can be extremely
simplified by equivalence laws of propositional logic. Secondly, there are many rea-
sons that none of the alternatives in W satisfies, and if we remove such “dummy”
reasons, the collective preference ordering over alternatives will not be changed,
as they correspond to the empty choice set. For instance, in Example 6.2, by re-
moving the “dummy” reasons, the aggregate formula Fmax(〈ϕAnn, ϕBill, ϕJim〉) is
simplified as (Comedy∧ (Fiction∨¬Cartoon)) O (Comedy∨Fiction∨Cartoon),
which represents the same preference ordering, i.e., Gravity and Frozen are in-
different, and Flipped is better than any of them. Unfortunately, the size of an
aggregate formula would be exponential in the worst case.
6.3.3 Model Checking
One of the advantages of RCL is that not only individual preferences but also the
collective choice rules are built into the logic, which allows us to use the model-
checking techniques to automatically generate individual and collective choices.
The model-checking problem for RCL is the following problem: for a given RCL
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formula ϕ, a set W of alternatives and an alternative w ∈ W , determine whether
W,w |= ϕ or not.
Proposition 6.11. There is an algorithm that runs in time O(|W | × ||ϕ||) to
check, given any set W ⊆ 2Φ0, any alternative w ∈ W and any formula ϕ ∈ LRCL,
whether W,w |= ϕ, where ||ϕ|| denotes the size of ϕ, i.e., the number of symbols
occurring in ϕ.
Proof. It suffices to develop an algorithm that runs in time O(|W | × ||ϕ||) to com-
pute the set of alternatives w′ ∈ W such that W,w′ |= ϕ. We implement this com-
putation by Algorithm 6.3.1. The general idea is to compute the desired choice
sets for all subformulas of ϕ recursively. Given any subformula ψ of ϕ, assuming
that the mentioned choice sets for all proper subformulas of ψ are available, the
computation on ψ can be done in time O(|W |). The number of subformulas of
ϕ is clearly not greater than ||ϕ||. Thus, Algorithm 6.3.1 must terminate in time
O(|W | × ||ϕ||). According to the semantics, it is also easy to verify the correctness
of this algorithm.
6.4 Discussion and Summary
In this section, we first embed RCL into the standard modal logic S5 [Blackburn
et al., 2002], and investigate the relation between collective choice and preference
aggregation, then discuss some related work, and finally conclude this chapter with
some future work.
6.4.1 Embeddings of RCL to S5
On the semantical level, the model of RCL can be easily regarded as an universal
Kripke model. Given a set W of alternatives, we construct an universal Kripke
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Algorithm 6.3.1: computeTruth(W,ϕ)
Input : W ⊆ 2Φ0 and ϕ ∈ LRCL
Output: the set C(W,ϕ)
1 begin
2 switch ϕ do
3 case p, where p ∈ Φ0
4 T ← {w ∈ W : p ∈ w};
5 break;
6 case ¬ψ, where ψ ∈ LRCL
7 T ← computeTruth(W,ψ);
8 T ← W \ T ;
9 break;
10 case ψ1 ∧ ψ2, where ψ1, ψ2 ∈ LRCL
11 T ← computeTruth(W,ψ1);
12 T ← T ∩ computeTruth(W,ψ2);
13 break;
14 case ψ1 O ψ2, where ψ1, ψ2 ∈ LRCL
15 T ← computeTruth(W,ψ1);
16 if T = ∅ then
17 T ← computeTruth(W,ψ2);
18 end
19 break;
20 otherwise
21 T ← ∅;
22 endsw
23 endsw
24 return T ;
25 end
model MW = (S,R, v) as follows: let W = S, R = S × S and v(p) = {s ∈ S | p ∈
s}. On the syntactic level, the prioritized connective can be defined by the global
modality A [Blackburn et al., 2002]. It is interpreted as follows: Given an universal
Kripke model M = (S,R, v) and a state s ∈ S,
M, s |= Aϕ iff for all t ∈ S,M, t |= ϕ
We next define a translation map from RCL formulas to S5 formulas to make RCL
embedded into S5.
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Definition 6.12. A translation Tr from RCL formulas to S5 formulas is defined
as follows:
• Tr(A) = A for all propositional formulas A
• Tr(ϕ1Oϕ2) = Tr(ϕ1) ∨ (A¬Tr(ϕ1)∧Tr(ϕ2))
We have the following correspondent result with respect to the translation.
Proposition 6.12. Given a set of alternatives W and w ∈ W , for any RCL
formula ϕ ∈ L,
W,w |= ϕ iff MW , w |= Tr(ϕ)
Proof. It is proved by induction on the structure of ϕ. It is trivial for the case
when ϕ is a propositional formula. Here we just show the case for the prioritized
formula.
Assume W,w |= (ϕ1Oϕ2)
iff
W,w |= ϕ1, or ( for all v ∈ W,W, v 6|= ϕ1 and W,w |= ϕ2)
iff
MW , w |= Tr(ϕ1), or ( for all v ∈ R(w),MW , v 6|= Tr(ϕ1)
and MW , w |= Tr(ϕ2))
iff
MW , w |= Tr(ϕ1) ∨ (A¬Tr(ϕ1) ∧ Tr(ϕ2))
iff
MW , w |= Tr(ϕ1Oϕ2)
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6.4.2 Relation with Preference Aggregation
Let us begin by showing that the Condorcet’s paradox [Gehrlein, 1983] can be
naturally avoided in RCL due to the characteristics of the language. As it is
shown in Proposition 6.2, any formula generates a preference ordering over the al-
ternatives on the basis of the priorities over reasons. This guarantees that all
collective rules in RCL always induce a preference ordering over alternatives.
For example, given the set of atomic properties Φ0 = {p, q, r}, consider three
candidates W = {w1, w2, w3}, where w1 = {p,¬q,¬r}, w2 = {¬p, q,¬r} and
w3 = {¬p,¬q, r}. There are three voters 1, 2 and 3 with their voting reasons
given as follows: ϕ1 = pOqOr, ϕ2 = qOrOp, and ϕ3 = rOpOq. According to the
simple majority rule (τ = 2), we get the collective result as follows:
Fmaj(〈ϕ1, ϕ2, ϕ3〉) = [(p∧ q)∨ (p∧ r)∨ (q ∧ r)]O[((p∨ q)∧ (q ∨ r))∨ ((p∨ q)∧ (p∨
r)) ∨ ((q ∨ r) ∧ (p ∨ r))]O(p ∨ q ∨ r)
Instead of generating a cyclic (intransitive) preference ordering, this aggregate for-
mula would result in a tie with three alternatives indifferent, i.e., C(W,F2(〈ϕ1, ϕ2, ϕ3〉)) =
{w1, w2, w3} .
As mentioned, all Arrowian conditions are plausible under the new setting except
Independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA). The main reason is that different
from other Arrowian conditions, IIA is a specification about the order of two par-
ticular alternatives. This condition requires for any two alternatives w and w′, the
collective preference between w and w′ depends only upon individual preferences
over that pair. On the other hand, a RCL-formula always specifies a priority rela-
tion over reasons which further induces a preference ordering over all alternatives.
Thus, it is impossible for a RCL- formula to describe two particular alternatives,
which provides a natural way to circumvents Arrow’s impossibility result in RCL.
In addition, we consider another condition Monotonicity which is the qualitative
counterpart of the monotonicity in database aggregation algorithm [Fagin et al.,
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2003a]. This condition is an important property for rank aggregation rules. In
fact, the proposed rules may be regarded as rank aggregation rules, since they
aggregate reasons according to their priority layer by layer. It turns out that all
other Arrowian conditions are consistent with Monotonicity.
6.4.3 Related Work
In recent years, many logical frameworks have been proposed for representing
and reasoning about choices and preferences [Boutilier, 1994, Brewka et al., 2004,
Lafage and Lang, 2000, Liu, 2008, Osherson and Weinstein, 2012, Pedersen et al.,
2013, Tan and Pearl, 1994, van Benthem et al., 2009, van Ditmarsch et al., 2007].
Most of the previous work takes preferences as fundamental and primitive con-
cepts, and typically treats them as modal operators [van Benthem et al., 2009,
van Ditmarsch et al., 2007]. On the one hand, these preference logics mainly fo-
cus on investigating logical properties of preferences with little concern about how
preferences are formed. On the other hand, formulas in these logics are interpreted
by an arbitrary given (utilitarian or ordinal) preference relation, which does not
provide a facility to represent different preference orderings.
Recent work in [Brewka et al., 2004, Liu, 2008, Osherson and Weinstein, 2012,
Pedersen et al., 2013, van Benthem et al., 2014] takes a different angle by exploring
how preferences come from.
Liu [2008] introduces a priority base that is ordered by the importance and also
discusses the ways to rationally derive preferences from it. Unfortunately, the
priority base is defined in the semantic level and the priority operator is not used
for representing individual and collective choices. Recently, van Benthem et al.
[2014] investigate in details how priority bases and preference logics are related in
a deontic context.
Chapter 6. Reason-based Collective Choice 155
Pedersen et al. [2013] develop a modal logic for reasoning about the framework of
Dietrich and List [2013b], and show how to use a standard modal logic for reason-
ing about reason-based preferences. Different from RCL, they use the standard
modal language and only encode the priority (weighing relation) over reasons into
the semantic model. In particular, they generalize their work to the multi-agent
case mainly for modelling non-trivial properties such as disagreement, consensus
in a multi-agent setting rather than for aggregating preferences. Moreover, they
assume that all agents share the same priority over reasons. This means all agents
have the same preference ordering over alternatives, which is unsuitable for pref-
erence aggregation.
Osherson and Weinstein [2012] propose another logical formalism for reasoning
about reason-based preferences. Different from our qualitative approach, their
logic is a non-standard modal logic built in the context of utility, and each alter-
native can be evaluated according to various utility scales. Moreover, they mainly
consider different ways to combine utilities induced by different reasons for single
agent without generalizing their work to the multi-agent dimension.
One of the closest related work is probably the framework of Brewka et al. [2004].
The non-standard part of this logic is a logical connective ~× called ordered disjunc-
tion. The intuition behind O is similar to that of the ordered disjunction. Also,
the same idea, though applied to deontic reasoning, is independently developed
in [Governatori and Rotolo, 2006]. Different from our motivation and approaches,
they propose a nonmonotonic formalism for representing reason-based choices and
do not consider the multi-agent case.
Based on above analysis, we may find that few logical formalisms can not only
represent reason-based preferences, but also provide efficient decision procedures
so as to automatically generate individual and collective choices based on reasons.
To the best of our knowledge, [Lafage and Lang, 2000] is the only one that can
do both. It uses weighted logics for representing preferences, that is, each agent
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expresses her preferences by means of logical formulas weighted by importance
degrees, and then generates the collective result by calculating the utility of each
agent into a collective utility function. The major difference from this work is
that we use a qualitative approach, and show that preferences as well as collective
rules are expressed in a standard modal logic, which allows us to develop a model-
checking algorithm to generate individual choices and collective choices.
In summary, this chapter has proposed a modal logic for representing and reasoning
about individual and collective choices based on reasons. Not only individual
preferences but also collective choice rules are expressed within this logic. We have
then developed a model checking algorithm to generate individual and collective
choices. Based on the proposed collective rules, we have demonstrated that all
Arrowian conditions are plausible in this logic except Independence of Irrelevant
Alternatives, which allows us to avoid the impossibility result.
As RCL can encode preferences and collective choice rules at the same time, our
long term goal is to enable an intelligent agent to reason about collective choices.
To this end, several extensions may be considered.
Firstly, to keep our logical formalism as simple and intuitive as possible, we cur-
rently do not allow the interplay of the prioritized connective and the other classi-
cal connectives. Consequently, the context dependent preferences are beyond the
expressivity power of this language. It would be interesting to remove some syn-
tactical limitations of the language for being in position to represent more general
preferences [Lang, 2006].
Secondly, we want to investigate the representation results for the proposed col-
lective choice rules. Though it is a difficult problem in social choice theory to
provide characterization results for specific aggregation rules, based on some ex-
isting results [Andre´ka et al., 2002, Dietrich and List, 2007b, May, 1952], this is
not impossible.
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Finally, we have assumed that one agent’s choice is given without any influence
from others. However, in many situations, beliefs about other agents’ choices might
affect the agent’s own decision, and consequently change the collective choice.
Thus, it is worth extending the language with epistemic operators so as to study
the effect of beliefs on individual and collective choices.
In particular, in many real-world situations, a group making collective decisions
may assign individual members or subgroups different priorities to determine the
collective decision. In the next chapter, we will investigate how to make collective
decision under such a hierarchical environment.
Chapter 7
Judgment Aggregation Under
Voters’ Hierarchy
Chapter 6 proposes a modal logic for modelling reason-based collective choices in
which each individual is treated equally. However, in many real-world situations,
a group making collective decisions may assign individual members or subgroups
different priorities to determine the collective decision. For instance, legislatures
or expert panels may assign specialist members such priority so as to rely on
their expertise. In this chapter, we focus on judgment aggregation, a relatively
new topic in social choice theory, and provide logical methods to investigate how
the judgment from each individual affects group judgment in such a hierarchical
environment.
7.1 Background
Judgment aggregation is an interdisciplinary research topic in economics, philos-
ophy, political science, law and recently in computer science [Brandt et al., 2012,
Dietrich and List, 2007a, Konieczny and Pe´rez, 2002, Mongin, 1995, Pigozzi, 2006,
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Wilson, 1975]. It deals with the problem of how a set of group judgments on cer-
tain issues, represented by logical propositions, can be formed based on individuals’
judgments on the same issues. Although most of voting rules for social choice,
such as majority rules, unanimity rules or dictatorships, are applicable to judg-
ment aggregation, their behaviour can be significantly different due to possible
logical links among the propositions on which a collective decision has to be made.
A well-known example is the so-called doctrinal paradox [Kornhauser and Sage,
1993, List, 2012], which shows that the majority rule fails to guarantee consistent
group judgments.
Suppose a court consisting of three judges has to reach a verdict in a breach-of-
contract case. There are three propositions on which the court is required to make
judgments:
p: The defendant was contractually obliged not to do a particular action.
q: The defendant did that action.
r: The defendant is liable for a breach of contract.
According to the legal doctrine, propositions p and q are jointly necessary and
sufficient for proposition r, that is p ∧ q ↔ r. Now the three judgments on the
propositions are shown in Table 7.1. If the three judges take a majority vote on
p q r
Judge 1 Yes Yes Yes
Judge 2 Yes No No
Judge 3 No Yes No
Majority Yes Yes No
Table 7.1: A doctrinal paradox.
proposition r, the outcome is its rejection: a ‘not liable’ verdict. But if they take
majority votes on each of p and q instead, then p and q are accepted, so by the
legal doctrine, r should be accepted as well: a ‘liable’ verdict. Although each
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judge holds consistent individual judgments on the three propositions, there are
majorities for p, q and ¬r, a logically inconsistent set of propositions with respect
to the constraint p ∧ q ↔ r.
More significantly, List and Pettit [2002] show an impossibility result, similar to
Arrow’s impossibility theorem [Arrow, 1950], that no aggregation rule can gen-
erate consistent collective judgments if we require an aggregation rule to satisfy
a set of “plausible” conditions. However, such an impossibility result does not
discourage the investigation of judgement aggregation. None of the conditions on
either aggregation rules or decision problems, is indefectible. By weakening or
varying these conditions, a growing body of literature on judgement aggregation
has emerged in recent years. For an overview of the related research, please refer
to [List, 2012, List and Puppe, 2009].
Among all the plausible conditions that lead to impossibility results on judgment
aggregation, completeness as one of the rationality requirements has received criti-
cism of being overly demanding in many real-world situations, where an individual
may abstain from voting on a decision issue, and a group judgment on some issue
may be undetermined. In fact, if we give up completeness, we are able to circum-
vent impossibility [Dietrich and List, 2007c, 2008a, Dokow and Holzman, 2010,
Ga¨rdenfors, 2006, List and Pettit, 2002]. Among them, Ga¨rdenfors [2006] proves
a representation theorem for judgment aggregation without completeness, which
shows that under certain fairly natural conditions, the only possible aggregation
rules are oligarchic. Dietrich and List [2008a] strengthen Ga¨rdenfors’ results and
show that by giving up completeness in favor of deductive closure, oligarchies
instead of dictatorships are obtained.
Moreover, in many real-world decision-making settings, when a group of agents
forms collective judgments, some group members or subgroups may have priority
to decide certain propositions. For instance, legislatures or expert panels may as-
sign specialist members such priority so as to rely on their expertise; when some
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propositions concern group members’ private spheres, they may be also assigned
the rights to be decisive on those propositions [Dietrich and List, 2008b]. How-
ever, in the current literature on judgment aggregation such priority has been
rarely investigated. In particular, Dietrich and List [2008b] propose a generaliza-
tion of Sen’s ‘liberal paradox’ [Sen, 1970]. Under plausible conditions, the assign-
ment of rights to two or more individuals or subgroups is inconsistent with the
unanimity principle requiring unanimously accepted propositions be collectively
accepted. Following this work, most existing literature is mainly concerned with
liberal (im)possibility results [Dietrich and List, 2008b, Patty and Penn, 2014, van
Hees, 1999]. There are seldom specific aggregation rules to formally display how
to generate consistent collective judgments in such a hierarchical group.
The aim of this chapter is to investigate how individual judgements affect group
judgement in a hierarchical environment. To this end, we first provide a logic-based
model for judgment aggregation with abstentions, and then develop a lexicographic
aggregation rule for generating consistent collective judgments based on voters’
hierarchy. We also show this rule satisfies a set of plausible conditions and has a
tractable computational complexity. We finally investigate the oligarchic property
of this rule.
7.2 Judgment Aggregation with Abstentions
In this section, we first provide a logic-based model for judgment aggregation with
abstentions, and then explore a set of plausible conditions for aggregations in terms
of abstentions.
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7.2.1 The Logic-Based Model
We consider a finite set of individuals N = {1, 2, . . . , n} with |N | ≥ 2. They face a
decision problem that requires collective judgments on propositions. Propositions
are represented by a logical language L with a set Φ0 of propositional variables
and standard logical connectives {¬,∨,∧,→,↔}. Following [List and Pettit, 2002,
2004], we assume that the underlying logic is the classical propositional logic with
standard syntax and semantics. The set of literals, denoted by P , consists of either
propositional variables or their negations, i.e., P = {p,¬p | p ∈ Φ0}.
The set of propositions on which judgments are to be made is called the agenda.
Formally, the agenda is a finite non-empty subset X ⊆ L closed under negation
(i.e., if ϕ ∈ X, then ¬ϕ ∈ X), and under propositional variables (i.e., for all ϕ ∈ L,
if ϕ ∈ X, then for all p ∈ Φ0 occur in ϕ, p ∈ X). Similar to [Dietrich and List,
2008a], we assume that double negations in the agenda cancel each other. That
is, X = {ϕ,¬ϕ : ϕ ∈ X∗}, where X∗ ⊆ L is a set of unnegated propositions. Let
X0 = X ∩ P be the set of literals included in the agenda. Consider the doctrinal
paradox in Section 1. The agenda is
{p, q, p ∧ q,¬p,¬q,¬(p ∧ q)}.
The set of literals in the agenda is
{p, q,¬p,¬q}.
Note that for the sake of readability, we replace r by p ∧ q as they are logically
equivalent. We call a set Y ⊆ L minimally inconsistent if it is inconsistent and
every proper subset of Y is consistent. For instance, {p, q,¬(p∧ q)} is a minimally
inconsistent set, while {p,¬q, p ∧ q} is not, since its proper subset {¬q, p ∧ q} is
inconsistent. The agenda X is non-simple if it has a minimal inconsistent subset Y
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such that |Y | ≥ 3. For instance, the agenda in the doctrinal paradox is non-simple,
since it includes a minimal inconsistent subset {p, q,¬(p ∧ q)}.
We represent each individual judgment set as a subset of the agenda, which indi-
cates all the propositions that this individual accepts or believes to be true. For-
mally, individual i’s judgment set, denoted by Φi, is a subset of X, i.e., Φi ⊆ X.
We assume that each individual judgment set Φi satisfies the following conditions:
• Consistence: all its members can be simultaneously true, i.e., Φi 6|= ⊥.
• Deductive closure: for every ϕ ∈ X, if Φi |= ϕ, then ϕ ∈ Φi.
As we have mentioned in Introduction, we do not require Φi to be complete, i.e., for
every pair ϕ,¬ϕ ∈ X, either ϕ ∈ Φi or ¬ϕ ∈ Φi. Then for each proposition ϕ ∈ X,
it may happen that ϕ 6∈ Φi and ¬ϕ 6∈ Φi. In this case, we say that individual i
abstains from making a judgment on ϕ. Given a proposition ϕ ∈ X, individual i’s
judgment on this proposition may be acceptance (i.e.,ϕ ∈ Φi), rejection (i.e.,¬ϕ ∈
Φi) and abstention, denoted as +, − and #, respectively. With abstentions, if an
individual makes her judgments over ϕ and ψ, respectively, then her judgments on
their compound formulas must be consistent with the judgments of ϕ and ψ. The
composition of two judgments with respect to → is depicted in Table 7.2. For
ϕ→ ψ ψ
+ # −
ϕ
+ + # −
# + # #
− + + +
Table 7.2: The compositions for →.
instance, if an individual abstains from voting on ϕ (i.e.,#) and rejects ψ (i.e.,−),
then she should abstain from voting on ϕ→ ψ (i.e.,#). Otherwise, her individual
judgment set would be inconsistent. Given each individual judgment set Φi, the
vector 〈Φi〉i∈N is called a profile of individual judgment sets. For instance, in the
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doctrinal paradox, the profile is
〈{p, q, p ∧ q}, {p,¬q,¬(p ∧ q)}, {¬p, q,¬(p ∧ q)}〉.
Finally, a judgment aggregation rule is a function F that assigns to each profile
〈Φi〉i∈N a single collective judgment set Φ ⊆ X, where ϕ ∈ Φ means that the
group as a whole accepts ϕ. The set of all admissible profiles is called the domain
of F , denoted by Dom(F ). Note that we do not require the collective judgments
to be complete, which allows that a group may abstain from voting on certain
propositions. Below we will impose plausible conditions on aggregation rules. A
standard example of aggregation rules is the majority rule, as introduced in the
doctrinal paradox, where each proposition is collectively accepted if and only if
the number of individuals accepted this proposition exceeds the half, i.e.,
F (〈Φi〉i∈N) = {ϕ ∈ X : |i ∈ N : ϕ ∈ Φi| > n/2}.
7.2.2 Conditions on Aggregation Rules
We begin with a simple impossibility result generated by minimal conditions in this
new context, and then explore plausible conditions under which the impossibility
does not arise.
7.2.2.1 An Impossibility Result
The impossibility result holds for all agendas exhibiting “mild” interconnections in
the following sense. We call a set Y ⊆ L minimally inconsistent if it is inconsistent
and every proper subset of Y is consistent. The agenda X is non-simple if it has
a minimal inconsistent subset Y such that |Y | ≥ 3.
Let F be an aggregation rule. Consider the following conditions:
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Universal Domain (UD). The domain of F includes all profiles of consistent
individual judgment sets.
Non-dictatorship (ND). There is no x ∈ N such that for all 〈Φi〉i∈N ∈ Dom(F ),
F (〈Φi〉i∈N) = Φx. This is a basic democratic requirement: no single individ-
ual should always determine the collective judgment set.
Unanimity with Abstentions (U). For every ϕ ∈ X, if there is some V ⊆ N
such that V 6= ∅, for all i ∈ V. ϕ ∈ Φi and for all j ∈ N\V . ϕ#Φj,
then ϕ ∈ F (〈Φi〉i∈N). That is, if a nonempty set of individuals agrees on
accepting a proposition ϕ, while all the others abstain from voting on ϕ,
then this condition requires that the group should accept ϕ as well.
It is worth noting that the unanimity with abstentions is the counterpart of con-
dition be unanimous with abstentions in [Andre´ka et al., 2002] and the Pareto
optimality in [Ga¨rdenfors, 2006] (also called unanimity principle in [Dietrich and
List, 2008b], Paretian condition in [Dokow and Holzman, 2010]).
Proposition 7.1. If F satisfies unanimity with abstentions, then F is Pareto
optimal, i.e., for every ϕ ∈ X, if ϕ ∈ Φi for every i ∈ N , then ϕ ∈ F (〈Φi〉i∈N).
The next proposition says that non-dictatorship can be derived from unanimity
with abstentions.
Proposition 7.2. Every judgment aggregation rule satisfying unanimity with ab-
stentions is non-dictatorial.
Proof. Assume that F is dictatorial in some individual x ∈ N , then N\{x} 6= ∅.
Take ϕ ∈ X and define ϕ#Φx and ϕ ∈ Φi for every i ∈ N\{x}. By unanimity
with abstentions, ϕ ∈ F (〈Φi〉i∈N), then F (〈Φi〉i∈N) 6= Φx, contradiction.
On the other hand, the following example shows that this condition fails to guar-
antee a consistent collective judgment set.
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Example 7.1. Suppose Ann, Bill and Tom have to make group judgments on
three logically connected propositions as follows:
p: There is the elixir of life.
q: Humans can be immortal.
p→ q: If there is the elixir of life, then humans can be immortal.
Their individual judgments are shown in Table 7.3.
p q p→q
Ann + # #
Bill # − #
Tom # # +
Table 7.3: Individual judgments in Example 7.1.
According to the unanimity with abstentions, the collective judgment set is {p, p→
q,¬q} which is inconsistent. In fact, the following result shows that this is not a
single case.
Theorem 7.3. If and only if the agenda is non-simple, no aggregation rule gener-
ates consistent collective judgment sets and satisfies Universal Domain and Una-
nimity with Abstentions.
Proof. First assume the agenda is non-simple. Suppose not for a contradiction
that there is an aggregation rule F satisfying universal domain and unanimity with
abstentions. We next show that F generates an inconsistent collective judgment
set on some profile. By assumption that the agenda is non-simple, then there is
a minimally inconsistent set Y ⊆ X with |Y | ≥ 3. Let α, β, γ be three distinct
propositions in Y . Consider a profile 〈Φi〉i∈N such that Φ1 = Y \{β}, Φ2 = Y \{α}
and Φi = Y \{γ} for any i ∈ N\{1, 2}. Then 〈Φi〉i∈N ∈ Dom(F ). And by
Unanimity of Abstention, Y ⊆ F (〈Φi〉i∈N), so F (〈Φi〉i∈N) is inconsistent.
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Now assume the agenda is simple. Then there is no minimally inconsistent set
Y ⊆ X with |Y | ≥ 3. Let F be the aggregation rule with universal domain as
follows: for all 〈Φi〉i∈N ∈ Dom(F ) and for all ϕ ∈ X,
ϕ ∈ F (〈Φi〉i∈N) iff ∀i∈N(¬ϕ 6∈ Φi) and ∃x∈N(ϕ ∈ Φx)
We next prove that F satisfies all requirements.
To show that F satisfies Unanimity with Abstentions, we assume for any ϕ ∈ X,
there is some V ⊆ N such that V 6= ∅, ∀i ∈ V. ϕ ∈ Φi and ∀j ∈ N\V . ϕ#Φj,
then ¬ϕ 6∈ Φi for any i ∈ N . And by V 6= ∅, there is x ∈ V such that ϕ ∈ Φx. So
it follows from the definition of F that ϕ ∈ F (〈Φi〉i∈N).
Finally, we consider any profile 〈Φi〉i∈N ∈ Dom(F ) and show that F (〈Φi〉i∈N) is
consistent. Suppose for a contradiction that F (〈Φi〉i∈N) is inconsistent for some
profile 〈Φi〉i∈N ∈ Dom(F ). As F (〈Φi〉i∈N) ⊆ X and by assumption that X is
simple, then there is some p ∈ X0 such that p ∈ F (〈Φi〉i∈N) and ¬p ∈ F (〈Φi〉i∈N).
According to the definition of F , (∀i∈N(¬p 6∈ Φi) and ∃x∈N(p ∈ Φx)), and (∀i∈N(p 6∈
Φi) and ∃y∈N(¬p ∈ Φy)), contradiction. Hence, F (〈Φi〉i∈N) is consistent for any
profile 〈Φi〉i∈N ∈ Dom(F ).
On the one hand, this impossibility result indicates that in decision process when
the agenda is logically connected, ignoring abstentions would lead to inconsistent
collective results. In fact, unanimity with abstentions means that an individual
has the right to determine the collective judgment on certain propositions when-
ever all the others abstain from voting on that proposition. Thus, to some extent,
this impossibility result is a version of Dietrich and List’s liberal impossibility
result in terms of abstentions. On the other hand, this result provides a charac-
terization theorem for the class of non-simple agendas. It shows that for the class
of non-simple agendas, a combination of conditions universal domain, collective
consistence and unanimity with abstentions leads to an empty class of aggregation
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rules. And it also fully characterizes those agendas for which this is the case and,
by implication, those for which it is not.
7.2.2.2 Conditions on Aggregation Rules
We now turn to investigating plausible conditions under which the impossibility
does not arise. To start with, the following condition is a variant of Unanimity
with Abstention by restricting propositions to the literals.
Literal Unanimity with Abstentions (LU). For every α ∈ P, if there is some
V ⊆ N such that V 6= ∅, for all i ∈ V. α ∈ Φi and for all j ∈ N\V . α#Φj,
then α ∈ F (〈Φi〉i∈N).
This condition is a restriction of Unanimity with Abstentions. As we will see in
the following example, it plays a crucial role in extending the agenda set from
a set of literals to a set of logically interconnected formulas without generating
inconsistent aggregate results. It is worth noting that LU is neither a restriction
nor an extension of Pareto optimality. The non-dictatorship can be still derived
from it.
Proposition 7.4. Every judgment aggregation rule satisfying literal unanimity
with abstentions is non-dictatorial.
The next condition requires that the group judgment on each literal should depend
only on individual judgments on that literal, which is a restricted counterpart of
Arrow’s “independence of irrelevant alternative” [Arrow, 1963].
Literal Independence (LI) . For every α ∈ P and all profiles 〈Φi〉i∈N , 〈Φ′i〉i∈N
∈ Dom(F ), if α ∈ Φi ↔ α ∈ Φ′i and ¬α ∈ Φi ↔ ¬α ∈ Φ′i for every i ∈ N ,
then α ∈ F (〈Φi〉i∈N) ↔ α ∈ F (〈Φ′i〉i∈N).
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This condition amounts to reserving the independent of irrelevant alternatives con-
dition in [Dokow and Holzman, 2010] to literals. The following condition is a
counterpart of the neutrality condition, which requires that an aggregation rule
should treat literals in an even-handed way.
Literal Neutrality (LN). For all α, β ∈ P and every profile 〈Φi〉i∈N ∈ Dom(F ),
if α ∈ Φi ↔ β ∈ Φi and ¬α ∈ Φi ↔ ¬β ∈ Φi for every i ∈ N , then
α ∈ F (〈Φi〉i∈N)↔ β ∈ F (〈Φi〉i∈N).
The last condition is the counterpart of Systematicity introduced in [List and
Pettit, 2002], which combines independency and neutrality.
Literal Systematicity (LS). For all α, β ∈ P and all profiles 〈Φi〉i∈N , 〈Φ′i〉i∈N
∈ Dom(F ), if for every i ∈ N , α ∈ Φi ↔ β ∈ Φ′i and ¬α ∈ Φi ↔ ¬β ∈ Φ′i,
then α ∈ F (〈Φi〉i∈N)↔ β ∈ F ((Φ′i)i∈N).
The reason why we reserve Independence, Neutrality and Systematicity to literals
is that the problem of the doctrinal paradox in Section 1 comes from the re-
quirement that the majority rule treats the compound formulas and propositional
variables independently. Indeed the principle of compositionality, a fundamental
presupposition of the semantics in most contemporary logics, denotes that the
propositional variables are more primary than the compound formulas, since the
truth of the later is determined by the truth of the former. For instance, in the
doctrinal paradox, the truth of the conjunctive formula p ∧ q is determined by its
constituents p and q. In this sense, we may say the judgments on p and q are the
reasons to accept p ∧ q or not, while the reason for whether p or q is accepted or
not is beyond the expressivity of propositional logic.
Therefore, we take a reason-based perspective and apply the aggregation rule only
to primary data whose reasons are beyond the expressivity power of the under-
lying logics, then use them to generate complex formulas within the underlying
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logic [Mongin, 2008, Nehring and Puppe, 2008]. Given abstentions, it is the literals
instead of propositional variables that are primary data. Without completeness,
we can not derive that p is rejected from that p is not accepted. It might be
possible that p is undetermined (neither accepted nor rejected). Therefore, we
reserve Independence, Neutrality and Systematicity to literals instead of proposi-
tional variables. On the one hand, this makes them more acceptable. For instance,
one criticizes Systematicity (the independent part) being used for p ∨ q, where p
denotes “The government can afford a budget deficit”, and q “Forbidding smoking
should be legalized” on the ground that there are two propositions involved, and
that the society should know how each individual feels about both propositions,
and not just about their disjunction. There is no similar objection arising when
Systematicity applies to either p or q [Mongin, 2008]. On the other hand, this
provides a plausible solution for the paradox shown in Section 1. Let us apply the
majority rule to literals and calculate p, q in the group judgment set, then use
them to generate p ∧ q in the group judgment set. Thereby, the group judgment
set is {p, q, r} which is logically consistent with the legal doctrine.
7.3 Aggregation Rule under Voters’ Hierarchy
In this section, we first propose a feasible rule for hierarchical groups based on
the lexicographic rule in [Andre´ka et al., 2002], then show that the rule satis-
fies the plausible conditions in Section 7.2.2.2 and has a tractable computational
complexity.
7.3.1 The Literal-based Lexicographic Rule
The priority over individuals is treated as a hierarchy among individuals. In the
real-world we can easily see such a hierarchy, for instance, the management struc-
ture of an enterprise, a democratic political regime or a community organisation.
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Members in different ranks may play different roles in decision-making.
Definition 7.1. A hierarchy over set N of individuals is a strict partial order
< ⊆ N ×N , i.e., it is transitive and asymmetric.
Since N is finite, so there must be no infinite ascending sequence i1 < i2 < i3 < · · · ,
where in ∈ N . In this sense, we call (N,<) is well-prioritized. This means all
hierarchical chains of N must be “up-bounded” with at least one top leader.
An aggregation rule determines which propositions are collectively accepted and
which ones are collectively rejected. Recall that X0 = X ∩ P is the set of literals
in the agenda. We first define an aggregate procedure F for that a literal α ∈ X0
is collectively accepted, denoted by α ∈ F (〈Φi〉i∈N), as follows:
Definition 7.2. For every α ∈ X0,
α ∈ F (〈Φi〉i∈N) iff ∀i ∈ N(¬α /∈ Φi∨∃j ∈ N(i < j∧α ∈ Φj)) and ∃k ∈ N.α ∈ Φk.
(7.1)
Intuitively, this aggregate procedure says that a literal α is accepted by a group if
the following two conditions are both satisfied. (i) for any individual if she rejects
α, then there is an individual with higher hierarchy accepting α, and (ii) At least
one individual accepts α. The set of collectively accepted literals is denoted by
F (〈Φi〉i∈N)0. Based on this concept, we next define that any formula in the agenda
is collectively accepted as follows:
Definition 7.3. For any ϕ ∈ X,
ϕ ∈ F (〈Φi〉i∈N) iff F (〈Φi〉i∈N)0 |= ϕ. (7.2)
This definition says that a proposition ϕ in the agenda X is collectively accepted
if it is a logical consequence of the collectively accepted literals.
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Similarly, a proposition ϕ ∈ X is collectively undetermined if neither itself nor its
negation is collectively accepted. That is,
ϕ#F (〈Φi〉i∈N) iff ϕ /∈ F (〈Φi〉i∈N) and ¬ϕ /∈ F (〈Φi〉i∈N). (7.3)
We call above judgment aggregation rule F the literal-based lexicographic (judg-
ment aggregation) rule, since we just apply the lexicographic rule to the subset of
literals in the agenda.
To demonstrate how this aggregation rule works, let us consider the following
example obtained by a slight change of Example 7.1.
Example 7.2. Suppose Ann, Bill and Tom have to make group judgments the
same three logically connected propositions p, q and p → q. Their individual
judgments are shown in Figure 7.4, and the hierarchy among them is illustrated in
Figure 7.1. Note that individuals with the highest priority are written at the top
of the diagram.
p q p→q
Ann + # #
Bill # − #
Tom # + +
Table 7.4: Individual judgments
in Example 7.2.
Bill
Ann Tom
Figure 7.1: The hierarchy of Ex-
ample 7.2.
We now use the literal-based lexicographic rule to generate the collective judgment
set. The model of this aggregation situation is given as follows:
• N = {Ann,Bill, Tom} with Ann< Bill and Tom< Bill;
• X = {p, q, p→ q,¬p,¬q,¬(p→ q)} and X0 = {p, q,¬p,¬q}.
Let us first calculate the group judgments on the set X0 of literals according to
Definition 7.2.
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• The group accepts p, since none of them rejects p, i.e., ∀i ∈ N(¬p /∈ Φi)
holds, and Ann accepts p, i.e., ∃j ∈ N(p ∈ Φj) holds.
• The group rejects q since Bill with the highest priority rejects q.
Then the group accepts p and rejects q, i.e., F (〈Φi〉i∈N)0 = {p,¬q}. And by
Definition 7.3, the group rejects (p → q), since {p,¬q} |= ¬(p → q). Thus, the
group judgment set is {p,¬q,¬(p→ q)}.
It should be noted that according to the literal-based lexicographic rule, the col-
lective result for Example 7.1 is {p,¬q,¬(p→ q)}, which is consistent. Moreover,
this rule also provides a solution to the discursive dilemma in the Background.
We may take all the possible hierarchy among the three agents into consideration.
One boss case: let 1 < 2 < 3 be the hierarchy, then according to this rule the ag-
gregate result is just the first individual’s judgement set {p, q, r}. The consistence
is obtained at the cost that the first agent seems to be the dictator for this profile.
Two-boss case: let the hierarchy be 3 < 1 and 3 < 2, then they collectively accept
p and abstain from voting on q and r, i.e., {p}. Three-boss (no boss or anonymity)
case: p, q and r are all collectively undetermined.
7.3.2 A Possibility Result
We next show that the literal-based lexicographic rule F is a feasible aggregation
rule to generate group judgments, as it satisfies the plausible conditions in Section
7.2.2.2.
Theorem 7.5. The literal-based lexicographic rule F generates consistent and
deductively closed collective judgment sets, and satisfies conditions UD, LU and
LS.
Proof. Regarding consistence, it suffices to show that for any α ∈ P , α ∈ F (〈Φi〉i∈N)0
implies ¬α 6∈ F (〈Φi〉i∈N)0. Suppose for a contradiction that for some β ∈ P , β ∈
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F (〈Φi〉i∈N)0 and ¬β ∈ F (〈Φi〉i∈N)0, then (i) ∀i∈N(¬β /∈ Φi∨∃j∈N(i < j∧β ∈ Φj))
and ∃k∈N(β ∈ Φk); (ii) ∀i∈N(β /∈ Φi∨∃j∈N(i < j∧¬β ∈ Φj)) and ∃k∈N (¬β ∈ Φk).
By (i), (ii) we can get an infinite ascending sequence i1, i2, i3, · · · , which is a con-
tradiction with that (N,<) is well-prioritized. Then F (〈Φi〉i∈N)0 is consistent, so
by Definition 7.3, F (〈Φi〉i∈N) is consistent as well.
Regarding deductive closure, for any ϕ ∈ X assume F (〈Φi〉i∈N) |= ϕ, then ϕ is
either a literal or a compound formula. If ϕ is a literal, then ϕ ∈ F (〈Φi〉i∈N)0, so
ϕ ∈ F (〈Φi〉i∈N). If ϕ is a compound formula, it is straightforward by Definition
7.3. And it is easy to see that F satisfies condition UD.
Regarding LU, assume for every α ∈ P , if there is some V ⊆ N such that V 6= ∅,
∀i∈V (α ∈ Φi) and ∀j∈N\V (α#Φj), then by Definition 7.2, α ∈ F (〈Φi〉i∈N).
Regarding LS, given every α ∈ P , the individuals accepting α and these rejecting
α are the same for every two profiles 〈Φi〉i∈N , 〈Φ′i〉i∈N , then the aggregate results
of α according to Definition 7.2 are the same as well. Yet it is not the case for
LSs. Consider a counter-example: Let N = {1, 2, 3} with 1 < 2, 1 < 3. For
the profile 〈Φi〉i∈N where α ∈ Φ1, α#Φ2 and α#Φ3, we have α ∈ F 〈Φi〉i∈N by
LU. Let individuals 2 and 3 who abstain from voting on it turn to rejecting α,
while individual 1 still accepts α, we get a different profile 〈Φ′i〉i∈N , where α ∈ Φ′1,
¬α ∈ Φ′2 and ¬α ∈ Φ′3, then α ∈ F 〈Φ′i〉i∈N by LSs, but according to the rule,
α /∈ F 〈Φ′i〉i∈N .
It follows directly that the impossibility result of Theorem 7.3 is avoided.
Corollary 7.6. There exists an aggregation rule that generates consistent collec-
tive judgment sets and satisfies conditions UD, LU and LS.
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7.3.3 Computational Complexity
Let us now investigate the computational complexity of winner determination for
the literal-based lexicographic rule [Endriss et al., 2012], i.e., how hard is it for
this rule to compute the result of a given profile of individual judgement sets.
Formally, the decision problem of winner determination is formulated as follows:
for a given formula ϕ ∈ X and a given profile 〈Φi〉i∈N , determine whether or not
ϕ ∈ F (〈Φi〉i∈N).
Proposition 7.7. The winner determination for the literal-based lexicographic
rule is in PTIME.
Proof. On the one hand, we use Algorithm 7.3.1 to compute the set of collective
judgments for literals. It is not difficult to check that Algorithm 7.3.1 can be
implemented in time O(m × n2), where m is the cardinality of X0 and n is the
number of agents. On the other hand, deciding whether a given proposition is
accepted by The group amounts to a model-checking problem, which is proved
to be in ALOGTIME [Buss, 1987]. Note that ALOGTIME is a complexity class
which is subsumed by PTIME. Combining it with the previous result, we then
obtain the desired bound.
Algorithm 7.3.1: Determining Collective Judgments for Literals
Input : A set of literals X0 and a profile 〈Φi〉i∈N
Output: A set of literals Y
1 Y ← ∅;
2 for α ∈ X0 do
3 if for all i ∈ N , ¬α 6∈ Φi or there is j ∈ N with i < j such that α ∈ Φj, and
there is k ∈ N such that α ∈ Φk then
4 Y ← Y ∪ {α}
5 end
6 end
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7.4 Multiple-Level Collective Decision-Making
In this section we first show that the literal-based lexicographic rule is not oli-
garchic in the standard sense, and then demonstrate that with abstentions, oli-
garchic aggregation is not necessarily a single level determination, but can be a
multiple-level collective decision-making.
7.4.1 The Oligarchic Property
One may be surprised to find that as an ‘unfair’ aggregation rule, F is non-
dictatorial by Proposition 7.4. This indicates that with abstentions, non-dictatorship
is a very weak condition imposed on judgment aggregation rules. In fact, it has
been shown that by giving up completeness, oligarchies instead of dictatorships are
obtained [Dietrich and List, 2008a, Ga¨rdenfors, 2006]. We now investigate in this
setting whether this proposed rule is oligarchic. To this end, let us first provide
the definition of an oligarchic rule borrowed from [Dietrich and List, 2008a].
Definition 7.4. An aggregation rule G satisfying UD is a weak oligarchy if there is
a nonempty smallest subset M ⊆ N such that for every profile 〈Φi〉i∈N ∈ Dom(G),
⋂
i∈M
Φi ⊆ G(〈Φi〉i∈N).
And an oligarchic rule G is strict if for every profile 〈Φi〉i∈N ∈ Dom(G),
⋂
i∈M
Φi = G(〈Φi〉i∈N).
In the first (second) case, we call G to be weakly (strictly) oligarchic w.r.t. M .
Special cases of weakly oligarchic aggregation rules are unanimous (M = N)
and dictatorial (M = {i}) rules. More specifically, they are both weakly and
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strictly oligarchic. However, the literal-based lexicographic rule F is neither weakly
oligarchic nor strictly oligarchic. Here is a simple counter-example.
Example 7.3. Let N = {1, 2} with <= ∅, X = {p, q, p → q,¬p,¬q,¬(p → q)}
and X0 = {p, q,¬p,¬q}, Individual judgment set for each agent is given as follows:
Φ1 = {p, q, p → q} and Φ2 = {¬p,¬q, p → q}. Then Φ1 ∩ Φ2 = {p → q}, but
according to the literal-based aggregation rule F , we have that p#F (〈Φ1,Φ2〉),
q#F (〈Φ1,Φ2〉) and p→ q#F (〈Φ1,Φ2〉). Thus, Φ1 ∩ Φ2 6⊆ F (〈Φ1,Φ2〉).
It should be noted that this does not violates the results in [Dietrich and List,
2008a, Ga¨rdenfors, 2006], since their conditions imposed on aggregation rules are
more strengthened than ours: their unanimity and systemacity conditions hold
for all formulas, while we restrict them to literals. Therefore, instead of the whole
agenda, we need to consider the oligarchy notion with respect to the set of literals
in the agenda. This idea leads to a weaker concept of oligarchy as follows:
Definition 7.5. An aggregation rule G satisfying UD is weakly oligarchic w.r.t.
X0 if there is a nonempty smallest subset M ⊆ N such that for every profile
〈Φi〉i∈N ∈ Dom(G),
{ϕ ∈ X |
⋂
i∈M
Φi ∩X0 |= ϕ} ⊆ G(〈Φi〉i∈N).
And an oligarchic rule G is strict w.r.t. X0 if for every profile 〈Φi〉i∈N ∈ Dom(G),
{ϕ ∈ X |
⋂
i∈M
Φi ∩X0 |= ϕ} = G(〈Φi〉i∈N).
This definition says that an aggregation rule satisfying universal domain is said
to be weakly oligarchic w.r.t. X0, if there is a nonempty smallest set M such
that for any profile of individual judgment sets, the group judgment set contains
all the consequences of literals that are in every member’s judgment set of M .
Similarly, an aggregation rule is strictly oligarchic with respect to X0, if for any
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profile of individual judgment sets, the group judgment set is exactly the set of
consequences of the literals that are in every member’s judgment set of M . With
this notion, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 7.8. The literal-based lexicographic rule F is weakly oligarchic w.r.t.
X0, but not strictly oligarchic w.r.t. X0.
Proof. Let O = Max≥(N) = {i ∈ N : @j ∈ N.i < j}. Since (N,<) is well-
prioritized and |N | ≥ 2, so O must exist and cannot be empty. Suppose for every
profile of individual judgment sets 〈Φi〉i∈N , every i ∈ N and for all α ∈ X0, α ∈⋂
i∈O Φi, then according to Definition 7.2, α ∈ F (〈Φi〉i∈N). Thus,
⋂
i∈O Φi ∩X0 ⊆
F (〈Φi〉i∈N)0. Since
⋂
i∈O Φi∩X0 |= ϕ, so F (〈Φi〉i∈N)0 |= ϕ. And by Definition 7.3,
so ϕ ∈ F (〈Φi〉i∈N).
We next show O is the smallest one with {ϕ ∈ X | ⋂i∈O Φi ∩ X0 |= ϕ} ⊆
F (〈Φi〉i∈N). Suppose not, then there is some A ⊆ N such that A ⊂ O and
{ϕ ∈ X | ⋂i∈A Φi∩X0 |= ϕ} ⊆ F (〈Φi〉i∈N), so there is some a ∈ N such that a ∈ O
but a /∈ A. Take some β ∈ X0, and define β ∈ Φi for every i ∈ N\{a} and ¬β ∈ Φa.
Then by Definition 7.2, β /∈ F (〈Φi〉i∈N), but β ∈ {ϕ ∈ X |
⋂
i∈A Φi ∩ X0 |= ϕ},
contradicting with assumption. Thus, F is weakly oligarchic w.r.t. X0.
Take α ∈ X0, and define α#Φa for some a ∈M and α ∈ Φx for every x ∈ N\{a}.
By literal unanimity with abstentions, α ∈ F (〈Φi〉i∈N), but α 6∈
⋂
i∈M Φi ∩ X0.
Thus, F is not strictly oligarchic w.r.t. X0.
7.4.2 Multi-Level Collective Decision-Making
We next show that with abstentions oligarchic aggregation is not necessarily a
single level determination, but can be a multiple-level collective decision making.
Before presenting the formal result, we need the following notion. We say that
a set of agents D is decisive for a judgment aggregation function G if for every
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profile 〈Φi〉i∈N ∈ Dom(G),
⋂
j∈D Φj ⊆ G(〈Φi〉i∈N). Note that a weakly (strictly)
oligarchic set is a decisive set, but not the converse, since a decisive set may not
be the smallest. We further restrict a decisive set to a specific literal α ∈ X0 as
follows:
Definition 7.6. A set of agentsD is decisive on α ∈ X0 for a judgment aggregation
rule G iff for every profile 〈Φi〉i∈N ∈ Dom(G), if α ∈ Φj for every j ∈ D, then
α ∈ G(〈Φi〉i∈N).
It follows that the set Max≥(N) = {i ∈ N : @j ∈ N. i < j} is decisive for G, yet
the decisive set for G is not unique, such as N . Next we partition the hierarchical
group N by classifying individuals with the same level into one subgroup from top
to bottom according to < .
Definition 7.7. Let < be a hierarchy on N . Then induced by <, N can be
partitioned into subgroups M1, · · · ,Mn, where ∅ 6= Mi ⊆ N for every i ∈ N ,⋃n
i=1Mi = N and Mi is inductively defined as follows:
• M1 = {i ∈ N : @j ∈ N. i < j}
• Mk+1 = {i ∈ N\(
⋃k
i=1Mi) : @j ∈ N\(
⋃k
i=1Mi). i < j}
It is clear that for every l, k ∈ {1, · · · , n}, if l 6= k, then Ml∩Mk = ∅. Thus we can
say that this is a partition of N in terms of the hierarchical levels. If the group N
can be partitioned into n subgroups by above definition, we say the height of the
hierarchical group N is n, denoted by h(N) = n. For every i ∈ N , if i ∈ Mk, we
say the rank of individual i is k. For example, if a ∈ M1, then a is at the level 1,
i.e., at the top of the hierarchy.
The following result displays that none of the superiors rejecting a literal is suffi-
cient and necessary to make the subgroup composed of the immediate inferiors a
decisive set on this literal.
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Proposition 7.9. Given a hierarchy among N with h(N) = n, let M1, · · · ,Mn be
the subgroups of each level. Then for every k ∈ {0, · · · , n− 1} and α ∈ X0, Mk+1
is decisive on α for the literal-based lexicographic rule F if, and only if ¬α /∈ Φi
for every i ∈ ⋃kh=0 Mh (M0 = ∅).
Proof. It suffices to prove this result by induction on k. Then
• For k = 0, it is trivial as M1 = {i ∈ N : @j ∈ N.i < j} is decisive on α for
F and
⋃
M0 = ∅.
• For k = l+ 1, where 0 ≤ l ≤ n− 1, suppose ¬α /∈ Φi for every i ∈
⋃l+1
h=0Mh,
and given arbitrary profile 〈Φi〉i∈N ∈ Dom(F ), α ∈ Φj for every j ∈ Ml+2,
we need to show α ∈ F (〈Φi〉i∈N). Further assume ¬α ∈ Φm for every m ∈ N ,
then m /∈ ⋃l+2h=0Mh, according to the definition of subgroups, there must be
some superior j for m in Ml+2 with α ∈ Φj, thus by the definition of F ,
α ∈ F (〈Φi〉i∈N).
Conversely, suppose Ml+2 is decisive on α for F , but there is some a ∈⋃l+1
h=0Mh such that ¬α ∈ Φa. Define a profile 〈Φi〉i∈N such that ¬α ∈ Φa,
α ∈ Φj for every j ∈ Ml+2 and α#Φl for every l ∈ N\Ml+2\{a}. Then
α /∈ F (〈Φi〉i∈N). But from assumption that Ml+2 is decisive on α for F , and
α ∈ Φj for every j ∈Ml+2, we have α ∈ F (〈Φi〉i∈N): a contradiction.
Thus, the result holds.
7.5 Discussion and Summary
A growing body of literature on judgement aggregation has emerged in recent
years. For an overview of the related research, see [Endriss, 2016, Grossi and
Pigozzi, 2014, List, 2012, List and Polak, 2010, List and Puppe, 2009]. In the
following, we will review the literature which is most related to our work.
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Pioneering work to study expert rights or liberal rights in the context of judgment
aggregation is [Dietrich and List, 2008b]. It identifies a liberal paradox for judg-
ment aggregation and explores special conditions to avoid the paradox. Similarly,
as a by-product, we obtain an impossibility result: the ignoring of abstentions in
decision making may lead to inconsistent collective judgments. It is worth noting
that there is no direct relation between the two impossibility results, as we use
a hierarchical approach to treat priority over individuals without involving the
concept of individual rights in [Dietrich and List, 2008b]. Although the individual
with the highest hierarchy (if unique) has the individual rights over the whole
agenda, there is no guarantee that two individuals have the rights to decide (at
least) one proposition in the agenda. This is why the proposed rule avoids the
liberal impossibility.
The idea to employ the lexicographic method for dealing with judgment aggre-
gation under individuals’ hierarchy is inspired by [Andre´ka et al., 2002] where a
generalization of the lexicographic rule for combining ordering relations is theo-
retically studied. In particularly, it applies the lexicographic rule to preference
aggregation in social choice and shows that the lexicographic rule is the only way
of combining preference relations which satisfies a set of plausible conditions. Dif-
ferent from their motivation, we investigate the collective decision making under
a hierarchical environment by proposing a specific procedure based on voters’ hi-
erarchy. This may be regarded as an attempt to apply the lexicographic rule for
judgment aggregation, which expands the application domain of this rule. We
also investigate the computational complexity of this rule which is not involved
in [Andre´ka et al., 2002].
To some extent, the proposed rule may be regarded as a special case of the premiss-
based rule [Dietrich and Mongin, 2010, List, 2012]. Dietrich and Mongin [2010]
provide a premiss-based approach to judgment aggregation. Their definition of
premisses is more general. As a special case, we take the set of literals as the
premiss due to the principle of compositionality. Different from our motivation
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and approaches, they mainly studied necessary and sufficient conditions under
which the combination of the premiss-based rule and the conclusion-based rule
leads to dictatorship or oligarchy.
In summary, this chapter has provided a hierarchical approach to deal with the
priority over individuals and proposed an aggregation rule for judgment aggrega-
tion under agents’ hierarchy. Meanwhile, we have identified an impossibility result
in this setting and explored a set of plausible conditions for aggregation rules in
terms of abstentions. We have also shown that the proposed rule satisfies the
plausible conditions and has a tractable computational complexity.
Directions of future research are manifold. Firstly, as a special kind of lexico-
graphic rule, it is interesting to investigate a representation result for the proposed
rule. The lexicographic rule has been extensively studies in preference aggregation,
and [Andre´ka et al., 2002] has proved that lexicographic rule is the only way of
combining preference relations satisfying some natural conditions which are very
close to Arrow’s conditions. We expect to obtain a similar characterization re-
sult. Secondly, under the provision of abstentions, we have investigated a set
of commonly desirable conditions. It is natural to investigate some possibility
results with respect to these conditions. In addition, with abstentions, the dic-
tatorship in judgment aggregation can also vary in degrees [Rossi et al., 2005]. It
is highly interesting to investigate the possibility scope between rationality, dic-
tatorship under a set of plausible conditions. Some work has been done in this
direction [Dietrich and List, 2013a].
Chapter 8
Conclusion and Future Work
In this final chapter, I summarize what has been done and discuss what could be
done in the future.
8.1 Conclusion
This thesis has proposed a set of logics for modelling strategic reasoning and
collective decision-making. Specifically, I have done the following work:
1. GDL-Based Strategic Reasoning
(a) A logical formalism, called GDR, has been proposed to represent and
reason about games strategies. GDR, though looks simple, gains the
expressive power from GDL and ATL so that it can be used for describ-
ing game rules and game strategies as well as for strategic reasoning.
To the best of our knowledge, there is no other logical system that can
have the same expressive power with a comparable complexity.
(b) An epistemic extension of GDL, called EGDL, has been proposed to
represent and reason about imperfect information games. EGDL can be
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used to represent the rules of an imperfect information game, formalize
its epistemic properties, and reason about player’s epistemic status.
Most importantly, the model-checking problem of EGDL is in ∆p2, which
is the lowest among the existing similar frameworks.
(c) I have further investigated the interplay between knowledge shared by
a group of agents and its coalitional abilities by modelling knowledge
sharing in ATL, a typical logic for reasoning about coalitional abilities.
The relation has been captured through the interplay of epistemic and
coalition modalities. Moreover, this semantics is sufficient to preserve
the desirable properties of coalitional abilities.
2. Beyond Games: Collective Decision Making
(a) I have generalized the approach to combine actions via the priority to
social choice theory. A modal logic, called RCL, has been proposed
by extending propositional logic with the prioritized connective. Not
only individual preferences but also aggregation rules can be built into
this logic. Thus, individual and collective choices can be automatically
generated by a model checking algorithm for RCL.
(b) I have further provided a logical model for judgment aggregation under
voters’ hierarchy and designed an aggregation rule based on priorities of
individuals so as to investigate how individual judgement affects group
judgment in a hierarchical environment. It has been proved that the
proposed rule satisfies a set of plausible conditions and has a tractable
computational complexity.
Let us stress that, a bottom-up approach was taken to establish the logical for-
malisms for strategic reasoning in perfect information or imperfect information
games: starting with a simple and practical language GDL, and then cautiously
extending it so as to retain its practicality. The complexity analysis of these logics
Chapter 8. Conclusion and Future Work 185
indicates that these frameworks make a good balance between expressive power
and computational efficiency.
8.2 Future Work
This thesis has taken logic-based approaches to analyze strategic reasoning and
collective decision-making. During this process, many new questions arose, some
of which have been mentioned in the relevant chapters. I now give four possible
directions for future work.
1. The approach to combine actions via the prioritized connectives may be used
in the development of general game players. Since the underlying language
GDL is the native language for general game playing, with further extension
of prioritized strategy connectives, an agent would be able to combine simple
actions into more complicated actions. For instance, the simple minmax
with alpha-beta heuristics can easily generate the following strategies for
mk-games: (1). Fill the center; (2). Fill it if I can win; (3). Fill it if the
opponent can win by filling it; (4). Fill one next to mine. Combining them
with the prioritized connectives can lead to winning/no-losing strategies for
simple mk-games and reasonably good strategies for complicated mk-games.
In general, if we do not target winning strategies, automatically discovering
strategies with certain desirable properties is possible. In this respect, model-
checking is useful for verifying properties of a strategy.
2. In Chapter 4, besides imperfect recall, we have demonstrated that the pro-
posed framework EGDL is flexible enough to specify other memory types,
such as state-based memory, action-based memory and perfect recall. To
obtain a complete picture of the relation between perfect or imperfect in-
formation, and perfect or imperfect recall, we need to study properties of
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knowledge with respect to these memory types and investigate the compu-
tational complexity in terms of these semantics for knowledge. Moreover,
it has been shown that in ATL imperfect information and imperfect recall
seems a reasonable compromise, with realistic modelling powers and decid-
able problems [Schobbens, 2004]. We expect a similar result in EGDL.
3. As in Decision Theory [Peterson, 2009], to make a rational choice in a game
is to select the “best” action in light of one’s beliefs or information. Thus,
to capture epistemic notions in a game situation, besides the knowledge
discussed in Chapter 4, we need to enrich the epistemic state transition
model with more ingredients such as belief, preference, trust, and further
investigate the dynamics of information so as to study the update of players’
epistemic attitudes during game play [Liu, 2008, van Benthem et al., 2011,
van Ditmarsch et al., 2007]. Some work has been done in this direction.
Lorini et al. [2009, 2010] propose some variants of a multi-modal of joint
action, preference and knowledge that support reasoning about epistemic
games in strategic form. We believe that this thesis provides a good starting
point for doing so.
4. The more specific logical properties of GDR and EGDL are worth investi-
gating. Specifically, we want to investigate the satisfiability problem and the
axiomatization of GDR and EGDL based on current literature [Goranko and
van Drimmelen, 2006, Halpern et al., 2004, Zhang and Thielscher, 2015a].
We also want to compare them with similar existing frameworks such as ATL,
ATEL. In particular, Ruan et al. build two one-way bridges: one is from
GDL to ATL and the other is from GDL-II to ATEL [Ruan and Thielscher,
2012, Ruan et al., 2009]. We expect two similar bridges from GDR to ATL,
and from EGDL to ATEL. Moreover, with reasoning facilities, we might
explore the converse direction.
Appendix A
Published Work
The following is a list of the published papers during my PhD study.
• Guifei Jiang, Dongmo Zhang, Laurent Perrussel: GDL Meets ATL: A Logic
for Game Description and Strategic Reasoning. In Proceedings of the 13th
Pacific Rim International Conference on Artificial Intelligence (PRICAI-
2014), 733-746, Springer, 2014. The results of this paper are included in
Chapter 2 and Chapter 3.
• Guifei Jiang, Dongmo Zhang, Laurent Perrussel, Heng Zhang: Epistemic
GDL: A logic for representing and reasoning about imperfect information
games. Proceedings of the 25th International Joint Conference on Artificial
Intelligence (IJCAI-2016), 1138-1144, IJCAI/AAAI press, 2016. The main
results of this paper are presented in Chapter 4.
• Guifei Jiang, Dongmo Zhang, Laurent Perrussel: Knowledge Sharing in
Coalitions. In Proceedings of the 28th Australasian Joint Conference on
Artificial Intelligence (AI-2015), 249-262, Springer, 2015. The results in this
paper are presented in Chapter 5.
• Guifei Jiang, Dongmo Zhang, Laurent Perrussel, Heng Zhang: A Logic
for Collective Choice. In Proceedings of the 2015 International Conference
on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS-2015), 979-987,
ACM, 2015. The results in this paper are presented in Chapter 6.
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• Guifei Jiang, Dongmo Zhang, Laurent Perrussel: Judgment Aggregation
with Abstentions under Voters’ Hierarchy. In Proceedings of the 17th In-
ternational Conference on Principles and Practice of Multi-Agent Systems
(PRIMA-2014), 341-356, Springer, 2014. The results in this paper are con-
tained in Chapter 7.
• Guifei Jiang, Dongmo Zhang, Xiaojia Tang: Judgment Aggregation with Ab-
stentions: A Hierarchical Approach. In Proceedings of the 4th International
Conference on Logic, Rationality, and Interaction (LORI-2013), 321-325,
Springer, 2013. The results in this paper are contained in Chapter 7.
• Emiliano Lorini, Guifei Jiang, Laurent Perrussel: Trust-based Belief Change.
In Proceedings of the 21th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence
(ECAI-2014), 549-554, IOS Press, 2014. This work is not discussed in the
dissertation due to the consideration of length and coherence of the disserta-
tion.
In addition,
• Guifei Jiang, Dongmo Zhang, Laurent Perrussel: A Hierarchical Approach
for Judgment Aggregation with Abstentions. To appear in the Journal of
Computational Intelligence, 2016.
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